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Stochastic Models of Limit Order Markets
Arseniy Kukanov
During the last two decades most stock and derivatives exchanges in the world transi-
tioned to electronic trading in limit order books, creating a need for a new set of quantitative
models to describe these order-driven markets. This dissertation offers a collection of mod-
els that provide insight into the structure of modern financial markets, and can help to
optimize trading decisions in practical applications.
In the first part of the thesis we study the dynamics of prices, order flows and liquidity
in limit order markets over short timescales. We propose a stylized order book model
that predicts a particularly simple linear relation between price changes and order flow
imbalance, defined as a difference between net changes in supply and demand. The slope
in this linear relation, called a price impact coefficient, is inversely proportional in our
model to market depth - a measure of liquidity. Our empirical results confirm both of these
predictions. The linear relation between order flow imbalance and price changes holds for
time intervals between 50 milliseconds and 5 minutes. The inverse relation between the
price impact coefficient and market depth holds on longer timescales. These findings shed
a new light on intraday variations in market volatility. According to our model volatility
fluctuates due to changes in market depth or in order flow variance. Previous studies also
found a positive correlation between volatility and trading volume, but in order-driven
markets prices are determined by the limit order book activity, so the association between
trading volume and volatility is unclear. We show how a spurious correlation between these
variables can indeed emerge in our linear model due to time aggregation of high-frequency
data. Finally, we observe short-term positive autocorrelation in order flow imbalance and
discuss an application of this variable as a measure of adverse selection in limit order
executions. Our results suggest that monitoring recent order flow can improve the quality
of order executions in practice.
In the second part of the thesis we study the problem of optimal order placement in a
fragmented limit order market. To execute a trade, market participants can submit limit
orders or market orders across various exchanges where a stock is traded. In practice these
decisions are influenced by sizes of order queues and by statistical properties of order flows
in each limit order book, and also by rebates that exchanges pay for limit order submissions.
We present a realistic model of limit order executions and formalize the search for an optimal
order placement policy as a convex optimization problem. Based on this formulation we
study how various factors determine investor’s order placement decisions. In a case when
a single exchange is used for order execution, we derive an explicit formula for the optimal
limit and market order quantities. Our solution shows that the optimal split between market
and limit orders largely depends on one’s tolerance to execution risk. Market orders help
to alleviate this risk because they execute with certainty. Correspondingly, we find that
an optimal order allocation shifts to these more expensive orders when the execution risk
is of primary concern, for example when the intended trade quantity is large or when it is
costly to catch up on the quantity after limit order execution fails. We also characterize the
optimal solution in the general case of simultaneous order placement on multiple exchanges,
and show that it sets execution shortfall probabilities to specific threshold values computed
with model parameters. Finally, we propose a non-parametric stochastic algorithm that
computes an optimal solution by resampling historical data and does not require specifying
order flow distributions. A numerical implementation of this algorithm is used to study the
sensitivity of an optimal solution to changes in model parameters. Our numerical results
show that order placement optimization can bring a substantial reduction in trading costs,
especially for small orders and in cases when order flows are relatively uncorrelated across
trading venues. The order placement optimization framework developed in this thesis can
also be used to quantify the costs and benefits of financial market fragmentation from the
point of view of an individual investor. For instance, we find that a positive correlation
between order flows, which is empirically observed in a fragmented U.S. equity market,
increases the costs of trading. As the correlation increases it may become more expensive
to trade in a fragmented market than it is in a consolidated market.
In the third part of the thesis we analyze the dynamics of limit order queues at the best
bid or ask of an exchange. These queues consist of orders submitted by a variety of market
participants, yet existing order book models commonly assume that all orders have similar
dynamics. In practice, some orders are submitted by trade execution algorithms in an at-
tempt to buy or sell a certain quantity of assets under time constraints, and these orders
are canceled if their realized waiting time exceeds a patience threshold. In contrast, high-
frequency traders submit and cancel orders depending on the order book state and their
orders are not driven by patience. The interaction between these two order types within
a single FIFO queue leads bursts of order cancelations for small queues and anomalously
long waiting times in large queues. We analyze a fluid model that describes the evolution
of large order queues in liquid markets, taking into account the heterogeneity between or-
der submission and cancelation strategies of different traders. Our results show that after
a finite initial time interval, the queue reaches a specific structure where all orders from
high-frequency traders stay in the queue until execution but most orders from execution
algorithms exceed their patience thresholds and are canceled. This “order crowding” effect
has been previously noted by participants in highly liquid stock and futures markets and
was attributed to a large participation of high-frequency traders. In our model, their pres-
ence creates an additional workload, which increases queue waiting times for new orders.
Our analysis of the fluid model leads to waiting time estimates that take into account the
distribution of order types in a queue. These estimates are tested against a large dataset
of realized limit order waiting times collected by a U.S. equity brokerage firm. The queue
composition at a moment of order submission noticeably affects its waiting time and we
find that assuming a single order type for all orders in the queue leads to unrealistic results.
Estimates that assume instead a mix of heterogeneous orders in the queue are closer to
empirical data. Our model for a limit order queue with heterogeneous order types also
appears to be interesting from a methodological point of view. It introduces a new type of
behavior in a queueing system where one class of jobs has state-dependent dynamics, while
others are driven by patience. Although this model is motivated by the analysis of limit
order books, it may find applications in studying other service systems with state-dependent
abandonments.
Keywords: limit order markets, price impact, market liquidity, price formation, volatil-
ity modeling, high-frequency financial data, queueing models, fluid approximation, high-
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Shareholder: I really must say that you are an ignorant person, friend Greybeard,
if you know nothing of this enigmatic business [of a stock exchange] which is at
once the fairest and the most deceitful in Europe, the noblest and the most infa-
mous in the world, the finest and the most vulgar on earth. It is a quintessence
of academic learning and a paragon of fraudulence; it is a touchstone for the
intelligent and a tombstone for the audacious, a treasury of usefulness and a
source of disaster, and finally a counterpart of Sisyphus who never rests as also
of Ixion who is chained to a wheel that turns perpetually.
Philosopher: Does my curiosity not deserve a short description from you on this
deceit and a succinct explanation of this riddle?
Joseph de la Vega, Confusion de confusiones, 1688
1.1 The Brave New Market
The main role of financial markets is to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers
and thus to provide liquidity. Markets are also the main vehicle of price formation - a
process by which prices for commodities, securities and other assets are determined and all
relevant information and risks are taken into account. Both liquidity and price formation
are outcomes of a dynamic interaction between multiple counterparties who actively trade
and provide quotes and other indications of trading interest to the rest of the market.
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Market microstructure research is a detailed analysis of how interactions between mar-
ket participants give rise to liquidity and price formation. The goal of this analysis is to
formulate quantitative models of the trading process and to improve this process, leading
to a reduction in transaction costs and ultimately to a more efficient allocation of goods
and capital in the economy. For example, in 1994, an academic paper [24] established that
the bid-ask spreads (margins between the best prices for buying and selling securities) on
the NASDAQ stock exchange were anomalously wide, suggesting that dealers colluded to
purposefully widen these spreads. A subsequent investigation by the U.S. Department of
Justice confirmed this observation, leading to a major scandal and an introduction of new
trading rules. This new regulation lead to a rapid growth of electronic communication net-
works (ECNs) - alternative trading platforms that profoundly changed the landscape of the
U.S. equity markets, increasing competition and reducing transaction costs.
Trading regulation and trading mechanisms have continuously evolved since the first
stock exchange opened in Amsterdam in 1602, but this evolution was never as fast as during
the last two decades - the era of electronic trading. Computer technology revolutionized
financial markets: trading moved from buzzing exchange pits to quiet data centers where
racks of co-located computer servers automatically process real-time market information and
execute orders. Similarly to other industries altered by technology, financial markets became
more cost-efficient as a result of this transformation. Various measures of transaction costs,
such as bid-ask spreads, effective spreads, brokerage commissions and order execution delays
dramatically improved over time (see [10; 23; 69]). As trading became more transparent
and its costs decreased, some previously uneconomical investment strategies became viable
and trading volumes skyrocketed.
The standardization and automatization of trading protocols made it possible to im-
plement many trading strategies as computer programs. Electronic trading now dominates
liquid financial markets. For example, in the U.S. the share of equity trading volume due
to electronic trading increased from 16% in 2000 to 82% in 2009 [71] and continues to grow.
Although the rules and costs of trading are the same for all traders, competitive forces have
led to a significant specialization among their strategies and algorithms. In particular, it is
common to distinguish between algorithmic trading in general and its subset high-frequency
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trading. Algorithmic trading is a general term, but most commonly it is used to refer to
trade execution strategies that are typically used by fund managers to buy or sell large
amounts of assets. They aim to minimize the cost of these transactions under certain risk
and timing constraints. These algorithms adjust how trading is done but typically do not
have discretion on whether to trade or not - this decision belongs to a portfolio manager.
In contrast, high-frequency trading algorithms have full discretion regarding their trading
positions. They opportunistically submit orders to buy and to sell, aiming to profit from
the market environment itself by capturing small price differences between their buy and
sell orders many times during a trading session.
The transition to electronic trading was a radical shift and it has seen its share of drama,
skepticism and controversy. As trading became predominantly electronic and exchange pits
closed, thousands of clerks, brokers and other trading specialists lost their jobs [87]. Since
then, repetitive periods of extreme volatility and incomprehensible stock price behavior have
plagued financial markets. These periods were associated with computer trading algorithms,
and their rather frequent occurrence undermines investors’ confidence in the current market
structure [43; 21]. One of the most well-known episodes of such market turbulence is the
Flash Crash of May 6, 2010. During a fifteen-minute interval of time between 2:30pm and
2:45pm, all major U.S. equity indices experienced a sudden 5-6% decline followed by an
almost complete recovery within the next 30 minutes. Some liquid stocks and exchange-
traded funds (ETFs) declined even further during that period, and thousands of trades
were executed at prices more than 60% away from their values just minutes prior. The
government investigation of that event [109] related it to a computer program executing an
exceptionally large order to sell. Empirical evidence presented in this government report
and in the subsequent studies [75; 93] shows that complex interactions between the program
executing the large sale and other trading programs exacerbated, if not caused, the crash.
Another infamous technological incident occurred with the trading systems of Knight
Capital Group on August 1, 2012. Knight Capital was one of the worldwide leaders in
automated market-making and a major advocate of electronic trading in general. Its market
volume share in U.S. equities alone was more than 16%. According to the company’s own
official statement “Knight experienced a technology issue at the open of trading at the NYSE
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... This issue was related to Knight’s installation of trading software and resulted in Knight
sending numerous erroneous orders in NYSE-listed securities into the market ... , which has
resulted in a realized pre-tax loss of approximately $440 million.”. According to company’s
financial statements, this loss is approximately equal to its cumulative net income over the
previous 4 years, or about 30% of its previous year book equity value. After just 30 minutes
of spurious trading this error brought to an end Knight’s 17 year-long history of success,
and the firm was subsequently merged with one of its rivals.
These events highlight the fragility of modern electronic markets and the high level of
their operational risks. Although a reduction in transaction costs due to automated elec-
tronic trading is an empirically established fact (see [60; 90]), the complexity, operational
risks and technological costs of maintaining the modern electronic market system are often
cited as arguments against it. The incidents cited above are extreme, dramatic consequences
of this complexity, but it also presents challenges for the analysis of everyday market behav-
ior. Some of the old questions in the market microstructure literature need to be revisited
again for this brave new market. How do changes in supply and demand translate into
changes in prices? What drives market volatility? How to quantify market liquidity and
what is the connection between liquidity and volatility? There is also a number of new
questions that emerged as markets became increasingly automated and fragmented. How
can market participants reduce their transaction costs in this challenging environment?
What is the effect of high-frequency trading strategies on market dynamics? What benefits
does market fragmentation bring to investors? Fortunately, electronic markets also generate
enormous amounts of data which help in answering these questions. The availability of data
coupled with the simple, transparent rules that underlie electronic trading create exciting
opportunities for research and innovation in market microstructure.
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1.2 Limit Order Books
Merchant: If it is not too great a trouble for our friend, I should like to hear also
about the place and the ways of the exchange transactions, how business is done,
for, although we know the origin, the innovators, and the confusions of the stock
exchange, we do not yet know anything about the kind of business dealings or
the site of the contest.
Joseph de la Vega, Confusion de confusiones, 1688
A major factor that contributed to the transformation of financial markets is the widespread
adoption of a unified trading protocol - a limit order book - by most exchanges around the
world [66; 112]. To trade in a limit order book at an exchange, participants submit limit
orders - electronic instructions to buy or to sell a certain asset, that specify a quantity to
be traded and the worst acceptable price (a limit price). Upon receiving a new order, a
matching engine at the exchange compares the order’s price and quantity with prices and
quantities of pre-existing orders. If an existing order can be matched with the new one
(according to their limit prices) they are are executed and a trade is reported. The new
order is called marketable or aggressive in this case because it initiated the trade and the
pre-existing order is called passive. If the new order’s limit price does not allow to execute it
right away (i.e. it is non-marketable) it joins other unmatched orders in the order book and
stays there until either a new aggressive order fills it or until it is canceled by the market
participant.
Order matching details vary across exchanges and can sometimes become very involved
[67], but in general matching priority is simply given to passive orders that have a better
price (e.g. buy orders with a higher price) and to orders that arrived earlier. With this
price-time matching priority structure, limit orders with identical prices form first-in first-
out (FIFO) queues across different price levels as they arrive to the exchange. The queue
of orders to buy (sell) at the highest (lowest) price is called the best bid (the best ask)
and only orders at the front of these two queues are matched with aggressive orders. Order
queues are depleted by aggressive orders and cancelations, and whenever the best bid or ask
queue is depleted, a queue at the next-best price becomes the new best bid or ask. Some
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Figure 1.1: An illustration of limit order book dynamics
exchanges provide additional order types, such as market orders, pegged orders, iceberg
orders, discretionary orders, etc., but most of them can be represented as simple limit order
trading strategies.
For markets organized as limit order books liquidity is often associated with passive
orders because they provide options to incoming traders to transact with them at their limit
prices. If liquidity is viewed as a good, then submission of passive orders is associated with
liquidity provision and submission of aggressive orders - with its consumption. In contrast
with dealer or specialist markets, limit order markets do not have designated agents whose
role is to provide liquidity or to set prices. Instead, liquidity is self-organized in the sense
that some market participants send passive limit orders based on their preferences and their
experience with the trading process. Similarly, prices are formed by passive orders resting
at the top of the book - near the best bid and ask prices.
The basic rules of limit order trading described above are quite simple, but limit order
trading strategies can be very complex. Depending on trader’s objectives he can submit limit
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orders to buy and/or to sell at different points in time with different prices and quantities
and moreover submit orders simultaneously to multiple order books (in a fragmented market
the same asset can be traded at multiple exchanges). These orders can be subsequently
canceled and modified at any time producing a high-dimensional action space of possible
strategies. In addition to this, strategies depend on past order submission outcomes and on
the actions of other traders. The high flexibility of strategies presents a significant challenge
for modeling limit order book markets in an economic equilibrium framework, but some
progress has been made in this direction (see [100] for a recent survey). Nevertheless, the
formal and well-defined decision environment of a limit order book (as compared to more
opaque dealer markets), combined with enormous amounts of data generated and recorded
daily by electronic financial markets present a good opportunity for rigorous mathematical
modeling of these systems. Their complexity can be overcome and meaningful results can
still be obtained from reduced-form models of limit order books using operations research
tools such as stochastic processes, statistics and optimization. Models of limit order books
have an immediate and important application in the financial markets industry, and also
motivate the development of new stochastic modeling techniquies and new statistical tools
that could be of interest to a broader academic community.
1.3 Literature Review
One of the major questions in market microstructure analysis is how trading activity leads
to price changes. The price impact of orders is a fundamental mechanism of price formation
because it translates changes in supply and demand into price movements. Early market
microstructure literature has described this concept in a setting of specialist markets. In
these markets prices are quoted by a centralized intermediary (a specialist) or a group of
competitive market-makers. The specialist receives orders from brokers and updates his
quotes as he interacts with their order flow. From a broker’s viewpoint, the impact of his
orders is a cost paid to a market-maker for his continuous availability to accept broker’s
orders [33], i.e. price impact can be seen as a transaction cost, specifically the cost of
immediacy. From a market-maker’s viewpoint, the picture is more complex. Some of the
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orders are submitted by brokers based on information about future asset payoffs, and a
fraction of this information is inferred from their order flow by the market maker. This
information becomes permanently impounded in the market-maker’s quotes [79] and the
permanent price impact reflects this learning process. Larger aggressive orders are more
frequently used by informed traders than smaller orders, implying larger potential losses for
a market-maker who trades against an informed counterparty [34]. Larger orders also create
more inventory risk for a market-maker because accepting these orders significantly exposes
him to random future price fluctuations. To recoup these utility losses, market-makers
quote worse prices for larger orders. The difference between a price that a specific order
obtains in the market and the best available quote for a small order is called the immediate
price impact and it is an increasing function of an order size. The temporary price impact
can be defined as a difference between the immediate and the permanent impact of an order
[73] and it represents a transient price concession required to accommodate a large order.
Although specialist markets have been largely replaced by electronic limit order books,
the same price impact terminology is commonly applied to both kinds of markets. However,
for limit order markets it is much more difficult to disentangle permanent and temporary
price impact because there are no centralized specialists, all traders can send aggressive
and passive orders, and all learn from each other’s actions. To describe price impact in a
theoretical economic model of a limit order market, one needs to detail trader utilities and
strategies, and then derive the dynamics of order flows and trader beliefs. Although this
is possible to do in some stylized models, they commonly involve unobservable parameters
and are rarely tractable (see [51; 100]), which prevents their estimation with real data and
limits their practical applicability. Describing the immediate price impact in a limit order
book appears, at first, to be a simpler goal because the impact of an aggressive order is
fully described by its mechanical effect on the order book state. However this approach is
also problematic because it requires a description of the high-dimensional state of an order
book. This state and its dynamics can be studied in a simulation framework (see e.g. [41])
but this approach is again infeasible for real-time applications.
Since theoretical market microstructure models give little practical guidance on how to
describe price impact in limit order markets, statistical models of price impact have gained
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significant popularity. An empirical approach is facilitated by the availability of detailed
data from limit order markets, and statistical price impact models are often motivated by
applications in algorithmic trading which typically rely on the data. Empirical studies of
price impact can be differentiated by the kind data that are used: proprietary data from
financial firms regarding their own orders, or public data from an exchange containing all
orders but not trader identities.
Proprietary datasets contain orders of a subset of firms (typically just one) but these
datasets have more detailed information on each order including intended trade sizes that
are also called parent orders or meta-orders in the literature. Using this information one can
aggregate smaller orders that were actually submitted to an exchange into intended trades,
which is not possible with public data that are lacking trader identifiers. With proprietary
order data, one can also directly model parent order transaction cost as a function of its size,
direction and other parameters. Most studies of proprietary data agree that the price impact
of a parent order is an increasing, concave function of its size, controlling for the average
stock trading volume, volatility and an execution time window [7; 115]. The monotonicity
and concavity of these price impact functions are confirmed by many studies, but their
estimation details vary and their reliance on proprietary data is prone to several general
criticisms. First of all, orders are executed over time and trader’s discretion to stop an
execution in unfavorable circumstances introduces a significant selection bias [96]. There is
also a large number of important factors that affect price impact but are difficult to control
in a proprietary dataset, such as details of specific algorithms and trading venues used to
execute a trade [20]. There are also significant variations in price impact across economies
and sectors and across stocks with different properties such as momentum or growth [16].
In summary, modeling the price impact of parent orders is an important practical task, but
implementation details make it difficult to draw general conclusions based on proprietary
data.
An alternative approach is to rely on anonimized public data from an exchange and to
estimate the price impact of all orders that were placed in a market by all traders. Until
recently, most studies focused exclusively on marketable orders and analyzed correlations
between sizes of these orders and subsequent price movements [39; 48; 54; 73; 74; 114; 102;
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103]. General conclusions are the same as for the impact of parent orders - the immediate
and temporary impact of a single marketable order are both increasing, concave functions
of an order size. Unfortunately these results do not at all describe a complete picture of
price formation. In most cases, marketable orders constitute about 10% of all orders [57]
at an exchange, so a model for their impact gives, at best, a very limited description of
market dynamics and price formation. Restricting analysis to marketable orders is also
unsatisfactory from a practical point of view because modern algorithmic trading strategies
often rely on passive limit orders to reduce trading costs [42]. More recent empirical studies
[61; 59; 35] consider the immediate impact of marketable orders, passive orders and order
cancelations together with the evolution of their impact through time. Descriptive statistical
models used in these studies illuminate rich interactions between order flows in a limit order
book and produce a highly complex picture of market dynamics on the level of individual
orders. Unfortunately these models also involve hundreds of free parameters which reduces
their usefulness for applications.
An important application of price impact models is the optimal trade execution problem
arising in algorithmic trading. Generally speaking it is a problem of finding a strategy to
buy or to sell a large quantity of assets at a low cost within a limited amount of time. The
trade quantity (a parent order) is typically much larger than the quantity of passive limit
orders available at the top of an order book at any time, so a trade is done with a sequence
of small child orders that are gradually submitted to an exchange. The problem of finding
a good trade execution strategy, i.e. a sequence of child order sizes and submission times is
important from both practical and regulatory points of view. In most developed markets
trading regulations require brokers to seek “best execution” for their customers1. Yet there
is no definition of best execution and, until recently, there was no quantitative methodology
to evaluate, compare and improve the quality of trade execution strategies.
Different formulations of the optimal trade execution problem vary in terms of their
assumptions on asset price dynamics, price impact and mechanisms by which trader’s orders
are filled in the market. An early treatment of the trade execution problem was given in
[15] where the authors used dynamic programming to minimize a mean execution cost
1see for example http://www.sec.gov/answers/bestex.htm
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objective. This formulation was later augmented in [6; 105] by adding a penalty for the
execution price risk carried by price fluctuations over the course of an execution. A trader’s
aversion to execution risk presses him to trade faster and use larger orders, which also bear
higher costs due to temporary price impact. Finding an optimal execution strategy that
balances execution risks and price impact costs is an interesting control problem, and it has
motivated a large number of theoretical studies.
Studies have noted that certain price impact assumptions make it possible to system-
atically earn positive returns on round-trip transactions, leading to ill-posed optimal trade
execution problems. For example, if price impact is a concave function of an order size
and is permanent, one can make systematic profits by selling two shares of a stock in a
sequence and then buying them back with one order. A rigorous study of quasi-arbitrage
trading strategies is performed in [63] with a conclusion that the permanent price impact
needs to be a linear function of an order size to avoid arbitrage. A later study [50] re-
lates the form of an immediate price impact function (which is possibly non-linear) to the
rate at which temporary impact decays through time, and establishes no-arbitrage restric-
tions on these functions for a number of popular price impact models. Later studies [4;
44] found additional restrictions on price impact models that must be imposed to prevent
price manipulation or erratic behavior of order execution strategies in a market model.
Practical applications of the optimal trade execution problem have motivated a large
number of extensions and alterations of its basic setup. On a macroscopic level, this prob-
lem is related to portfolio allocation decisions because trade execution strategies are ul-
timately used to turn over investors’ portfolios. On a microscopic level, each child order
generated by a trade execution strategy needs to be placed as a limit or a market order
in a limit order book, linking trade execution and order placement decisions. Although
it is possible to combine optimal trade execution with optimal portfolio construction [47;
99] or optimal option hedging [86] within a single problem formulation, such problems are
rarely analytically tractable, and their solutions require strong assumptions on price impact
and on the evolution of asset prices.
Similarly, it is possible to include some details of order placement decisions into an
optimal trade execution problem, but such extensions come at the cost of restrictive as-
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sumptions on trading strategies and on market dynamics. One approach, followed in [3; 97;
104], restricts a trader to use only marketable orders. The execution cost of a marketable
order is explicitly computed by integrating an idealized density function which represents
passive orders at the top of the book. After a marketable order is executed, this density
restores over time due to order book resiliency [81]. In these models the total cost of a
sequence of marketable orders depends on their initial impact and the speed of order book
recovery, creating a tradeoff between execution cost and speed. This approach presents an
improvement compared to early trade execution models that completely abstracted from
mechanisms of order placement. However the restriction to use only marketable orders is
not satisfactory. In practice investors rely on passive orders for trade execution [20], thus
suggesting that pure marketable order strategies are generally suboptimal. Because the
restriction to use marketable orders is imposed ex-ante in these models, they also do not
improve our understanding of the order type selection (limit or market) and do not explain
what factors contribute to this choice.
More recent studies [14; 53; 65] present optimal trade execution strategies with limit
orders. Limit order fills are modeled with a point process whose intensity depends on
the distance of a limit order to the best bid or ask price. This distance is within trader’s
control, and thus a trade execution problem with limit orders can be solved using stochastic
control techniques. Market orders can also be included in this setting as impulse controls.
A general drawback of this approach is that it requires specifying a joint process of price
and limit order book dynamics. Another problem is that even with strong assumptions on
this process, the resulting control problems are usually analytically intractable. Finally, the
focus of these problems remains on optimizing trade execution across time, and only basic
details of order placement decisions (e.g. average limit order execution rates) are included
in stochastic control formulations. This leaves out important information about the present
state of an order book [111], adverse selection in limit order executions [107], order queue
sizes and limit order queueing delays [94] that matter for order timing and order placement
decisions in practice.
Another important aspect of trade execution that is rarely addressed in the academic
literature is market fragmentation, i.e. the possibility of trading the same asset in multiple
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limit order books at the same time. The problem of optimizing order placement across
multiple dark pools (markets where supply and demand are unobserved) is studied in [49;
82] but there is no similar analysis for limit order books.
In summary, the problem of optimally pricing and placing limit orders in a fragmented
market remains relatively unexplored and, until recently, limit order placement optimization
was considered only as a complicated extension to the trade execution problem.
The market microstructure literature shows a steady interest in developing tractable
models of order-driven markets that can realistically describe these markets, and at the
same time can be used in practical applications such as optimal trade execution [97; 104]
or market-making [12; 53; 85]. The two main streams of literature - theoretical equilibrium
models from financial economics, and statistical order book models from econometrics and
econophysics - describe different aspects of limit order markets but do not seem to answer
practical needs. Economic models precisely describe various theoretical tradeoffs that are
faced by market participants, but usually present them in a simplified setting and rely on
unobservable parameters such as individual trader utilities. These models can rarely be
estimated with real data which limits their practical value. On the other hand, statistical
models of price impact and order book dynamics can fit the data well, but often lack
economic structure and involve numerous free parameters which also reduces their usefulness
in applications.
Stochastic order book models seem to find a balance between analytical tractability
and descriptive power. The distinguishing feature of these models is that they represent
aggregate order flows from all traders with a random process, e.g., a Poisson process [31;
41]. With this description a limit order market can be viewed as a stochastic system (a
queueing system), where orders randomly arrive, cancel and execute according to order
matching rules. This stochastic modeling approach avoids making detailed assumptions on
the utilities, beliefs and strategies of individual traders, replacing them with assumptions
on measurable statistical properties of aggregate order flows, thus making it straightforward
to calibrate a stochastic model to order book data. Stochastic models of limit order books
are more flexible than economic equilibrium models, but possess more structure than purely
descriptive statistical models.
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The analysis of stochastic order book models relies on a rich queueing theory, and
their analytical tractability makes them appealing from a practical point of view. For
example, order execution costs can be improved in practice by strategically timing order
submissions. It is optimal to submit aggressive orders when the probability of an adverse
price change implied by the current order book state is high [111]. This probability and
other useful distributions for order placement optimization can be easily computed in a
birth-death stochastic order book model via Laplace transforms [31; 62]. Analytical results
can also be derived from scaling approximations of order book models. Even if processes
that govern individual order arrivals and cancelations are very complicated, under suitable
conditions their time aggregates can be conveniently approximated with simpler processes
using functional laws of large numbers and functional central limit theorems. For instance,
a queueing order book model in a heavy-traffic regime is analyzed in [30]. This model is
used to derive the distribution of durations between consecutive price changes, as well as the
distribution of price increments conditional on the order book state. This analysis creates
a link between the order book state and its dynamics on a microscopic timescale of a few
milliseconds and price fluctuations on longer mesoscopic timescales of several minutes or
hours. The link is formally established in a subsequent work [29] via a heavy-traffic limit
theorem - under suitable conditions microscopic price changes in a queueing order book
model converge on a larger scale to a Brownian motion, whose volatility is a function of
the average order queue size and the order inter-arrival rate. Other widely used tools in
the stochastic modeling literature are fluid approximations, and they have been applied to
limit order books as well. A fluid model of a fragmented market with multiple order books
is used in [94] to show how the strategic order routing activity of self-interested investors
creates coupling between order flows and order queues across market centers.
These are several successful examples of applying classical stochastic modeling tech-
niques to describe limit order markets. However, the rich structure of these markets also
motivates the development of entirely new modeling tools. Empirical studies of order data
with trader identifiers [1; 13; 75] have exposed complicated interactions and feedback ef-
fects between heterogeneous market participants. While the queueing order book models
discussed above can describe the behavior of aggregate order flows from all participants in
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a limit order book, studying interactions between traders or trader groups seems to be dif-
ficult with off-the-shelf stochastic models. So far these interactions have been only explored
in the financial economics literature using game theoretical arguments. The stochastic mod-
eling literature offers a large variety of multi-class queueing models for studying systems
with dissimilar participants. These models express differences between participants (jobs)
in a queue or a network of queues by assigning each class of jobs a distinct distribution
of arrival, service or abandonment times (see e.g. [68]). Multi-class queueing models may
capture some of the differences between participants in limit order markets, but their use
does not seem proper because they have been developed in other contexts such as call center
modeling or healthcare. Impatient customers in a service system typically share the same
timescale - customers in a call center may wait several minutes, and patients may spend
several days or weeks in a ward. In contrast, some participants in financial markets submit
and cancel their orders thousands of times faster than other traders [57], responding to
changes in the state of the order books. Some orders that queue in a limit order book are
driven by patience, similarly to customers in a service system, while others exhibit more
complex behavior which depends on the order book state. In summary, modeling limit or-
der books is a new and interesting application of the queueing theory and presents exciting
opportunities for developing new models and new theoretical tools.
1.4 Contribution
The rapid transformation of financial markets during the last two decades posed a num-
ber of challenges. Regulators and exchanges worldwide recognize the complexity of these
markets and work to improve their fairness, transparency and robustness to hazards like
the Flash Crash event. Practitioners increasingly rely on quantitative models and computer
algorithms to hedge their positions, turn over large portfolios, provide liquidity and guide
their trading decisions. To better understand and improve the modern marketplace, regu-
lators and practitioners alike need models of limit order books, which on one hand could
realistically describe the complicated dynamics exhibited by these markets, and on the other
hand would be tractable enough to be useful in applications.
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This need has motivated four research goals addressed in this thesis:
 Develop a parsimonious model that relates price dynamics in a limit order market to
order submissions and cancelations (order book events) without requiring a complex
description of full order book dynamics or references to unobservable parameters.
 Investigate connections between the price impact of order book events, liquidity, trad-
ing volume and volatility in limit order markets on intraday timescales.
 Propose a tractable framework for order placement and order routing optimization in
a fragmented market with multiple limit order books, and study the tradeoffs that
form the order placement decisions of a single investor.
 Study how the heterogeneity in order submission and cancelation strategies across
market participants (e.g. algorithmic traders and high-frequency traders) affects the
dynamics of limit order queues and order waiting times in these queues.
In Chapter 2 we develop a model that describes price dynamics in limit order books by
incorporating the immediate effects of limit orders, market orders and order cancelations
on prices. Our model specification (2.7) is detailed enough to describe the immediate price
impact of all order book updates, yet it does not require one to describe the complex
evolution of a limit order book and involves a single parameter that can be estimated
by fitting a linear regression. We follow an empirical approach and test our model on a
large sample of high-frequency data. The methodological contribution of this model is that
it finds a middle ground between theoretical order book models from financial economics
literature and statistical models of price impact. In comparison with theoretical order book
models, ours is simpler and can be easily mapped to real data or used in applications.
In contrast with statistical price impact models, it is based on simple economic intuition
and imposes strong structural restrictions on parameter values. This structure allows us
to not only describe the immediate price impact in a limit order book, but also to link
different variables of interest: the magnitude of price impact, market depth, volatility and
trading volume. Specifically our model predicts an inverse relation between the price impact
coefficient and market depth (2.8). This relation and other parameter restrictions posed
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by our model are confirmed by empirical analysis in Section 2.3, where we also show that,
despite its simplicity, our model successfully explains 65% of variance in short-term price
movements (see also Tables 2.2 – 2.4). The link between market depth and price impact
predicted by this model allows us to structurally explain intraday variations in volatility
with variations in two observable variables - the average market depth and the variance
of order flows 2.21. Previous studies of trade data noted that market volatility positively
correlates with trading volume, but, in order-driven markets, prices are determined by limit
order book dynamics and the effect of trading volume on prices is dubious. Proposition
1 in Section 2.4.3 establishes one channel through which the correlation between volume
and volatility can spuriously emerge as a consequence of aggregating high-frequency data.
Our model parsimoniously relates price changes, order flows and market liquidity and thus
lends itself to multiple applications, from the analysis of intraday volatility dynamics to
price impact forecasting. In Section 2.4.1 we develop an application of our results that can
improve the quality of limit order executions in practice.
In Chapter 3 we propose a novel framework for order placement optimization in a
fragmented market. The main distinction of our approach from the existing literature on
optimal trade execution is that we decouple the optimization of a trade execution trajectory
in time and individual order placement decisions, focusing on the latter part. This allows
us to study order placement decisions in significant detail without sacrificing analytical
tractability. In Section 3.2 we describe a realistic model for limit order executions in an order
book that considers the length of limit order queues, statistical properties of order flows
on multiple exchanges and different order routing incentives (fees and rebates) provided by
exchanges. Based on this detailed description of limit order execution mechanics, the search
for an optimal order placement policy can be formulated as a convex optimization problem
3.4, which is shown to have an optimal solution in propositions 2,3. An alternative approach
to order placement optimization is based on a cost minimization problem 3.6 under execution
shortfall constraints, and we show in section 3.2 that the two approaches are connected by
duality. Other studies in the optimal trade execution literature have predominantly focused
on the risk of price fluctuations during the course of a trade execution, but assumed that
each order on a trade execution schedule is filled with certainty. Instead, we focus on the
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non-execution risk for an individual order and show that this risk plays a major role in
determining an optimal mix of market and limit orders for a trader. In a special case when
a single exchange is used for order execution, proposition 4 gives an explicit formula for
optimal limit and market order sizes, and shows how the optimal solution shifts to market
orders when the non-execution risk outweighs the high cost of these orders.
The fragmentation of financial markets in the U.S. and Europe motivates us to analyze
the order placement problem with multiple exchanges. This is an improvement relative to
existing studies that typically consider a single exchange for order execution. Proposition
5 shows that the optimal solution in case of fragmented markets is characterized by setting
execution shortfall probabilities to specific values computed with transaction cost parame-
ters. In Section 3.5 we propose a stochastic approximation scheme that uses historical data
samples to optimize order placement decisions without a need to specify order flow distribu-
tions. Our numerical examples in that section illustrate the structure of an optimal solution
in a case of fragmented markets and show that substantial cost savings can be realized by
applying order placement optimization. The framework developed in Chapter 3 can also be
applied to study the costs and benefits of market fragmentation from an investor’s perspec-
tive. We observe that it is often optimal to oversize the total quantity of limit orders sent to
all exchanges (i.e. to overbook) in an attempt to diversify the non-execution risk. However,
when order flows on each exchange are strongly positively correlated, this diversification
advantage fades and the cost of execution in a fragmented market can become higher than
the cost of execution in a consolidated market.
In Chapter 4, we study the dynamics of a limit order queue in a market populated
by heterogeneous traders. Our model for this queue, presented in Section 4.2, explicitly
distinguishes between orders submitted by trade execution algorithms and high-frequency
traders (henceforth, type-1 and type-2 orders). Trade execution algorithms usually oper-
ate under time constraints and therefore type-1 orders in our model have finite patience
deadlines. In contrast, type-2 orders of high-frequency traders respond to changes in a
limit order book state and are not driven by patience. This distinction between order types
plays an important role in our analysis and it is a new feature compared to the existing
literature on stochastic order book models, which assume identical dynamics for all orders
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in the market. In our model, orders of both types arrive at the back of the same FIFO
queue at the best bid (ask) and gradually propagate through this queue to match against
a contra-side marketable order at the queue front. When the queue size is relatively large,
high-frequency traders perceive a low risk of price changes and keep their type-2 orders in
the queue, as opposed to type-1 orders that constantly cancel due to impatience. As it takes
additional time for marketable orders to clear the extra “workload” introduced by type-2
orders, the queue waiting times for type-1 orders increase, forcing execution algorithms to
cancel their orders and trade aggressively at worse prices. This “order crowding” effect has
been previously noticed by traders in exceptionally liquid stock and futures markets, but
it cannot be captured by models with homogenous order behavior. In contrast, when the
queue size becomes small, all type-2 orders immediately cancel due to the risk of a price
change, creating a rush of high-frequency order cancelations.
In Section 4.3 we present our results for a fluid model that approximates the evolution
of large orders queues over relatively long time intervals. This approximation is analytically
tractable and applicable to studying limit order queue waiting times in liquid markets.
Propositions 6, 7, 8 analyze the fluid model dynamics and show that a particular queue
structure emerges for large queues and for queues that have evolved for a sufficiently long
time. These cases correspond to the “crowding” phenomenon because all new type-2 orders
remain in the queue until execution, while only a fraction of finitely patient type-1 orders
make it to the queue front. Proposition 8 describes the convergence of the fluid model to
a steady state and characterizes its limit. Proposition 9 explores the dependence of queue
waiting times on the initial queue composition with type-1 and type-2 orders. When all or-
ders in a queue belong to impatient traders, waiting times are expected to be relatively short
even if the queue is long because most of its content is eventually canceled. However, the
presence of type-2 orders significantly increases queueing delays, and our model prescribes a
specific procedure for computing queueing delay forecasts as a function of the initial type-1
and type-2 order quantities. In Section 4.4 these forecasts are tested against an extensive
proprietary dataset of realized limit order delays in U.S. equity markets. We find that as-
suming a homogenous queue composition leads to unrealistic waiting time predictions that
can biased up or down by a factor of 10 or more. The model with heterogeneous orders
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leads to more realistic predictions that lie between the two extremes (see Figure 4.5) and can
potentially be used to predict order queueing delays in practical applications. In summary,
our analysis motivates the development of a new generation of stochastic models for order
book markets. These models go beyond the description of aggregate order flows and take
into account more detailed features of these markets, such as the trader heterogeneity, pro-
viding a link with market microstructure models in the financial economics literature. The
stochastic model introduced here is also interesting on a stand-alone basis - in comparison
with existing multi-class queueing models, it introduces new types of dynamics, induced by
the state-dependent behavior of one of the job classes.
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Chapter 2
Price impact, liquidity and market
volatility
This chapter is based on the paper ”The Price Impact of Order Book Events” [28] which is
a joint work with Professor Rama Cont and Doctor Sasha Stoikov.
2.1 Introduction
Sometimes a quiet state of prices is obtained and the Exchange is influenced by
neither favorable nor unfavorable news... Suddenly a cloud appears which por-
tends a storm. The sellers of shares rejoice and start talk about the uncertainties
in the situation and the possibilities of disasters. As quick as lightning the bulls
hasten forward in order to dam the inundations and to reject this reproach on
their wisdom... The skirmishing goes on, and at last the price is higher than
before the confusion, because those groups of exchange operators who, suspect-
ing no intrigue, had no thought of fighting and had been pursuing their regular,
peaceful practices, have been awakened by the attacks.
Joseph de la Vega, Confusion de confusiones, 1688
The availability of high-frequency records of trades and quotes has stimulated an exten-
sive empirical and theoretical literature on the relation between order flow, liquidity and
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price movements in order-driven markets. A particularly important issue for applications
is the impact of orders on prices: the optimal liquidation of a large block of shares, given
a fixed time horizon, crucially involves assumptions on price impact (see Bertsimas and Lo
[15], Almgren and Chriss [6], Obizhaeva and Wang [97]). Understanding price impact is
also important from a theoretical perspective, since it is a fundamental mechanism of price
formation.
Various aspects of price impact have been studied in the literature but there is little
agreement on how to model it [18], and the only consensus seems to be the intuitive notion
that imbalance between supply and demand moves prices. Theoretical studies draw a
distinction between instantaneous price impact of orders and its decay through time, and
show that the form of instantaneous impact has important implications. Huberman and
Stanzl [63] show that there are arbitrage opportunities if the instantaneous effect of trades
on prices is non-linear and permanent. Gatheral [50] extends this analysis by showing that if
the instantaneous price impact function is non-linear, impact needs to decay in a particular
way to exclude arbitrage and if it is linear, it needs to decay exponentially. Bouchaud et
al. [19] associated the decay of price impact of trades with limit orders, arguing that there
is a “delicate interplay between two opposite tendencies: strongly correlated market orders
that lead to super-diffusion (or persistence), and mean reverting limit orders that lead
to sub-diffusion (or anti-persistence)”. This insight implies that looking solely at trades,
without including the effect of limit orders amounts to ignoring an important part of the
price formation mechanism.
However, most of the empirical literature on price impact has primarily focused on
trades. One approach is to study the impact of “parent orders” gradually executed over
time using proprietary data (see Engle et. al [105], Almgren et. al [7]). Alternatively,
empirical studies on public data [39; 48; 54; 73; 74; 114; 102; 103] have analyzed the relation
between the direction and sizes of trades and price changes and typically conclude that the
instantaneous price impact of trades is an increasing, nonlinear function of their size. This
focus on trades leaves out the information in quotes, which provide a more detailed picture
of price formation [37], and raises a natural question: is volume of trades truly the best
explanatory variable for price movements in markets where many quote events can happen
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between two trades?
In our view, a price impact model that encompasses limit orders, market orders and
cancelations, and relates their impact to the concurrent market liquidity would provide a
more detailed description of price formation. Obtaining such model is also desirable from
the practical point of view because modern order execution algorithms increasingly use
limit orders and incorporate market state variables in their decisions. There is also ample
empirical evidence that limit orders play an important role in determining price dynamics.
Arriving limit orders significantly reduce the impact of trades [116] and the concave shape
of the price impact function changes depending on the contemporaneous limit order arrivals
[110]. The outstanding limit orders (also known as market depth) significantly affect the
impact of an individual trade ([76]), low depth is associated with large price changes [117;
40], and depth influences the relation between trade sizes and returns [58]. The emphasis in
the aforementioned studies remains, however, on trades and there are few empirical studies
that focus on limit orders from the outset. Notable exceptions are Engle & Lunde [37],
Hautsch and Huang [59] who perform an impulse-response analysis of limit and market
orders, Hopman [61] who analyzes the impact of different order categories over 30 minute
intervals and Bouchaud et al. [35] who examine the impact of market orders, limit orders
and cancelations at the level of individual events.
2.1.1 Relation to the literature
The primary focus of our study is on short-term effects of orders on stock prices, i.e. their
price impact, and on the relation between price impact and market liquidity. The immediate
price impact of individual orders and aggregate order imbalances (sums of buy order sizes
minus sell order sizes) was previously analyzed for marketable orders in [74; 102; 103;
61] and was generally confirmed to be an increasing, concave function of a marketable order
size. This can be explained by a typical order book density shape that has more orders
near the top of the book and fewer orders deeper in the book [116]. A marketable order
consumes liquidity from the top of the book first and then executes against orders that are
progressively deeper in the order book. Therefore its impact can be written as an integral
of a decreasing order book density, leading to a concave price impact function. Although
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the aforementioned studies provide interesting insights into order book properties they do
not consider the impact of non-marketable orders or order cancelations which constitute
a majority of order book updates, and therefore more detailed models are required to
comprehensively describe price dynamics in order-driven markets. Vector autoregression
and kernel models were applied to study the price impact of marketable orders [54], non-
marketable limit orders and order cancelations [35; 59] and the evolution of their impact
through time. These statistical models give a highly detailed description of price impact
but involve many parameters which impedes their further application. We propose a more
structured model that describes the immediate price impact of all order book events at the
top of the order book using a single parameter.
Our model is applied to investigate the relation between market depth (a measure of
liquidity), price volatility and price impact. Market depth and volatility are known to
be correlated - depth increases in response to an increase in transitory volatility [2], but
decreases when informational volatility is high [101], while volatility itself decreases with
an increase in market depth. Our model contributes to this discussion by structurally
explaining these connections: price volatility is related to variations in order flow, whose
effect on prices depends on market depth. We use these links to explain significant intraday
variations in volatility, that were previously attributed to information asymmetries by [89]
and [55]. In contrast, our model explains these diurnal data features using only observable
variables. Multiple studies comment on the positive correlation between trading volume and
volatility (see [72] for a review), but we argue that prices in limit order markets are driven by
orders and not by trades. However, we make a connection with market volume by showing
that a spurious positive correlation between price volatility and volume can emerge as an
artifact due to aggregation of high-frequency data. Price impact models are often applied
to optimize transaction costs, for instance optimization of limit order executions is studied
in [14; 111]. Our findings suggest that monitoring imbalances in order flow can improve the
quality of limit order executions.
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2.1.2 Summary of main results
We conduct an empirical investigation of the instantaneous impact of order book events –
market orders, limit orders and cancelations – on equity prices. Although previous studies
give a relatively complex description of their impact, we show that their instantaneous
effect on prices may be modeled parsimoniously through a single variable, the order flow
imbalance (OFI). This variable represents the net order flow at the best bid and ask and
tracks changes in the size of the bid and ask queues by
 increasing every time the bid size increases, the ask size decreases or the bid/ask prices
increase,
 decreases every time the bid size decreases, the ask size increases or the bid/ask prices
decrease.
Interestingly, this variable treats a market sell and a cancel buy of the same size as equiva-
lent, since they have the same effect on the size of the best bid queue. This aggregate variable
explains mid-price changes over short time scales in a linear fashion, for a large sample of
stocks, with an average R2 of 65%. In contrast, order flows deeper in the order book do not
substantially contribute to price changes. Our model based on OFI relates prices, trades,
limit orders and cancelations in a simple way: it is linear, requires the estimation of a single
price impact coefficient and it is robust across stocks and across timescales.
Most of variability in the instantaneous price impact, both across time and across stocks
is explained by variations in market depth. In fact, we establish an exact inverse relation
between the two variables. The coefficient of proportionality in that relation depends dra-
matically on the depth definition, showing that arbitrary measures of market depth are
biased proxies for price impact and may lead to misleading conclusions on market liquidity.
The price impact coefficient exhibits substantial intraday variability coinciding with
known intraday patterns observed in spreads, market depth and price volatility [2; 9; 83;
91]. We explain the diurnal effects in price volatility using the volatility of order flow
imbalance and market depth, as opposed to unobservable parameters previously invoked
in the literature, such as information asymmetry [89] or informativeness of trades [55].
The strong link between price volatility and standard deviation of OFI suggests that our
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price impact coefficient is a better estimate of Kyle’s λ (a useful metric of liquidity [8;
79]) than traditional estimates based on trades data. We also show that intraday price
volatility is mainly driven by OFI and not by trading volume. The positive correlation
between price volatility and volume, widely confirmed by empirical studies [72], can be a
statistical artifact due to aggregation of data over time, and we establish how such spurious
relation can arise in our model.
The OFI variable exhibits positive autocorrelation over short time scales, which can be
exploited to improve the quality of order executions. In particular, we show that a limit
order fill is more likely to be followed with a price change in the same direction as the order
flow imbalance before that fill. For example, a limit sell order is more likely to be adversely
selected when order flow imbalance is positive. Monitoring OFI can therefore help reduce
adverse selection in limit order fills.
2.1.3 Chapter outline
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we specify a parsimonious model that
links stock price changes, order flow imbalance and market depth and motivate it by a
stylized order book example. Section 2.3 describes our data and presents estimation results
for our model. Section 2.4 discusses potential applications of our results: in 2.4.1 we use
order flow imbalance as a measure of adverse selection in limit order executions, in 2.4.2
we demonstrate how diurnal effects in depth and order flow imbalance generate intraday
patterns in price impact and price volatility, and in 2.4.3 we show how a spurious relation
between volume and the magnitude of price moves emerges as a statistical artifact from our
simple model. Section 2.6 presents our conclusions.
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2.2 Price impact model
2.2.1 Stylized order book
To motivate our approach we first consider a stylized example of the order book where the
instantaneous effect of order book events can be explicitly computed.
Consider an order book in which the number of shares (depth) at each price level beyond
the best bid and ask is equal to D. Order arrivals and cancelations occur only at the best
bid and ask. Moreover, when bid (or ask) size reaches D, the next passive order arrives one
tick above (or below) the best quote, initializing a new best level. Consider a time interval
[tk−1, tk] and denote by Lbk, C
b
k respectively the total size of buy orders that arrived to and
canceled from current best bid during that time interval. Also denote by M bk the total size
of marketable buy orders that arrived to current best ask, and by P bk the bid price at time






k for sell orders are defined analogously and P
s
k is the ask price.









k −P b,sk−1) (also illustrated on Figures 2.1-2.3):
∆P bk = δ
⌈




∆P sk = −δ
⌈




where δ is the tick size1. These relations are remarkably simple - they involve no parameters,
the impact of all order book events is additive and depends only on their net imbalance.
1This is easily proven by induction over the number of price changes in [tk−1, tk]. The statement is clearly
true when there are no price changes or a single price change of ±δ. Since any price change of ±kδ consists
of jumps of size 1, we simply need to sum the order flow imbalances across these jumps on the right side of
the equation.
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Although all of the subsequent analysis can be carried out separately for bid and ask











k − Cbk −M sk − Lsk + Csk +M bk, (2.4)
where OFIk is the order flow imbalance (or net order flow) and  is the truncation error.







k −M sk , (2.6)
where TIk is the trade imbalance and ηk =
Lbk−Cbk−Lsk+Csk
2D + k. When limit order activity
dominates, i.e. absolute values of terms |Lb,sk |, |Cb,sk | are much larger than |M b,sk |, the corre-
lation of price changes with TIk is weaker than with OFIk, because limit order submissions
and cancelations manifest as noise in (2.5).
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Figure 2.1: Market sell orders remove M s shares from the bid (gray squares represent net
change in the order book).
Figure 2.2: Market sell orders remove M s shares from the bid, while limit buy orders add
Lb shares to the bid.
Figure 2.3: Market sell orders and limit buy cancels remove M s + Cb shares from the bid,
while limit buy orders add Lb shares to the bid.
CHAPTER 2. PRICE IMPACT, LIQUIDITY AND MARKET VOLATILITY 30
2.2.2 Model specification
Actual order books have complex dynamics: arrivals and cancelations occur at all price
levels, the depth distribution across levels has non-trivial features [103; 106; 119], and hidden
orders together with data-reporting issues create additional errors [11; 56]. Motivated by
the stylized order book example we assume a noisy relation between price changes and OFI,
which holds locally for short intervals of time [tk−1,i, tk,i] ⊂ [Ti−1, Ti], where [Ti−1, Ti] are
longer intervals.
∆Pk,i = βiOFIk,i + k,i (2.7)
In this model βi is a price impact coefficient for an i-th time interval and k,i is a noise
term summarizing influences of other factors (e.g. deeper levels of the order book). We
allow βi and the distribution of k,i to change with index i, because of well-known intraday
seasonality effects. Our discussion from the previous section allows us to interpret 12βi as
an implied order book depth. The stylized order book model suggests that price impact





where c, λ are constants and νi is a noise term. The stylized order book model corresponds
to c = 12 , λ = 1. We also consider a relation between price changes and trades:
∆Pk,i = β
T
i TIk,i + ηk,i, (2.9)
but expect it to be much noisier than (2.7).
The specification (2.7-2.8) may be regarded as a model of instantaneous price impact of
order book events, arriving within time interval [tk−1, tk]. An order submitted or canceled
at time τ ∈ [tk−1, tk] contributes a signed quantity eτ to supply/demand. In any given time
interval, these contributions are likely be unbalanced, leading to an order flow imbalance
OFIk, which affects supply/demand and leads to a corresponding price adjustment. If an
individual order goes in the same direction as the majority of orders (sgn(eτ ) = sgn(OFIk)),
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it reinforces the concurrent order flow imbalance and can affect the price. If the order goes
against the concurrent order flow imbalance (sgn(eτ ) = −sgn(OFIk)), it is compensated
by other orders and has an instantaneous impact of zero. In our model all events (including
trades) have a linear price impact, on average equal to βi during the i-th interval. Their
realized impact however depends on the concurrent orders.
The idea that the concurrent limit order activity can make a difference in terms of trades’
impact was demonstrated in [110], where authors show that the shape of the price impact
function essentially depends on the contemporaneous limit order activity. Our approach can
also be related to the model proposed in [35], where order book events have a linear impact
on prices, which depends on their signs and types2. The major difference of our model lies
in the aggregation across time and events. As shown in [35], time series of individual order
book events have complicated auto- and cross-correlation structures, which typically vanish
after 10 seconds. In our data the autocorrelations at a timescale of 10 seconds are small
and quickly vanish as well (ACF plots for a representative stock are shown on Figure 2.4).
Finally, the model used in [58] for explaining the price impact of trades is similar to (2.9).
Although the focus there is on trades, authors allow the price impact coefficient to depend
on contemporaneous liquidity factors and change through time.
At the same time, the linear relation (2.7) is different from many earlier models that
consider only the effect of transactions [48; 54; 74; 114; 102; 103]. Instead of modeling price
impact of trades as a (nonlinear) function of trade size, we show that the instantaneous
price impact of a series of events (including trades) is a linear function of their size after
these events are aggregated into a single imbalance variable. We will show that, first, the
effect of trades on prices is adequately captured by the order flow imbalance and, second,
that if one leaves out all events except trades, the relation 2.7 leads to an apparent concave
relation between the magnitude of price changes and trading volume.
The next section provides an overview of the estimation results for our model.
2Note that in our case all order book events have the same average impact, equal to βi, regardless of
their type. As shown in [35], average impacts of different event types are empirically very similar, allowing
to reasonably approximate them with a single number.
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Figure 2.4: ACF of the mid-price changes ∆Pk,i, the order flow imbalance OFIk,i and the
5% significance bounds for the Schlumberger stock (SLB).
2.3 Estimation and results
2.3.1 Data
Our main data set consists of one calendar month (April, 2010) of trades and quotes data
for 50 stocks. The stocks were selected by a random number generator from S&P 500
constituents, which were obtained from Compustat. The data for individual stocks was
obtained from the TAQ consolidated quotes and TAQ consolidated trades databases3.
Consolidated quotes contain best bid/ask price changes and round-lot changes in best
bid/ask sizes. Quote data entries consist of a stock ticker, a timestamp (rounded to the
nearest second), bid price and size, ask price and size and various flags including exchange
flag. Consolidated trade entries consist of timestamps, prices, sizes and various flags. These
two data sets are often referred to as Level 1 data, as opposed to Level 2 data, which includes
quote updates deeper in the book, or information on individual orders. The main reason
for using TAQ data rather than Level 2 order book data, is that it is far more accessible,
yet contains all events in the top order book (best bid and ask updates), except maybe for
odd-lot changes. We demonstrate that Level 1 TAQ data can be successfully used to study
3The TAQ data were obtained through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
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the impact of limit order submissions and cancelations and we hope that more empirical
studies of that subject will follow. We find that the ratio between the number of NBBO
quote updates and the number of trades is roughly 40 to 1 in our data. Many empirical
studies have previously focused exclusively on trades rather than quotes, but the sheer
difference in sizes of these data sets suggests that more information may be conveyed by
quotes than by trades.
We considered only quotes with timestamps ∈ [9:30 am, 4:00 pm], positive bid/ask
prices and sizes, and quote mode 6∈ {4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 27, 28}. Similarly, trades
were considered only if they had timestamps ∈ [9:30 am, 4:00 pm], positive price and size,
correction indicator ≤ 2 and condition 6∈ {”O”, ”Z”, ”B”, ”T”, ”L”, ”G”, ”W”, ”J”, ”K”}.
From the filtered quotes data we construct the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO)
quotes. This is done by scanning through the filtered quotes data, while maintaining a
matrix with the best quotes for every exchange. When a new entry is read, we check the
exchange flag of that entry and update the corresponding row in the exchange matrix. Using
this matrix, the NBBO prices are computed at each entry as the highest bid and the lowest
ask across all exchanges. The NBBO sizes are simply the sums of all sizes at the NBBO bid
and ask across all exchanges. For more details on TAQ dataset we refer the reader to [56],
which discusses some particularities of that data, such as possible mis-sequencing of data
across exchanges and lack of odd-lot sized orders. With our auxiliary dataset we checked
that neither of these issues significantly affects our results. As a robustness check, we also
considered using data from one exchange at a time instead of NBBO data and obtained
similar empirical results.
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After the NBBO quotes are computed, we applied a simple quote test to the NBBO
quotes and the filtered trades data. This test matches trades with NBBO quotes and
computes the direction of matched trades. A trade is matched with a quote, if:
1. Trade is not inside the spread, i.e.
(a) Trade price ≥ NBBO ask: in this case the trade is considered to be a buy trade.
(b) Trade price ≤ NBBO bid: in this case the trade is considered to be a sell trade.
2. Trade date = quote date.
3. Trade timestamp ∈ [quote timestamp, quote timestamp + 1 second].
4. If the above conditions allow to match a trade with several quotes, it is matched with
the earliest quote.
This matching algorithm cannot identify the direction of trades occurring within the
bid-ask spread. By comparing the number of matched trades with the overall number of
trades in our sample, we found that 59-95% of trades depending on the stock cannot be
matched. Although these percentages appear to be extremely large, the volume percentage
of unmatched trades is only 10-39% depending on the stock with an average of 17% across
stocks, and we believe that omitting these trades does not affect our results. There are
other routines to estimate trade direction, including the tick test and the Lee-Ready rule
[84]. Although the latter is used quite frequently, there seems to be no compelling evidence
of superiority of either of these heuristics [98; 113]. To test the robustness of our findings
to the choice of a trade direction test, we compared our results on a subsample of stocks,
applying alternatively the tick test or our quote test and results were virtually the same.
Finally, we removed observations with high bid-ask spreads to filter out “stub quotes”
and data errors. To apply this filter coherently across stocks, we computed the 95-th
percentile of bid-ask spread distribution for each stock and removed 5% of that stock’s
quotes with spreads above that percentile. For the representative stock in our sample
(SLB), the removed observations fall mostly on the first minutes after market opening:
15.8% of them occur between 9:30 am and 9:35 am, and 42.1% of them occur between 9:30
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am and 10:00 am. The average bid-ask spread of the removed quotes is 3.44 cents with
a standard deviation 11.98 cents, the average queue size of these quotes is 11.78 round
lots with a standard deviation 12.89 lots. The average time interval between two removed
quotes is 1.03 seconds with a standard deviation 41.64 seconds. All results in this chapter
are generated using the filtered data.
TAQ data has important limitations - the timestamps are rounded to the nearest sec-
ond, and it may omit odd-lot trades and quotes. To perform several detailed robustness
checks we also use an auxiliary data set consisting of NASDAQ ITCH 4.0 messages for the
same calendar month (April, 2010) for one representative stock from our main data set
(Schlumberger). This data is accessible through LOBSTER website4 which also provides
NASDAQ order book history for the selected stock. We used LOBSTER data for the top
five order book levels without any additional pre-processing.
2.3.2 Variables
Every observation of the bid and the ask consists of the bid price P b, the bid queue size qb
(in number of shares), the ask price P s and size qs. We enumerate them by n and compute









n1{P bn≥P bn−1} − q
b
n−11{P bn≤P bn−1} − q
s
n1{P sn≤P sn−1} + q
s
n−11{P sn≥P sn−1} (2.10)
The variables en are signed contributions of order book events to supply/demand. When a
passive buy order arrives, qb increases but P b remains the same, leading to en = q
b
n − qbn−1
which is the size of that order. If qb decreases, we have en = q
b
n − qbn−1, representing the
size of a marketable sell order or buy order cancelation. If P b changes, then en = q
b
n or
en = −qbn−1, representing respectively the size of a price-improving order or the last order
in the queue that that was removed. Symmetric computations are done for the ask side.
4http://lobster.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/Lobster/about/About WhatIsLOBSTER.jsp
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We use two uniform time grids {T0, . . . , TI} and {t0,0, . . . , tI,K} with time steps Ti −
Ti−1 = 30 minutes and tk,i − tk−1,i = ∆t = 10 seconds5. Within each long time interval
[Ti−1, Ti] we compute 180 price changes and order flow imbalances indexed by k:
∆Pk,i =














where N(tk−1,i)+1 and N(tk,i) are the index of the first and the last order book event in the
interval [tk−1,i, tk,i]. The tick size δ is equal to 1 cent in our data. Note that in our empirical
study OFI is computed from fluctuations in best bid/ask prices and their sizes according
to (2.12), because data on individual orders is not available in our main dataset. If that
data is available, OFI can be computed according to (2.4). We believe that a computation
based on (2.4) can lead to better empirical results because aggressive order terms M b,M s
will capture information on hidden orders and unreported odd-lot sized orders within the
spread, to the extent that aggressive orders interact with hidden orders. Since TAQ data
reports only round-lot sized quote changes, we note that units of OFI are round lots (100
shares), and assume in (2.12) that both sides of the market are equally affected by missing
quote updates6.
We define trade imbalance during a time interval [tk−1,i, tk,i] as the difference between
volumes of buyer- and seller-initiated trades during that interval, and also define trading




bn − sn V OLk,i =
N(tk,i)∑
n=N(tk−1,i)+1
bn + sn, (2.13)
where bn, sn are sizes of buyer- and seller-initiated trades (in round lots) that occurred
at the n-th quote (equal to zero if no trade occurred at that quote). In contrast with
5results for other timescales are reported in Section 2.5
6As we demonstrate in Section 2.5, neither missing odd-lot sized observations nor potential mis-sequencing
of quote updates across different exchanges during NBBO computation change our qualitative findings.
CHAPTER 2. PRICE IMPACT, LIQUIDITY AND MARKET VOLATILITY 37
TI, the OFI measure computed using (2.12) does not hinge on trade classification, which
is known to be problematic for TAQ data (see Section 2.5 for more details on matching
trades with quotes and trade classification). Whereas previous studies [23; 54; 58; 74; 102;
114] focused on trade imbalance7, the order flow imbalance is a more general measure. It
encompasses effects of all order book events, including trades.
For each interval [Ti−1, Ti] we also estimate depth by averaging the bid/ask queue sizes
right before or right after a price change, consistently with the definition of depth in the

























1{P sn 6=P sn−1}
 . (2.14)
7Hopman [61] computes the supply/demand imbalance based on limit orders and trades, but not cance-
lations.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics for 50 randomly chosen U.S. stocks
Name Ticker Price
Daily Number of Number of Average Maximum Best quote
volume, best quote trades Spread, spread, size,
shares updates ticks ticks shares
Advanced Micro Devices AMD 9.61 20872996 417204 6687 1 1 103484
Apollo Group APOL 62.92 1949337 172942 4095 2 5 1525
American Express AXP 45.21 8678723 559701 7748 1 24 7918
Autozone AZO 179.03 243197 43682 1081 9 35 750
Bank of America BAC 18.43 164550168 1529395 15008 1 1 320801
Becton Dickinson BDX 78.07 1130362 61029 2968 2 5 1530
Bank of New York Mellon BK 31.77 6310701 285619 5518 1 1 12199
Boston Scientific BSX 7.13 25746787 309441 6768 1 1 296501
Peabody Energy corp BTU 47.14 5210642 298616 7267 1 3 2949
Caterpillar CAT 67.20 6664891 392499 8224 1 2 3835
Chubb CB 52.22 1951618 149010 3601 1 2 4251
Carnival CCL 40.16 4275911 215427 5503 1 2 5330
Cincinnati Financial CINF 29.41 688914 51373 1528 1 2 4157
CME Group CME 322.83 418955 38504 1412 31 103 541
Coach COH 41.91 3126469 176795 4458 1 2 4061
ConocoPhillips COP 56.09 9644544 426614 8621 1 2 8402
Coventry Health Care CVH 24.16 1157022 79305 2213 1 2 3838
Denbury Resources DNR 17.88 5737740 263173 4643 1 1 18622
Devon Energy DVN 66.98 3260982 177006 5805 2 4 1847
Equifax EFX 35.34 799505 62957 1945 1 3 3925
Eaton ETN 78.53 1757136 67989 3580 2 6 1254
Fiserv FISV 52.56 1038311 58304 2208 1 3 2026
Hasbro HAS 39.48 1322037 86040 2672 1 2 3438
HCP HCP 32.63 2872521 213045 4357 1 2 4810
Starwood Hotels HOT 50.59 3164807 150252 5106 2 4 2174
Kohl’s KSS 56.88 3064821 128196 4936 1 3 2688
L-3 Communications LLL 94.64 670937 72818 2141 2 6 867
Lockheed Martin LMT 84.14 1416072 88254 3333 2 5 1495
Macy’s M 23.40 8324639 491756 6469 1 1 17567
Marriott MAR 34.45 5014098 238190 5499 1 2 6511
McAfee MFE 40.04 2469324 109073 3561 1 2 4018
McGraw-Hill MHP 34.90 1954576 102389 3261 1 2 4183
Medco Health Solutions MHS 63.22 2798098 109382 4680 1 3 2534
Merck MRK 36.03 13930842 448748 7997 1 1 23137
Marathon Oil MRO 32.33 5035354 341408 5522 1 1 14259
MeadWestvaco MWV 26.96 1035547 92825 2312 1 3 3741
Newmont Mining NEM 53.43 5673718 435295 7717 1 2 3847
Omnicom OMC 41.17 3357585 150800 4359 1 2 6492
MetroPCS Communications PCS 7.53 4424560 107967 2901 1 1 52304
Pultegroup PHM 11.80 6834683 262420 4604 1 1 31856
PerkinElmer PKI 23.98 1268774 78114 2127 1 2 7163
Ryder System R 44.01 631889 47422 2085 2 5 1147
Reynolds American RAI 54.44 773387 56236 2076 1 4 2177
Schlumberger SLB 67.94 9476060 440839 10286 1 2 3942
Teco Energy TE 16.52 1070815 70318 1807 1 1 14816
Time Warner Cable TWC 53.21 1770234 88286 3554 2 3 2174
Whirlpool WHR 97.73 1424264 134152 3348 4 9 958
Windstream WIN 11.03 2508830 104887 2937 1 1 79834
Watson Pharmaceuticals WPI 42.51 895967 63094 2024 1 3 2884
XTO Energy XTO 48.13 7219436 612804 5040 1 7 22479
Grand mean 51.75 7512376 223232 4552 2 6 22665
Table 2.1 presents average mid-prices, daily transaction volumes, daily numbers of best
quote updates, daily numbers of trades, spreads and the depths at the best quotes.
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2.3.3 Empirical findings
This section reports detailed results for a representative stock, Schlumberger (SLB) and
some average results across stocks. Detailed results for other stocks in our sample are
presented in Section 2.5. During the sample period the average price of Schlumberger stock
was 67.94 dollars and the average daily volume was 947.6 million shares. The daily average
number of NBBO quote updates is about 440 thousands, and the average daily number of
trades is around 10 thousands. The average spread is one cent, its 95-th percentile is 2 cents
and the average best NBBO quote size is 39 round lots (3900 shares).
The model (2.7) is estimated by an ordinary least squares regression:
∆Pk,i = αˆi + βˆiOFIk,i + ˆk,i, (2.15)
with separate half-hour subsamples indexed by i. Figure 2.5 presents a scatter plot of ∆Pk,i
against OFIk,i for one of such subsamples.
Figure 2.5: Scatter plot of ∆Pk,i against OFIk,i for the Schlumberger stock (SLB),
04/01/2010 11:30-12:00pm.
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In general we find that βˆi is statistically significant
8 in 98% of samples, and αˆi is signif-
icant in 10% of samples, which is close to the Type-I error rate. The average t-statistics for
αˆi, βˆi are respectively -0.21 and 16.27 for SLB (cross-sectional averages are -0.02 and 12.08).
To check for higher order/nonlinear dependence we estimate an augmented regression:
∆Pk,i = αˆ
Q
i + γˆiOFIk,i + γˆ
Q
i OFIk,i|OFIk,i|+ ˆQk,i. (2.16)
The coefficients γˆQi have an average t-statistic of -0.32 across stocks and are statistically
significant only in 17% of our samples. We reject the hypothesis of quadratic (convex or
concave) instantaneous price impact, and take this as strong evidence for a linear price
impact model (2.7), because other kinds of non-linear dependence would likely be picked
up by this quadratic term.
The goodness of fit is surprising for high-frequency data, with an R2 of 76% for SLB and
65% on average across stocks9, suggesting that a one-parameter linear model (2.7) performs
well regardless of stock-specific features, such as average spread, depth or price level. The
definition of R2 as a percentage of explained variance has an interesting consequence in
our case. Since OFI is constructed from order book events taking place only at the best
bid/ask, our results show that activity at the top of the order book is the most important
factor driving price changes. In Section 2.5 we confirm this by showing that order flow
imbalances from deeper order book levels only marginally contribute to short-term price
dynamics. Even though large price movements sometimes occur at this timescale, they
mostly correspond to large readings of OFI. Figure 2.6 confirms this by demonstrating a
relatively low level of excess kurtosis in regression residuals.
When the amount of passive order submissions and cancelations is much larger than
the amount of trades, the stylized order book model predicts that trade imbalance TI
8Given a relatively large number of observations we use the z-test with a 95% significance level. Since
regression residuals demonstrate heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, Newey-West standard errors are
used to compute t-statistics.
9We note that OFI includes the contributions en of price-changing order book events, leading to a
possible endogeneity in the regression (2.15). This problem is inherent to all price impact modeling, because
the explanatory variables (events or trades) sometimes mechanically lead to price changes. To test that the
high R2 in our regressions is not due to this endogeneity, we estimated (2.15) on a subsample of stocks,
excluding the price-changing events from OFI. With this change the R2 declined, but remained high, in
the 35%-60% region.
CHAPTER 2. PRICE IMPACT, LIQUIDITY AND MARKET VOLATILITY 41
Figure 2.6: Distribution of excess kurtosis in the residuals ˆk,i across stocks and time.
explains price changes significantly worse thanOFI. To empirically confirm this we estimate










i OFIk + θˆ
T
i TIk,i + ˆ
D
k,i. (2.17b)
When either OFI or TI variable is taken individually, that variable has a statistically
significant correlation with price changes. The average t-statistics of slope coefficients in
simple regressions (2.15, 2.17a) are, correspondingly 16.27 and 5.31 for SLB (cross-sectional
averages are 12.08 and 5.08). The average R2 for the two regressions are 65% and 32%,
respectively, confirming the prediction that relation between price changes and trade im-
balance is more noisy. When the two variables are used in a multiple regression (2.17b),
the dependence of price changes on trade imbalance becomes much weaker. The average
t-statistic of TI coefficient drops to 1.56 for SLB (1.51 across stocks) and it remains statis-
10These regressions contain only linear terms, because we found no evidence of non-linear price impacts
in our data (for neither OFI nor TI).
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tically significant in only 47% of SLB samples (43% of all stock samples). The dependence
on OFI remains strong with an average t-statistic 13.91 for SLB (9.53 across stocks), and
the coefficient is statistically significant in almost all samples. We conclude that OFI ex-
plains price movements better than trade imbalance, and OFI is a more general measure
of supply/demand imbalance because it adequately includes the effect of trade imbalance.
Finally, we use time series of Di and βˆi for each stock to estimate the relation (2.8) with
the following two regressions:
log βˆi = ˆαL,i − λˆ logDi + ˆL,i, (2.18)




Both regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares11. For SLB we find cˆ =
0.56, λˆ = 1.08 and an R2 of (2.18) is 92%. The results for all stocks are shown in Table
2.2. We observe that depth significantly correlates with price impact coefficients for the
vast majority of stocks, confirming our intuition that 12βi is the implied order book depth.
Interestingly, estimates cˆ, λˆ across stocks are very close to values predicted by the stylized
order book model. With the t-statistics12 in Table 2.4 the null hypotheses {c = 0.5} and
{λ = 1} cannot be rejected for most stocks based on conventional significance levels. The
restricted model with λ = 1 also demonstrates a good quality of fit, making this a good
approximation13. Figure 2.7 illustrates these results with a log-log scatter plot for Di and
βˆi. Some stocks (namely APOL, AZO and CME) have poor fits in regression (2.18), mainly
due to outliers in the dependent variable. After removing these outliers and re-estimating
the regression, the estimates cˆ, λˆ for these stocks fell in line with estimates for other stocks.
11We note that an estimate λˆi is used in regression (2.19). This “plug-in” approach leads to potential
errors in explanatory variable, and standard errors for cˆ may be underestimated. However, the good quality
of fit in regression (2.18) with an average R2 of 76% indicates that λˆi are estimated with good precision.
We believe that errors in variable 1
Dλˆi
are small and do not affect our results.
12Since the residuals of these regressions appear to be autocorrelated, the t-statistics are computed with
Newey-West standard errors.
13The squared correlation between ∆Pk,i and
OFIk,i
2Di
averaged across all subsamples in our data is 0.6523,
very close to the average R2 in (2.15).
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Figure 2.7: Log-log scatter plot of the price impact coefficient estimate βˆi against average
market depth Di for the Schlumberger stock (SLB).
To assess the stability of these findings, we re-estimated (2.18,2.19) with observations
pooled across days but not across intraday time intrervals, resulting in 13 estimates cˆi, λˆi
for each stock. Although these estimates demonstrate some diurnal variability, they are
relatively stable and most of variability in price impact coefficients is explained by variations
in depth (e.g. see Figure 2.9).
We repeated the analysis with different depth variables, taking Di to be equal to arith-
metic or geometric average of queue sizes over the i-th time interval. Overall, the results
were the same, except for the level of cˆ estimates, which were about 40% lower across stocks
for the arithmetic average depth, and even lower for the geometric average. The systematic
difference in these coefficients implies that taking an arbitrary measure of depth (such as
arithmetic average of queue sizes) as a proxy of price impact may lead to significant biases,
i.e. one would dramatically under- or over-estimate price impact in a given stock. Instead
of looking at arbitrary depth measures, we suggest computing price impact coefficients βi
and/or implied depth 12βi to precisely characterize price sensitivity to order flow.
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2.4 Applications
2.4.1 Monitoring adverse selection
Time intervals that are involved in modern high-frequency trading applications are usually
so short that price changes are relatively infrequent events. Therefore price changes provide
a very coarse and limited description of market dynamics. However, OFI tracks best
bid and ask queues and fluctuates on a much faster timescale than prices. It incorporates
information about build-ups and depletions of order queues and it can be used to interpolate
market dynamics between price changes (see Figure 2.8 for example). Our results confirm
that such interpolation is in fact valid because OFI closely approximates price changes
over short time intervals (e.g. results for 50 millisecond time intervals are shown in Section
2.5). To study one possible application of OFI for high-frequency trading we turn to our
auxiliary dataset, because it contains accurate timestamps up to a millisecond.
Figure 2.8: Price dynamics and cumulative OFI on NASDAQ for a 1-second time interval
starting at 11:16:39.515 on 04/28/2010, Schlumberger stock (SLB).
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Given the strong link between OFI and price changes, and the positive autocorrelation
of OFI over short time intervals (see Figure 2.4), we propose to use it as a measure of
adverse selection in the order flow. For example, when a limit order is filled, and its
execution was preceded by positive OFI, a positive price change is more likely to happen
after the limit order execution. This is because the pre-execution positive OFI is likely to
persist in the future, and can lead to a post-execution positive price change. For a limit sell
order a positive post-execution price change implies that the order was executed at a loss,
i.e. adversely selected.
To test our hypothesis, we consider all limit order executions in our auxiliary dataset.
For each execution we compute the pre-execution order flow imbalance OFIprek and the post-
execution mid price change ∆P postk . The pre-execution order flow imbalance is computed
from best bid and ask quote updates with timestamps in [tk−200, tk−1] milliseconds, where
tk is the time of the k-th limit order execution. Similarly the post-execution price change
is defined as the difference in mid-quote prices between tk + 200 milliseconds and tk
14 .
Then we consider 30-minute subsamples of data indexed by i, and estimate the following
regression:









The average R2 of these regressions across a month is 2.93%, the average t-statistic15 of βpi is
2.68 and this coefficient is significant at a 5% level in 63% of subsamples. The average βpi is
0.0105. We conclude that pre-execution OFI are positively correlated with post-execution
price changes.
We also estimated regression (2.20) with 50- and 100-millisecond time intervals for pre-
and post-execution variables, and obtained similar results, with stronger correlations for
smaller time intervals16. When we split OFIprek,i into multiple order flow imbalance variables
over non-overlapping subintervals of [tk − 200, tk − 1], we find that only the variable closest
14If there are multiple quotes with timestamp tk + 200 or tk, we take the last one.
15Here we also use Newey-West standard errors because residuals demonstrate significant autocorrelation.
16For instance, with 50-millisecond time intervals the average t-statistic of βpi is 3.41 and this coefficient
is significant in 75% of samples. The average R2 becomes 3.32%
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to tk - the execution time - is statistically significant and positively correlated with post-
execution price change. These results suggest that limit order traders need to actively
monitor order flows and react to emerging order flow imbalances as quickly as possible to
avoid being adversely selected.
2.4.2 Intraday volatility dynamics
The link between price impact and market depth established here has important implications
for intraday volatility. Market depth is known to follow a predictable diurnal pattern ([2],
[83]), and equation (2.8) implies that instantaneous price impact must also have a predictable
intraday pattern. To demonstrate it, we averaged βˆi for each stock and each intraday half-
hour interval across days, resulting in diurnal effects for that stock, normalized these effects
by a grand average βˆi for that stock and averaged normalized diurnal effects across stocks.
The same procedure was repeated for depths Di. We also re-estimated (2.18,2.19) with
observations pooled across days but not across intraday time intrervals, resulting in 13
estimates λˆi, cˆi for each stock. The overall average diurnal effects for these quantities are
shown on Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9: Diurnal effects in the price impact coefficient βˆi, the average depth Di and the
parameters cˆi, λˆi. Most of the intraday variation in price impact coefficients comes from
variations in depth, while parameters cˆi, λˆi are relatively more stable.
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We found that between 9:30 and 10am the depth is two times lower than on average,
indicating that the market is relatively shallow. In a shallow market, incoming orders can
easily affect mid-prices and price impact coefficients between 9:30 and 10am are in fact two
times higher than on average. Moreover, price impact coefficients between 9:30 and 10am
are five times higher than between 3:30 and 4pm.
The intraday pattern in price impact can be used to explain intraday patterns in price
volatility, observed by many studies ([2], [9], [55],[89]). Similarly to the price impact co-
efficient and the market depth, we computed the intraday patterns in variances of ∆Pk,i
and OFIk,i, using our half-hour subsamples. Taking the variance on both sides in equation
(2.7), we obtain a link between var[∆Pk,i], var[OFIk,i] and βi:
var[∆Pk,i] = β
2
i var[OFIk,i] + var[k,i] (2.21)
Figure 2.10: Diurnal variability in variances var[∆Pk,i], var[OFIk,i], the price impact coef-
ficient βˆi and the expression β
2
i var[OFIk]i.
The average variance patterns are plotted on Figure 2.10. Notice that price volatility
has a sharp peak near the market open, while volatility of OFI peaks near the market close.
The latter peak is offset by low price impact, which gradually declined throughout the day.
For the i-th half-hour interval, equation (2.21) implies that var[∆Pk,i] ≈ βˆ2i var[OFIk,i]
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because var[k,i] is relatively small, which is also demonstrated
17 on Figure 2.10.
Since the R2 in regression (2.15) is high, the ratio
var[k,i]
var[OFIk,i]
is small, and we can rewrite
(2.21) as βi ≈ σP,iσO,i , where σP,i =
√
var[∆Pk,i] and σO,i =
√
var[OFIk,i]. This bears strong
resemblance to the definition of Kyle’s λ (see [79]) - a metric that is used in the asset pricing
literature to gauge liquidity risk (see [8] and references therein). This metric is traditionally
estimated as a slope βLi in regression (2.17a), but our analysis suggests that βi is a better
estimate. Although one could also write βLi ≈ σP,iσT,i , where σT,i =
√
var[TIk,i], this would






as shown by R2 values in Table
2.2.
The intraday pattern in price variance was explained in an earlier study [89] using a
structural model. The authors argued that price volatility is higher in the morning because
of a higher inflow of public and private information. In another study [55] the morning
peak of price volatility is explained mostly by higher intensity of public information. Both
studies agree that the impact of trades is larger in the morning. Our model contributes to
this discussion by explaining the peak of price volatility using tangible quantities, rather
than unobservable information variables. Our findings also suggest that price impact and
information asymmetry may be, in fact, two sides of the same coin. If there is more private
information in the morning than in the evening and if limit order traders are aware of this
information asymmetry, their participation will likely diminish in the morning, leading to
lower depth near market open. At the same time, low depth implies a higher price impact
in our model, making the information advantages harder to realize at the market open.
17βˆ2i var[OFIk,i] was computed from the average patterns of βˆi and var[OFIk,i]
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2.4.3 Volume and volatility
The positive correlation between magnitudes of price changes and trading volume is empir-
ically confirmed by many authors (see [72] for a review). Recently, trading volume became
an important metric for order execution algorithms - these algorithms often attempt to
match a certain percentage of the total traded volume to reduce the price impact. However,
it remains unclear whether trading volume truly determines the magnitude of price moves
and whether it is a good metric for price impact. Casting doubt on this assertion, it was
found in [70] that the relation between daily volatility and daily volume is essentially due
to the number of trades and not the volume per se (also see [22] for a following discussion).
We provide further evidence that volume is not a driver of price volatility, now on
intraday timescales. First, we prove that even when prices are purely driven by OFI and not
by volume, a concave relation between magnitude of price changes and transaction volume
emerges as an artifact due to aggregation of data across time. Second, we confirm that
such relation exists in the data, but it becomes statistically insignificant after accounting
for magnitude of OFI.
Comparing the definitions of V OL and OFI we note that both quantities are sums of
random variables. As the aggregation time window [tk−1, tk] becomes progressively larger,
the behavior of these sums (under certain assumptions) will be governed by the Law of Large
Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem. We consider a general time interval [0, T ] and
denote by N(T ) the number of order book events during that time interval. We also denote
by OFI(T ) and V OL(T ), respectively, the order flow imbalance and the traded volume
during [0, T ]. The following proposition shows a link between OFI(T ) and V OL(T ) as T
grows.
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Proposition 1 Assume that
1. N(T )T → Λ, as T →∞, where Λ is the average arrival rate of order book events.




ajYi−j, where Yi is a two-sided sequence of i.i.d random variables with E[Yi] =





cov(e1, e1+n) ∼ cn2(H−1) as n→∞, where 0 < H < 1 is a constant that governs the
decay of the autocorrelation function.
3. {wi}i≥1, wi = bi + si are random variables with a finite mean µpi, where pi is the
proportion of order book events that correspond to trades and µ is the mean trade size.







wi|q)r/q <∞ for some r, q such that






T→∞⇒ ξ ∼ N(0, 1),
where ⇒ denotes convergence in distribution.
Proof: First, we note that Assumption (1) ensures N(T ) → ∞ as T → ∞. With this we
can use Assumption (3) and apply the law of large numbers for weakly dependent variables







→ µpi,w.p.1, as T →∞ (2.22)
Second, event contributions ei have a finite variance σ
2 and, using Assumption (2), we







⇒ ξ, as T →∞, (2.23)
where ξ ∼ N(0, 1) is a standard normal random variable. Although the denominator
σNH(T ) is random, it goes to infinity by assumption (1) and Anscombe’s lemma ensures
that we can use such a normalization in the central limit theorem [36, Lemma 2.5.8]. Since
the function g(x) = xH , H > 0, x ≥ 0 is continuous, the convergence in (2.22) takes place
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)H ⇒ ξ, as T →∞  (2.24)
Proposition 1 implies that as the time interval [0, T ] increases and includes a progressively
larger enough number of order book events, we can use an approximation for OFI(T ):
OFI(T ) ∼ ξ σ
(µpi)H








If all time intervals [tk−1,i, tk,i] are large enough to support this approximation then we can






V OL2Hk,i + σi
)
,
where σi = var[k,i]. Note that even if σi = 0, i.e. even if volume cannot affect price
volatility through the residual variance, Proposition 1 predicts a spurious relation between
price volatility and volume.
Interestingly, the recent theory of market microstructure invariants (see [80]) also pre-
dicts a relation between the volatility of order flow imbalance and trading volume. In their
analysis, order flow imbalance is defined differently based on unobservable “bets”, however
it is natural to assume positive correlation between OFI and the imbalance of “bets”, since
the latter reach exchanges in form of actual orders.
We can recast this statement in a testable form for the magnitudes (absolute values) of
price changes. Assuming k,i ≈ 0, the scaling argument in Proposition 1 together with our







CHAPTER 2. PRICE IMPACT, LIQUIDITY AND MARKET VOLATILITY 52
We denote by θi =
βiσ
(µpi)H
and take logarithms in (2.27) to obtain
log |∆Pk,i| = log θˆi + Hˆi log V OLk,i + log |ξˆk,i| (2.28)
Based on Proposition 1, we expect this relation to be indirect (i.e. come through
|OFIk,i|) and noisy. To confirm this empirically, we estimate three regressions18:
|∆Pk,i| = αˆOi + βˆOi |OFIk,i|+ ˆOk,i (2.29a)
|∆Pk,i| = αˆVi + βˆVi V OLHˆik,i + ˆVk,i (2.29b)
|∆Pk,i| = αˆWi + φˆOi |OFIk,i|+ φˆVi V OLHˆik,i + ˆWk,i (2.29c)
These regressions are estimated for every half-hour subsample with the exponents Hˆi pre-
estimated by (2.28). The averages of Hˆi and their standard deviation for each stock are
presented on the left panel in Table 2.5. The exponent varies considerably across stocks
and time, but is generally below 1/2 in our data. The average results of regressions (2.29a-
2.29c) for each stock are presented on the middle and right panels. We observe that |OFIk,i|
explains the magnitude of price moves better than V OLHˆik,i. Although both variables appear
to be statistically significant when taken individually, the t-statistics for V OLk,i drop to
marginally significant levels in the multiple regression. Thus, the dependence between
absolute values of price moves and traded volume seems to come mostly from correlation
between V OLk,i and |OFIk,i|. Interestingly, the number of trades variable (suggested in
[70]) is also statistically significant on a stand-alone basis, but becomes insignificant when
added to (2.29c) as a third variable. Given the recent proliferation of order splitting, the
size of most orders is equal to one lot, so V OLk,i is almost the same as the number of trades
variable.
18Here we estimate linear regressions rather than log-linear ones to directly test whether the effect of V OL
is consumed by |OFI| variable
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2.5 Robustness checks
2.5.1 Cross-sectional evidence
This section presents various robustness checks for our model. First of all, we re-estimate
the regressions from previous sections on a larger sample of 50 randomly selected stocks
and find that results fall in line with those for the representative stock. Detailed results for
each stock are provided below.
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Table 2.2: Relation between price changes and order flow imbalance.
Ticker
Average results Hypothesis testing





2 {αi 6= 0} {βi 6= 0} {γQi 6= 0}
AMD -0.0032 -0.24 0.0008 11.10 1.4E-07 0.93 64% 0% 100% 36%
APOL 0.0038 0.13 0.0555 10.74 -2.2E-04 -2.42 63% 17% 96% 6%
AXP 0.0019 0.11 0.0082 14.12 -3.8E-06 -1.37 69% 16% 100% 8%
AZO 0.0101 0.34 0.1619 7.02 -9.3E-04 -1.40 47% 25% 99% 6%
BAC -0.0018 -0.13 0.0002 19.08 1.9E-09 -0.08 79% 3% 100% 14%
BDX -0.0008 -0.07 0.0536 10.77 -1.1E-04 -0.74 63% 12% 100% 12%
BK -0.0078 -0.26 0.0069 15.56 -4.0E-06 -0.89 74% 6% 100% 8%
BSX 0.0000 0.01 0.0003 7.55 7.8E-08 3.51 58% 3% 88% 51%
BTU 0.0048 0.15 0.0242 14.75 -3.5E-05 -2.05 72% 16% 100% 3%
CAT 0.0147 0.30 0.0194 14.80 -1.9E-05 -1.72 71% 19% 100% 5%
CB -0.0086 -0.05 0.0191 12.61 -3.5E-07 -0.04 64% 10% 100% 18%
CCL -0.0067 -0.24 0.0140 14.16 -1.2E-05 -1.03 70% 7% 100% 11%
CINF -0.0030 -0.02 0.0260 11.66 -7.0E-06 0.38 70% 4% 99% 30%
CME 0.0506 0.06 0.6262 5.46 -7.2E-03 -1.66 35% 18% 96% 7%
COH -0.0221 -0.54 0.0179 13.13 -1.7E-05 -1.18 69% 5% 100% 7%
COP -0.0008 0.10 0.0084 12.79 -5.8E-06 -1.86 68% 13% 100% 5%
CVH -0.0034 -0.07 0.0217 11.74 7.6E-06 0.37 65% 7% 99% 20%
DNR -0.0008 -0.07 0.0045 13.78 -1.3E-07 0.19 69% 5% 99% 22%
DVN 0.0112 0.20 0.0370 12.11 -1.0E-04 -2.72 65% 19% 100% 2%
EFX -0.0032 -0.06 0.0222 9.47 6.4E-05 0.87 56% 6% 99% 32%
ETN -0.0076 0.10 0.0712 11.01 -2.3E-04 -1.81 65% 17% 100% 4%
FISV -0.0002 0.10 0.0397 11.09 -2.3E-05 -0.28 63% 10% 100% 16%
HAS -0.0031 -0.01 0.0222 12.36 4.7E-06 0.28 67% 6% 100% 23%
HCP -0.0078 -0.21 0.0150 13.82 -1.4E-05 -0.63 67% 5% 100% 10%
HOT -0.0012 0.05 0.0345 12.94 -7.2E-05 -2.06 68% 14% 100% 4%
KSS -0.0030 -0.05 0.0317 14.10 -5.4E-05 -1.38 71% 13% 100% 5%
LLL 0.0160 0.42 0.1000 12.34 -3.8E-04 -1.56 67% 22% 98% 7%
LMT 0.0006 0.00 0.0520 14.14 -1.2E-04 -1.49 72% 17% 100% 4%
M -0.0010 0.07 0.0043 16.61 8.8E-08 0.15 75% 6% 100% 19%
MAR -0.0039 0.02 0.0121 15.10 -4.1E-06 -0.43 71% 10% 100% 10%
MFE 0.0087 0.22 0.0205 13.19 -3.8E-05 -0.63 68% 11% 100% 11%
MHP -0.0073 -0.18 0.0211 12.41 5.8E-06 0.18 68% 5% 99% 24%
MHS -0.0055 -0.20 0.0334 11.97 -8.3E-05 -1.64 66% 12% 100% 4%
MRK -0.0065 -0.26 0.0032 13.26 -5.4E-07 -0.61 69% 4% 100% 14%
MRO 0.0018 0.12 0.0058 14.16 -3.6E-07 0.32 69% 8% 100% 23%
MWV -0.0011 0.02 0.0205 12.55 -1.7E-05 -0.31 68% 9% 100% 17%
NEM -0.0102 -0.26 0.0170 13.90 -1.9E-05 -2.15 71% 12% 100% 5%
OMC -0.0099 -0.36 0.0144 12.40 -4.5E-06 -0.19 65% 4% 100% 20%
PCS -0.0006 -0.05 0.0015 6.52 1.8E-06 3.79 53% 2% 86% 51%
PHM 0.0006 0.02 0.0027 11.27 8.4E-07 1.20 66% 3% 99% 36%
PKI -0.0004 -0.05 0.0102 7.96 4.1E-05 2.15 53% 3% 96% 51%
R 0.0006 0.03 0.0667 10.90 3.7E-05 -0.21 63% 14% 100% 16%
RAI -0.0070 -0.10 0.0396 11.39 2.6E-05 -0.03 66% 9% 100% 19%
SLB -0.0077 -0.21 0.0198 16.27 -1.8E-05 -1.67 76% 10% 100% 2%
TE 0.0011 0.05 0.0049 7.76 1.4E-05 3.27 54% 4% 91% 55%
TWC -0.0130 -0.15 0.0384 12.24 -5.6E-05 -0.73 64% 12% 99% 9%
WHR 0.0628 0.73 0.1278 11.10 -3.3E-04 -1.44 65% 25% 100% 7%
WIN -0.0004 -0.04 0.0009 4.32 1.5E-06 3.98 44% 1% 72% 43%
WPI -0.0090 -0.27 0.0270 11.46 2.9E-05 0.26 66% 5% 99% 23%
XTO -0.0088 -0.25 0.0029 13.26 2.7E-07 0.48 65% 3% 100% 28%
Average 0.0002 -0.02 0.0398 12.08 -2.0E-04 -0.32 65% 10% 98% 17%
Table 2.2 presents a cross-section of results (averaged across time) for regressions:





i OFIk,i + γˆ
Q
i OFIk,i|OFIk,i|+ ˆQk,i,
where ∆Pk,i are the 10-second mid-price changes in ticks and OFIk,i are the contemporaneous order flow imbalances.
These regressions were estimated using 273 half-hour subsamples (indexed by i) for each stock and their outputs
were averaged across subsamples. Each subsample typically contains about 180 observations (indexed by k). The
t-statistics were computed using Newey-West standard errors. For brevity, we report the R2, the average αˆi and the
average βˆi only for the first regression (with a single OFIk,i term). There is almost no difference between averages of
estimates βˆi and βˆ
Q
i and the R
2 in two regressions. The last three columns report the percentage of samples where
the coefficient(s) passed the z-test at the 5% significance level.
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Table 2.3: Comparison of order flow imbalance and trade imbalance.
Ticker
Order flow imbalance Trade imbalance Both covariates
R2 t(βˆi) {βi 6= 0} F R2 t(βˆTi ) {βTi 6= 0} F R2 t(θˆOi ) t(θˆTi ) {θOi 6= 0} {θTi 6= 0} F
AMD 64% 11.10 100% 382 39% 5.06 95% 140 67% 7.64 1.59 99% 45% 214
APOL 63% 10.74 96% 396 30% 5.04 95% 83 66% 8.95 1.58 96% 44% 211
AXP 69% 14.12 100% 449 34% 5.55 92% 101 71% 11.31 1.90 100% 55% 241
AZO 47% 7.02 99% 179 30% 4.88 96% 87 54% 5.78 2.87 98% 81% 118
BAC 79% 19.08 100% 774 45% 7.03 98% 157 80% 13.55 0.80 99% 25% 397
BDX 63% 10.77 100% 362 28% 4.85 92% 79 65% 8.90 1.53 100% 46% 195
BK 74% 15.56 100% 610 36% 5.36 93% 117 75% 11.90 0.80 100% 26% 313
BSX 58% 7.55 88% 338 31% 3.60 71% 106 62% 5.74 0.88 82% 24% 189
BTU 72% 14.75 100% 527 35% 6.03 97% 103 74% 11.96 1.63 100% 44% 277
CAT 71% 14.80 100% 498 33% 5.75 94% 94 72% 12.14 1.55 100% 46% 262
CB 64% 12.61 100% 378 33% 5.47 95% 102 66% 9.41 1.57 99% 44% 202
CCL 70% 14.16 100% 478 32% 5.31 94% 93 71% 11.44 1.17 100% 37% 247
CINF 70% 11.66 99% 552 39% 5.35 96% 141 72% 8.28 1.28 98% 40% 297
CME 35% 5.46 96% 112 24% 4.31 88% 63 44% 4.73 2.78 96% 71% 78
COH 69% 13.13 100% 457 29% 4.75 93% 80 70% 11.06 1.12 100% 31% 238
COP 68% 12.79 100% 450 35% 5.69 92% 107 70% 10.25 1.76 100% 49% 240
CVH 65% 11.74 99% 418 35% 5.05 93% 114 67% 8.43 1.35 97% 37% 222
DNR 69% 13.78 99% 471 32% 4.89 92% 101 70% 10.43 1.27 99% 37% 246
DVN 65% 12.11 100% 414 33% 5.57 95% 96 68% 9.61 2.12 98% 60% 226
EFX 56% 9.47 99% 289 31% 4.75 89% 101 60% 7.13 2.26 98% 55% 167
ETN 65% 11.01 100% 389 25% 4.43 86% 69 67% 9.85 1.47 99% 43% 209
FISV 63% 11.09 100% 380 28% 4.82 93% 79 65% 9.08 1.25 100% 38% 201
HAS 67% 12.36 100% 427 32% 5.15 95% 97 68% 9.67 1.17 100% 34% 223
HCP 67% 13.82 100% 417 31% 5.07 90% 91 68% 10.92 1.33 100% 42% 217
HOT 68% 12.94 100% 438 27% 4.75 88% 74 70% 11.00 1.48 100% 40% 231
KSS 71% 14.10 100% 525 31% 5.16 93% 91 72% 11.86 1.14 100% 37% 274
LLL 67% 12.34 98% 485 36% 6.00 95% 117 70% 9.68 2.14 98% 57% 270
LMT 72% 14.14 100% 516 35% 5.80 96% 105 73% 11.35 1.83 100% 51% 277
M 75% 16.61 100% 640 35% 5.10 93% 108 76% 12.80 1.13 100% 38% 330
MAR 71% 15.10 100% 498 34% 5.54 95% 105 72% 11.41 1.18 100% 36% 258
MFE 68% 13.19 100% 463 31% 4.82 88% 93 69% 10.27 0.89 100% 30% 239
MHP 68% 12.41 99% 489 31% 5.09 93% 96 70% 9.94 1.04 99% 33% 257
MHS 66% 11.97 100% 414 28% 4.81 89% 80 68% 10.03 1.50 99% 40% 218
MRK 69% 13.26 100% 451 31% 4.99 92% 93 70% 10.41 1.02 100% 29% 235
MRO 69% 14.16 100% 465 35% 5.38 96% 104 70% 10.67 1.12 100% 35% 241
MWV 68% 12.55 100% 452 34% 5.30 96% 102 69% 9.66 1.01 100% 33% 237
NEM 71% 13.90 100% 490 34% 5.77 92% 100 72% 11.38 1.90 100% 54% 260
OMC 65% 12.40 100% 411 30% 4.90 93% 88 67% 9.85 1.22 100% 39% 216
PCS 53% 6.52 86% 297 35% 4.08 74% 169 58% 4.47 1.43 81% 35% 195
PHM 66% 11.27 99% 416 35% 4.76 93% 115 68% 8.40 1.22 98% 38% 224
PKI 53% 7.96 96% 263 28% 3.98 82% 89 57% 6.16 1.70 93% 47% 148
R 63% 10.90 100% 352 27% 4.80 96% 71 65% 9.02 1.58 100% 44% 188
RAI 66% 11.39 100% 422 36% 5.60 98% 111 68% 8.64 1.42 100% 43% 224
SLB 76% 16.27 100% 644 32% 5.31 89% 94 77% 13.91 1.56 100% 47% 336
TE 54% 7.76 91% 301 37% 4.65 82% 175 60% 5.27 1.96 86% 45% 200
TWC 64% 12.24 99% 377 31% 5.21 86% 93 66% 9.67 1.70 99% 45% 201
WHR 65% 11.10 100% 394 29% 5.03 95% 85 67% 9.27 1.86 100% 52% 217
WIN 44% 4.32 72% 243 41% 4.74 75% 249 58% 2.60 2.55 58% 47% 206
WPI 66% 11.46 99% 437 32% 4.80 93% 100 68% 8.95 1.35 99% 46% 232
XTO 65% 13.26 100% 399 21% 3.78 78% 54 66% 11.72 1.42 100% 40% 209
Average 65% 12.08 98% 429 32% 5.08 91% 103 67% 9.53 1.51 97% 43% 231
Table 2.3 presents the average results of regressions:










i OFIk,i + θˆ
T
i TIk,i + ˆ
D
k,i,
where ∆Pk,i are the 10-second mid-price changes, OFIk,i are the contemporaneous order flow imbalances and TIk,i are the contem-
poraneous trade imbalances. These regressions were estimated using 273 half-hour subsamples (indexed by i) for each stock and their
outputs were averaged across subsamples. Each subsample typically contains about 180 observations (indexed by k). The t-statistics
were computed using Newey-West standard errors. For each of three regressions, Table 2.3 reports the average R2, the average t-statistic
of the coefficient(s), the percentage of samples where the coefficient(s) passed the z-test at the 5% significance level and the F-statistic
of the regression.
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Table 2.4: Relation between the price impact coefficient and market depth.
Ticker
Parameter estimates Fit measures





AMD 0.53 1.04 31.06 2.0 22.5 1.0 78% 86% 86%
APOL 0.30 0.38 4.59 -3.2 1.1 -1.8 3% 34% 35%
AXP 0.45 1.01 26.27 -3.2 45.8 0.6 90% 87% 87%
AZO 0.45 0.70 5.47 -0.7 5.2 -2.2 14% 17% 16%
BAC 0.87 1.10 31.80 13.6 19.1 1.7 80% 89% 89%
BDX 0.48 1.03 23.91 -1.2 22.2 0.6 74% 71% 71%
BK 0.47 1.04 28.28 -1.9 68.5 2.5 94% 94% 94%
BSX 0.51 1.02 15.23 0.3 24.1 0.4 73% 81% 81%
BTU 0.58 1.10 45.36 6.2 53.8 5.0 93% 90% 90%
CAT 0.48 1.01 35.12 -1.4 20.7 0.2 91% 91% 90%
CB 0.53 1.09 32.41 2.1 63.6 5.5 93% 91% 91%
CCL 0.45 1.04 35.26 -3.6 41.9 1.5 89% 86% 86%
CINF 0.43 1.03 25.48 -4.2 52.5 1.7 93% 90% 90%
CME 1.21 0.35 2.10 1.2 1.4 -2.7 1% 2% 2%
COH 0.61 1.11 15.35 2.9 44.7 4.3 81% 83% 82%
COP 0.32 0.94 13.77 -8.1 22.6 -1.6 82% 79% 79%
CVH 0.54 1.13 26.92 2.2 37.9 4.2 88% 90% 89%
DNR 0.55 1.10 40.77 3.6 44.9 3.9 92% 90% 90%
DVN 0.34 0.91 16.15 -7.8 19.3 -2.0 48% 61% 61%
EFX 0.43 1.05 19.58 -3.0 27.1 1.2 84% 80% 80%
ETN 0.64 1.11 13.55 2.9 20.8 2.1 65% 63% 63%
FISV 0.47 1.04 25.33 -1.7 34.1 1.3 85% 80% 80%
HAS 0.52 1.08 27.80 1.3 49.8 3.8 90% 86% 85%
HCP 0.37 1.00 33.13 -11.3 64.7 0.0 95% 94% 94%
HOT 0.61 1.13 28.19 5.2 37.7 4.3 87% 87% 87%
KSS 0.59 1.09 28.99 4.3 41.7 3.4 90% 85% 85%
LLL 0.57 1.02 15.30 1.9 14.5 0.3 53% 65% 65%
LMT 0.72 1.17 7.93 2.4 15.6 2.3 69% 63% 63%
M 0.52 1.06 24.92 1.0 52.1 3.0 94% 92% 92%
MAR 0.50 1.06 22.26 0.0 52.7 3.1 92% 89% 89%
MFE 0.47 1.06 22.12 -1.3 45.3 2.7 92% 89% 89%
MHP 0.45 1.02 20.58 -2.1 38.1 0.6 83% 78% 78%
MHS 0.71 1.16 19.88 5.9 39.5 5.3 88% 87% 86%
MRK 0.31 0.94 21.38 -12.8 36.3 -2.3 87% 84% 84%
MRO 0.55 1.09 28.87 2.4 51.9 4.2 94% 94% 94%
MWV 0.54 1.13 28.16 2.2 39.3 4.6 90% 87% 87%
NEM 0.51 1.07 31.09 0.4 39.3 2.6 89% 88% 88%
OMC 0.52 1.04 36.61 1.1 19.5 0.7 86% 90% 90%
PCS 0.43 1.06 22.79 -3.4 18.6 1.1 53% 83% 83%
PHM 0.62 1.10 39.56 7.7 36.6 3.3 87% 92% 92%
PKI 0.49 1.14 29.01 -0.5 34.7 4.4 80% 87% 86%
R 0.50 1.05 17.43 -0.1 15.8 0.7 58% 59% 59%
RAI 0.51 1.07 26.19 0.4 47.3 3.1 88% 79% 79%
SLB 0.56 1.08 23.39 2.5 47.6 3.6 92% 94% 93%
TE 0.35 1.10 12.12 -5.1 25.1 2.2 70% 85% 86%
TWC 0.55 1.07 22.29 1.9 18.9 1.2 73% 85% 84%
WHR 1.09 1.25 12.66 6.9 13.4 2.7 51% 54% 53%
WIN 17.21 1.80 13.95 13.5 12.2 5.4 35% 72% 74%
WPI 0.39 0.99 19.57 -5.6 32.6 -0.4 79% 77% 77%
XTO 0.97 1.19 27.70 13.46 35.64 5.77 88% 91% 90%
Grand mean 0.88 1.05 23.55 0.59 33.40 1.99 76% 79% 79%
Table 2.4 presents the results of regressions:
log βˆi = ˆαL,i − λˆ logDi + ˆL,i,




where βˆi is the price impact coefficient for the i-th half-hour subsample and Di is the average market depth for
that subsample. These regressions were estimated for each of the 50 stocks, using 273 estimates of βˆi for that stock,
obtained from (2.15). The second regression uses estimates λˆ obtained from the first regression. The t-statistics were
computed using Newey-West standard errors. The last three columns provide three alternative fit measures - the
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Table 2.5: Comparison of traded volume and order flow imbalance.
Ticker
Avg Stdev Order flow imbalance Traded volume Both covariates
Hˆ Hˆ R2 t(βˆOi ) β
O
i 6= 0 F R2 t(βˆVi ) βVi 6= 0 F R2 t(φˆOi ) t(φˆVi ) φOi 6= 0 φVi 6= 0 F
AMD 0.06 0.08 63% 11.7 100% 356 14% 4.6 87% 34 63% 10.8 1.2 99% 38% 182
APOL 0.24 0.08 53% 9.1 97% 258 25% 6.9 100% 63 57% 7.6 3.3 94% 86% 144
AXP 0.16 0.08 55% 11.3 100% 249 20% 6.8 100% 48 57% 9.7 2.9 100% 82% 133
AZO 0.43 0.22 39% 6.3 98% 131 32% 5.8 100% 93 50% 5.0 3.9 97% 98% 98
BAC 0.09 0.08 73% 17.6 100% 560 24% 6.0 89% 61 74% 15.3 1.3 97% 40% 285
BDX 0.26 0.10 55% 9.4 100% 261 27% 6.5 100% 71 58% 7.6 3.1 99% 85% 147
BK 0.11 0.07 68% 14.1 100% 437 19% 6.7 97% 46 68% 12.6 2.0 100% 58% 225
BSX -0.17 2.41 68% 10.3 100% 486 14% 3.4 97% 33 69% 10.1 0.0 99% 13% 246
BTU 0.24 0.07 58% 11.4 100% 283 23% 7.1 99% 57 60% 9.7 2.6 100% 81% 151
CAT 0.22 0.07 56% 11.0 100% 250 19% 6.3 99% 44 57% 9.7 2.3 100% 68% 131
CB 0.19 0.09 56% 11.1 100% 261 23% 6.5 99% 58 58% 9.1 2.8 100% 76% 141
CCL 0.14 0.07 60% 12.2 100% 309 19% 6.7 99% 45 62% 10.8 2.5 100% 77% 162
CINF 0.13 0.12 67% 12.0 100% 505 30% 6.2 98% 85 69% 10.3 2.1 100% 58% 268
CME 0.49 0.24 28% 4.8 98% 78 30% 5.3 100% 83 42% 3.9 4.1 94% 99% 71
COH 0.19 0.07 60% 11.3 100% 299 22% 6.5 99% 52 61% 9.8 2.4 100% 73% 157
COP 0.16 0.07 56% 10.5 100% 277 20% 6.1 97% 49 58% 9.2 2.5 100% 74% 145
CVH 0.18 0.10 62% 11.4 100% 352 27% 6.1 100% 72 64% 9.2 2.4 100% 73% 189
DNR 0.08 0.07 64% 13.4 100% 376 17% 6.4 95% 38 65% 12.0 1.9 99% 57% 193
DVN 0.26 0.07 52% 9.6 97% 236 24% 6.9 100% 59 55% 8.0 3.2 96% 85% 131
EFX 0.20 0.11 52% 9.1 100% 241 26% 5.6 99% 69 56% 7.3 2.8 99% 77% 137
ETN 0.26 0.10 55% 9.1 99% 252 27% 6.6 99% 70 58% 7.6 3.1 98% 85% 142
FISV 0.19 0.11 57% 10.1 100% 284 25% 6.0 100% 65 59% 8.3 2.4 100% 70% 153
HAS 0.20 0.09 61% 11.3 100% 328 26% 6.3 100% 67 63% 9.5 2.5 100% 76% 175
HCP 0.14 0.07 57% 11.8 100% 268 21% 7.1 99% 50 59% 10.0 2.8 100% 80% 143
HOT 0.23 0.08 57% 10.5 99% 263 24% 7.2 100% 60 60% 9.0 3.2 99% 88% 145
KSS 0.24 0.08 60% 11.6 100% 318 25% 6.8 99% 61 62% 9.8 2.6 99% 78% 169
LLL 0.33 0.12 58% 10.3 97% 323 34% 7.2 100% 101 63% 7.9 3.4 96% 92% 188
LMT 0.28 0.09 61% 11.6 100% 327 31% 7.6 100% 85 64% 9.3 3.1 100% 85% 182
M 0.11 0.07 69% 15.2 100% 463 20% 6.3 100% 46 69% 13.5 2.0 100% 63% 238
MAR 0.15 0.07 61% 13.3 100% 324 21% 7.0 99% 50 62% 11.5 2.5 100% 74% 170
MFE 0.16 0.09 60% 11.7 100% 318 24% 7.0 98% 62 62% 9.7 2.6 100% 73% 170
MHP 0.20 0.10 62% 11.6 100% 377 25% 6.1 100% 62 64% 9.7 2.0 100% 56% 199
MHS 0.23 0.08 56% 10.0 100% 258 24% 6.7 100% 58 58% 8.4 2.9 100% 80% 139
MRK 0.10 0.07 62% 12.1 100% 330 17% 5.5 99% 40 63% 10.8 1.9 100% 60% 170
MRO 0.09 0.06 61% 12.7 100% 333 16% 6.4 97% 36 63% 11.5 2.0 100% 56% 172
MWV 0.18 0.10 62% 11.3 100% 330 28% 6.9 100% 75 64% 9.2 2.6 100% 79% 180
NEM 0.20 0.07 56% 10.6 100% 253 20% 6.3 99% 47 58% 9.3 2.6 100% 79% 135
OMC 0.15 0.09 57% 11.0 100% 286 20% 6.4 98% 48 59% 9.4 2.5 100% 75% 151
PCS 0.11 0.18 62% 8.9 100% 411 18% 3.8 98% 54 63% 8.4 0.8 100% 28% 214
PHM 0.07 0.08 64% 11.5 100% 384 15% 5.4 91% 34 65% 10.7 1.2 100% 41% 195
PKI 0.11 0.11 55% 9.0 99% 266 20% 4.8 98% 47 57% 7.8 1.9 98% 55% 141
R 0.27 0.11 56% 9.8 99% 259 28% 6.3 100% 74 59% 7.9 3.1 99% 87% 147
RAI 0.25 0.10 61% 10.6 100% 334 28% 5.9 99% 73 63% 8.8 2.6 100% 75% 182
SLB 0.24 0.07 62% 12.5 99% 330 19% 5.8 97% 46 63% 11.2 1.9 99% 56% 171
TE 0.09 1.69 60% 9.6 100% 371 18% 4.5 84% 48 61% 8.7 1.3 99% 43% 196
TWC 0.25 0.10 55% 10.5 100% 253 27% 6.8 100% 73 58% 8.4 3.1 99% 83% 142
WHR 0.34 0.11 56% 9.2 99% 272 29% 6.6 100% 78 59% 7.5 3.2 98% 88% 156
WIN 0.06 0.26 48% 5.5 86% 340 10% 2.9 50% 34 49% 5.3 0.6 85% 31% 179
WPI 0.22 0.10 61% 11.0 100% 361 28% 5.9 100% 75 64% 9.0 2.4 99% 71% 196
XTO 0.08 0.06 53% 11.3 100% 238 15% 6.6 100% 32 55% 10.0 2.8 100% 82% 125
Average 0.18 0.18 58% 10.9 99% 313 23% 6.1 97% 58 61% 9.3 2.4 99% 70% 168
Table 2.5 presents the average results of regressions:
|∆Pk,i| = αˆOi + βˆOi |OFIk,i|+ ˆOk,i,
|∆Pk,i| = αˆVi + βˆVi V OLHˆik,i + ˆVk,i,
|∆Pk,i| = αˆWi + φˆOi |OFIk,i|+ φˆVi V OLHˆik,i + ˆWk,i,
where ∆Pk,i are the 10-second mid-price changes, OFIk,i are the contemporaneous order flow imbalances and V OLk,i
are the contemporaneous trade volumes. The exponents Hˆi were estimated in each subsample beforehand using a
logarithmic regression: log |∆Pk,i| = log θˆi + Hˆi log V OLk,i + log |ξˆk,i|. These regressions were estimated using 273
half-hour subsamples (indexed by i) for each stock and their outputs were averaged across subsamples. Each subsample
typically contains about 180 observations (indexed by k). The t-statistics were computed using Newey-West standard
errors. For each of three regressions, Table 2.5 reports the average R2, the average t-statistic of the coefficient(s), the
percentage of samples where the coefficient(s) passed the z-sest at the 5% significance level and the F-statistic of the
regression.
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2.5.2 Transaction prices
To reconcile our results with earlier studies that operate in transaction time, we repeated





for L trades, instead of differences in mid-prices ∆Pk. We picked at random five stocks from
our sample (BDX, CB, MHS, PHM and PKI), and computed ∆LP
t
k for L = 2, 5, 10 trades
(we avoided using L = 1 because of possible issues with order direction estimation). Using
the same inter-trade time intervals we computed concurrent OFI and TI variables. To
ensure that there is an ample amount of data for each regression, we pooled data across
days for each stock and each intraday time subsample, resulting in 13 samples for each stock
over a month of data. The results averaged across time and stocks are presented in Table
2.6 and closely mirror our results for mid prices. The variable OFIk explains price changes
better than TIk on stand-alone basis. Moreover, the effect of trades on prices seems to be
captured by the order flow imbalance, i.e. the variable TIk loses its statistical significance
19.
when used together with OFIk in the regression. The increase in R
2 from adding TIk as
an extra regressor is almost nill (0.65%, 0.18%, 0.24% for L = 1, 2, 5 respectively).
Table 2.6: Comparison of order flow imbalance and trade imbalance for transaction prices.
Lag
Order flow imbalance Trade imbalance Both covariates
R2 t(βˆi) {βi 6= 0} F R2 t(βˆTi ) {βTi 6= 0} F R2 t(θˆOi ) t(θˆTi ) {θOi 6= 0} {θTi 6= 0} F
L = 2 14% 15.03 100% 464 1% 2.97 69% 26 15% 14.19 -2.90 100% 71% 245
L = 5 38% 16.68 98% 753 8% 4.79 88% 113 39% 15.13 -0.14 98% 14% 379
L = 10 51% 14.85 98% 655 13% 4.85 88% 100 51% 13.21 0.70 98% 11% 329
Interestingly, we found that the relation between trade price changes and OFIk (or TIk)
is sometimes concave. We estimated regressions (2.15) and (2.17a) for trade price changes
∆LP
t
k with additional quadratic variable OFIk|OFIk| and found that average t-statistics
of its coefficient are, respectively -3.02, -4.10 and -3.85 for L = 1, 2, 5 trades. The quadratic
term is significant at a 5% level in 60%, 74% and 85% of samples for respective values of
L, and we did not observe any pattern in these t-statistics, neither across stock nor across
time. In the trade imbalance regression the coefficient near quadratic variable TIk|TIk| is
also significant with average t-statistics -3.64, -5.53, -5.48 for respective lag values and it is
19Here we also use Newey-West standard errors because regression residuals have statistically significant
autocorrelation
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significant in even a larger fraction of samples.
From these results it appears that price impact is concave when prices are sampled at
trade times, but it is linear when they are sampled at regular time intervals. This effect
may be a consequence of sampling data at special times (i.e. trade times), which introduces
systematic biases into the regression. If traders submit large orders when they expect their
impact to be minimal, it would lead to a concave (sublinear) price impact. Supporting
the idea of a sampling bias, we found that when mid-price changes are sampled at trade
times, the price impact of OFIk is again concave - the quadratic term in the regression
is statistically significant in a large fraction of our samples. We also regressed changes in
last trade prices sampled regularly at a 1-minute frequency on OFIk, and observed concave
price impact once again. This may again be attributed to a dependent variable bias - since
trades are relatively infrequent, for many time intervals the trade prices are going to be
stale and trade price changes are equal to zero, while mid price changes are not.
2.5.3 Order flow at higher order book levels
The level of detail in our Level 2 auxiliary data set allows us to analyze contributions of
order flows at different price levels to price formation and to confirm our claim that price
changes are mostly driven by activity at the top of the order book (thus Level 1 data is
sufficient to study the impact of limit orders on prices).
For example, consider the bid side of the order book with 10 shares at the top two levels.
Absent any activity on the ask side and the second bid level, an OFI of -11 shares will lead
to a bid price change of -1 tick. However, if 9 orders at the second bid level cancel before
that order flow happens, the same OFI of -11 shares will lead to a price change of -2 ticks.
In other words, if order activity up to second (third, fourth etc) level is important, tracking
OFI only at the best prices will give a flawed picture of price dynamics.
To test this assertion, we compute variables OFIm,m = 2, . . . , 5 from m-th level queue
fluctuations similarly to (2.12) and relabel OFI1 = OFI. Then we fit five regressions,










k,i, M = 1, . . . , 5 (2.30)
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The average results across time for a representative stock are shown on Figure 2.11. The
average increase in explanatory power (measured by R2) from adding OFI2 as a regressor
is 6.22%, which is quite small compared to the stand-alone R2 of 70.83% for OFI1. The
effect of OFI3 − OFI5 is very small, and their coefficients appear to be only marginally
significant, in contrast with those of OFI1 and OFI2. The cross-time average of coefficients
βˆ1,1i in the simple regression
20 with OFI1 is 0.0597. In the multiple regression with OFI1
and OFI2 the averages of their respective coefficients are 0.0673 and 0.0406. We conclude
that second-level activity, as summarized by OFI2, has only a second-order influence on
price changes, which are mainly driven by OFI1. The effect of OFI3−OFI5 is almost nill.
Figure 2.11: Cross-time average increase in R2 from inclusion of variables OFI2 − OFI5,
and cross-time average Newey-West t-statistics of their coefficient in the regression with all
five variables, with NASDAQ ITCH data for the Schlumberger stock (SLB).
2.5.4 Choice of timescale
Using the auxiliary Level 2 dataset, we verify that our results are robust to potential issues
in TAQ data, namely odd-lot sized orders at the best bid and offer, and mis-sequencing in
quote data across exchanges during NBBO construction. We also compare our results across
20This coefficient is higher than the one obtained with NBBO data, because NASDAQ best quote depth
is smaller than NBBO depth
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a wide range of timescales. The auxiliary data comes from a single exchange (NASDAQ),
has information on orders of all sizes and has timestamps up to a millisecond.
We estimate the regression (2.15) for a variety of timescales ∆t, ranging from 50 millisec-
onds to 5 minutes using separate intraday subsamples as before. The size of these samples
was different in order to stabilize the number of observations per sample. More precisely,
data for the smallest timescales (50, 100 and 500 milliseconds) was separated into 1-minute
instead of 30-minute subsamples to make numerical computations feasible. Data for the
largest timescales (30 seconds to 5 minutes) was pooled across days preserving separate 30-
minute intraday intervals to have a large number of observations per sample. The average
R2 and Newey-West t-statistics for OFI across time for each ∆t are presented on Figure
2.12.
Figure 2.12: Average R2 and Newey-West t-statistics for OFI coefficient across time for
different ∆t, with NASDAQ ITCH data for the Schlumberger stock (SLB).
The goodness of fit is stable across ∆t, despite pronounced discreteness of data for very
short time intervals. The OFI variable is statistically significant at a 95% level21 in more
than 80% of samples for ∆t below one second, 100% of samples for ∆t between one second
and 2 minutes, and 92% of samples for ∆t equal 5 minutes.
Notably there are many large price changes even when we consider ∆t equal to 50
21using Newey-West t-statistics
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milliseconds, but they usually correspond to high values of OFI. This is consistent with
findings in [57], where authors describe the sporadic character of order activity in modern
markets. When a subset of traders reacts to market updates in a matter of several millisec-
onds, this creates short intervals of increased activity with possibly large price changes and
large OFI, and many time intervals with no activity when both variables are equal to zero.
From our findings it appears that the simple model (2.7) can capture both of these regimes.
When a quadratic term γˆQi OFIk,i|OFIk,i| is added to the regression, the coefficient γˆQi
is significant in a handful of samples (10 out of 871) for ∆t bigger or equal to one second.
For ∆t under one second, the quadratic term is significant in about 16% of samples, and its
contribution is marginal (about 3% increase in average R2). We conclude that the relation
between price changes and OFI is linear, irrespective of a timescale.
2.6 Conclusion
We have introduced order flow imbalance, a variable that cumulates the sizes of order book
events, treating the contributions of market, limit and cancel orders equally, and provided
empirical and theoretical evidence for a linear relation between high-frequency price changes
and order flow imbalance for individual stocks. We have shown that this linear model is
robust across stocks and timescales, and the price impact coefficient is inversely proportional
to market depth. These relations suggest that prices respond to changes in the supply and
demand for shares at the best quotes, and that the impact coefficient fluctuates with the
amount of liquidity provision, or depth, in the market. Moreover, we have demonstrated
that order flow imbalance is a more general metric of supply/demand dynamics than trade
imbalance, and it can be used to analyze intraday changes in volatility, and monitor possible
adverse selection in limit order executions. Trades seem to carry little to no information
about price changes after the simultaneous order flow imbalance is taken into account. If
trades do not help to explain price changes after controlling for the order flow imbalance, it is
highly possible that the relation between the magnitude of price changes, or price volatility
and traded volume simply captures the noisy scaling relation between these variables.
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Chapter 3
Optimal order placement in limit
order markets
This chapter is based on the paper ”Optimal Order Placement in Limit Order Markets” [27]
which is a joint work with Professor Rama Cont.
3.1 Introduction
When [a group of brokers] thinks it is advisable to sell shares, the means for
prudently carrying out this purpose are given much thought. The members ini-
tiate action only when they can foresee its result, so that, apart from unlucky
incidents, they can reckon on rather sure success.
Joseph de la Vega, Confusion de confusiones, 1688
In today’s automated, electronic financial markets, the trading process is divided into
several stages, each taking place on a different time horizon: portfolio allocation decisions
are usually made on a monthly or daily basis and translate into trades that are executed
over time intervals of several minutes to several days. Existing studies on optimal trade
execution [15; 6] have investigated how the execution cost of a large trade may be reduced
by splitting it into multiple orders spread in time. Once this order scheduling decision
is taken, one still needs to specify how each individual order should be placed: this order
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placement decision involves the choice of an order type (limit order or market order), order
size and destination, when multiple trading venues are available. We focus here on this
order placement problem: given an order which has been scheduled, deciding what type of
order –market or limit order– and which trading venue to submit it to.
Orders are filled over short time intervals of a few milliseconds to several minutes and
the mechanism through which orders are filled in the limit order book are relevant for such
order placement decisions. When trading large portfolios, market participants need to make
such decisions repeatedly, thousands of times a day, and their outcomes have a large impact
on each participant’s transaction cost as well as on aggregate market dynamics.
Early work on optimal trade execution [15; 6] did not explicitly model the process
whereby each order is filled, but more recent formulations have tried to incorporate some
elements in this direction. In one stream of literature (see [97], [3], [104]) a trader is restricted
to using market orders whose execution costs are given by an idealized order book shape
function. Another approach is to model the process through which an order is filled as a
dynamic random process ([25; 26]) and thus formulate the optimal execution problem as a
stochastic control problem: this formulation has been studied in various setting with limit
orders ([14], [52]) or limit and market orders [53; 65] but its complexity makes it intractable
unless restrictive assumptions are made on price and order book dynamics.
In the present work, we adopt a simpler, more tractable approach: assuming that the
trade execution schedule has been specified, we focus on the task of filling each order.
Decoupling the scheduling problem from the order placement problem leads to a more
tractable approach which is closer to market practice and allows us to incorporate some
realistic features which matter for order placement decisions, while conserving analytical
tractability.
Individual order placement and order routing decisions play an important role in modern
financial markets. Brokers are commonly obliged by law to deliver the best execution quality
to their clients and empirical evidence confirms that a large percentage of market orders in
the U.S. and Europe is sent to trading venues providing lower execution costs or smaller
delays [17; 46]. Market orders gravitate towards exchanges with larger posted quote sizes
and low fees, while limit orders are submitted to exchanges with high rebates and lower
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execution waiting times (see [94]). These studies demonstrate how investors’ aggregate order
routing decisions have a significant influence on market dynamics, but a systematic study of
the order routing problem from the investor’s perspective is lacking. A reduced-form model
for routing an infinitesimal limit order to a single destination is used by [94], while [49] and
[82] propose numerical algorithms to optimize order executions across multiple dark pools,
where supply/demand is unobserved. To the best of our knowledge this work is the first
to provide a detailed treatment of investor’s order placement decision in a multi-exchange
market, unified with the market/limit order choice.
Our key contribution is a quantitative formulation of the order placement problem which
takes into account multiple important factors - the size of an order to be executed, lengths
of order queues across exchanges, statistical properties of order flows in these exchanges,
trader’s execution preferences, and the structure of liquidity rebates across trading venues.
Our problem formulation is tractable, intuitive and blends the aforementioned factors into
an optimal allocation of limit orders and market orders across available trading venues.
Order routing heuristics employed in practice commonly depend on past order fill rates at
each exchange and are inherently backward-looking. In contrast, our approach is forward-
looking - the optimal order allocation depends on current queue sizes and distributions
of future trading volumes across exchanges. When only a single exchange is available for
execution, this order placement problem reduces to the problem of choosing an optimal split
between market orders and limit orders. We derive an explicit solution for this problem
and analyze its sensitivity to the order size, the trader’s urgency for filling the order and
other factors. Similar results are also established in a case of two trading venues under
some assumptions on order flow distributions. Finally, we propose a numerical method for
solving the order placement problem in a general case and demonstrate its efficiency through
examples. Our numerical examples show that the use of our optimal order placement
method allows to substantially decrease trading costs in comparison with some simple order
placement strategies.
An important aspect of our framework is to account for the execution risk, i.e. the risk
of not filling an order, through the incorporation of a penalty for such outcomes. This is
different from most other studies which focus on the risk of price variations over the course
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of a trade execution [6; 64] but assume that orders are always filled, or studies that ignore
execution risks altogether [15; 14]. In our framework the penalty for execution risk plays
an important role. When it is costly to catch up on the unfilled portion of the order, the
optimal allocation shifts from limit to market orders. Although market orders are executed
at a less favorable price, their execution is more certain and it becomes optimal to use
them when the execution risk is a primary concern. Optimal limit order sizes are strongly
influenced by total quantities of orders queueing for execution at each exchange and by
distributions of order outflows from these queues. For example, if the queue size at one of
the exchanges is much smaller than the expected future order outflow there, it is optimal
to place a larger limit order on that exchange. According to a related study [94] such
favorable limit order placement opportunities vanish in equilibrium due to competition and
strategic order routing of individual traders. However the empirical results in that study
also show that short-term deviations from the equilibrium are a norm, and can therefore
be exploited in our optimization framework to improve limit order placement decisions.
Finally, we find that the targeted execution size plays an important role - limit orders are
used predominantly to execute small sizes and market orders are used to execute larger
quantities, as long as their cost is less than the penalty for falling behind the target. This
is a due to the fact that the amount of limit orders that can be realistically filled at each
exchange is naturally constrained by the corresponding queue size and the order outflow
distribution, so to execute larger quantities the trader needs to rely on market orders.
We find that the optimal order allocation almost always sends limit orders to all available
exchanges in an attempt to diversify execution risk, which suggests a benefit in having
multiple exchanges. However, when order flows on different exchanges are highly positively
correlated, these diversification advantages fade and the cost of execution becomes higher
than on a single consolidated exchange.
Section 3.2 describes our formulation of the order placement problem and presents simple
and intuitive conditions for the existence of an optimal order placement. In Section 3.3 we
derive an optimal split between market and limit orders for a single exchange. Section
3.4 analyzes the general case of order placement on multiple trading venues. Section 3.5
presents a numerical algorithm for solving the order placement problem in a general case
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and our simulation results, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The order placement problem
Consider a trader who has a mandate to buy S shares of a stock within a (short) time interval
[0, T ]. The deadline T may be a fixed time horizon (e.g. 1 minute) or a stopping time (e.g.
triggered by price changes or trading volume dynamics). To gain queue priority, the trader
can immediately submit K limit orders of sizes Lk to multiple exchanges k = 1, . . . ,K and
also market orders for M shares. The trader’s order placement decision is thus summarized
by a vectorX
∆
= (M,L1, . . . , LK) ∈ RK+1+ of order sizes whose components are non-negative
(only buy orders are allowed). Our objective is to define a meaningful framework in which
the trader may choose between various possibilities for this order placement decision, for
example between sending an order to a single exchange or splitting it in some proportion
across K exchanges.
Our focus here is on limit order placement and we assume for simplicity that a market
order of any size M ≤ S can be filled immediately and with certainty at any exchange.
Under this assumption sending market orders to exchanges with high fees is clearly sub-
optimal and we therefore consider a single exchange with the smallest liquidity fee f for
the purpose of sending a single market order1 of size M . Limit orders with quantities
(L1, . . . , LK) join queues of (Q1, . . . , QK) pre-existing orders at the best bids of K limit
order books, where Qk ≥ 0, i.e. empty queues are allowed which corresponds to sending an
order inside the bid-ask spread. We assume that all K limit orders submitted by the trader
have the same price (the national best bid price), but this can be generalized to having
multiple prices at the expense of additional notation2.
1This simplifying assumption is reasonable as long as the target size S is small relative to the prevailing
market depth. Otherwise the quantity S can be filled with multiple market orders at exchanges with
progressively larger fees f1 < f2 < · · · < fK , and the total cost of these market orders becomes a convex
piecewise linear function. Our results extend to this case, but to avoid additional notation we assume that
S can be executed with a single market order at a fee f so the market order cost is linear in its size.
2In our framework the only difference between submitting a limit order to the best bid price and deeper in
the order book is that orders deeper in the book have lower costs and larger queue sizes - i.e. in addition to
orders queued at the same price they need to wait for all higher-priced buy orders to clear from the market.
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Denote by (x)+
∆
= max(x, 0). If the trader does not modify his limit orders before time
T , the amount purchased with each limit order by time T can be explicitly computed as a
function of future order flow:
min(max(ξk −Qk, 0), Lk) = (ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − Lk)+, k = 1, . . . ,K,
where ξk is a total outflow from the front of the k-th order queue. The order outflow ξk
consists of order cancelations that occurred before time T from queue positions in front of an
order Lk, and of marketable orders that reach the k-th exchange before T . The mechanics
of limit order fills and order outflows are further illustrated on Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Limit order execution on exchange k depends on the order size Lk, the queue
Qk in front of it, total sizes of order cancelations Ck and marketable orders Dk, specifically
on ξk = Ck +Dk.
We note that limit order fill amounts are random because they depend on random
future bid queue outflows ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξK). The random variable ξ is defined with respect
to an execution time horizon T , therefore its distribution depends on a trader’s choice of T .
Here we do not make any assumptions regarding the distribution of ξ except for illustration
purposes. In fact our formulation leads to an intuitive iterative procedure that approximates
the optimal order allocation by using historical data and also does not require specifying a
distribution for ξ.
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The total amount of shares A(X, ξ) bought by the trader by time T with his limit and
market orders is a function of the order allocation X and an overall bid queue outflow ξ:
A(X, ξ) = M +
K∑
k=1
((ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − Lk)+) (3.1)
The total price of this purchase is divided into a benchmark cost paid regardless of
trader’s decisions, computed using a mid-quote price level, and an execution cost relative




(h+ rk)((ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − Lk)+), (3.2)
where h is a half of the bid-ask spread at time 0, f is the lowest available fee for taking
liquidity and rk, k = 1, . . . ,K are rebates for adding liquidity on different exchanges. The
benchmark price in our formulation is the mid-quote price at time 0, so in (3.2) the trader
saves half of the bid-ask spread plus liquidity rebates on his limit orders, and pays half of
the spread plus a liquidity fee on his market orders. Limit orders reduce the cost but lead
to a risk of falling behind the target quantity S because their fills are random. To capture
this execution risk we include, in the objective function, a penalty for violations of target
quantity in both directions:
λu (S −A(X, ξ))+ + λo (A(X, ξ)− S)+ , (3.3)
where λu ≥ 0, λo ≥ 0 are marginal penalties in dollars per share for, respectively falling
behind or exceeding the execution target S. These penalties are motivated by a correlation
that exists between limit order executions and price movements (so-called adverse selection,
see e.g. [107]). If A(X, ξ) < S, the trader has to purchase the remaining S−A(X, ξ) shares
at time T with market orders. Adverse selection implies that conditionally on the event
{A(X, ξ) < S} prices have likely moved up and the transaction cost of market orders at
time T is higher than their cost at time 0, i.e. λu > h+ f . Alternatively, if A(X, ξ) > S the
trader experiences buyer’s remorse - conditionally on this event prices have likely moved
down and he could have achieved a better execution by sparing some of his market orders.
CHAPTER 3. OPTIMAL ORDER PLACEMENT IN LIMIT ORDER MARKETS 70
Besides adverse selection, parameters λu, λo may reflect trader’s execution preferences. For
example a trader with a positive forecast of short-term returns may prefer to trade early
with a market order and set a larger value for λu compared to λo. A trader with significant
aversion to execution risk would choose high values for both λu, λo to reflect this aversion.
Problem 1 (Optimal order placement problem) An optimal order placement is a vec-





v(X, ξ) := (h+f)M−
K∑
k=1
(h+rk)((ξk−Qk)+−(ξk−Qk−Lk)+)+λu (S −A(X, ξ)))++λo (A(X, ξ)− S)+
(3.5)
is the sum of the execution cost and penalty for execution risk.
We will denote V (X) = E[v(X, ξ)]. We begin by assuming certain economically reasonable




{rk}+h > 0: even if some rebates rk are negative3, limit orders reduce the execution
cost.
A2 λo > h+max
k
{rk} and λo > −(h+f): there is no incentive to exceed the target quantity
S regardless of fees and rebates, even if they are negative.
Proposition 2 below shows that it is not optimal to submit limit or market orders that are
a priori too large or too small (larger than the target size S or whose sum is less than S).
Proposition 3 guarantees the existence of an optimal solution.
3Some inverse exchanges pay for executing marketable orders and charge for executing passive limit
orders. For example, on 03/07/2013 a U.S. equity exchange Direct Edge EDGA had a negative rebate
r = −$0.0006 per share for passive orders and a negative fee f = −$0.0004 per share for marketabe orders.
Another inverse exchange BATS BYX had on that date a rebate r = −$0.0002 and a fee f = −$0.0002.
These negative values are typically smaller than the minimal value of h = $0.005 for U.S. equities, justifying
our assumptions A1-A2.
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Under assumptions A1-A2 for any X˜ /∈ C, ∃X˜ ′ ∈ C with V (X˜ ′) ≤ V (X˜). Moreover, if
min
k
{P(ξk > Qk + S)} > 0, the inequality is strict: V (X˜ ′) < V (X˜).
Proof: First, for any allocation X˜ that has M˜ > S, we automatically have A(X˜) > S and
we can show that the (random) cost and penalty of X˜ are larger than those of Xnaive
∆
=
(S, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ C:
v(X˜, ξ)− v(Xnaive, ξ) = (h+ f)(M˜ − S)−
K∑
k=1
(h+ rk)((ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − Lk)+)+
λo
(
M˜ − S +
K∑
k=1
((ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − Lk)+)
)
=
(λo + h+ f)(M˜ − S) +
K∑
k=1
(λo − h− rk)((ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − Lk)+) > 0,
which holds for all random ξ. Therefore, V (X˜) > V (Xnaive). Similarly, for any allocation
X˜ with L˜k > S − M˜ define a different allocation X˜ ′ by M˜ ′ = M˜ , L˜′j = L˜j , ∀j 6= k and
L˜′k = S − M˜ . Then v(X˜, ξ) − v(X˜ ′, ξ) = 0 on the event B = {ω|ξk(ω) < Qk + S −M}.
On its complementary event Bc,
v(X˜, ξ)− v(X˜ ′, ξ) = −(h+ rk)((ξk −Qk − S + M˜)+ − (ξk −Qk − L˜k)+)
+λo((ξk −Qk − S + M˜)+ − (ξk −Qk − L˜k)+).
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Therefore
V (X˜)− V (X˜ ′) = E
[









(λo − (h+ rk))((ξk −Qk − S + M˜)+ − (ξk −Qk − L˜k)+)|Bc
]
P(Bc) ≥ 0
with a strict inequality if P(Bc) > 0. If X˜ ′ /∈ C, we can continue truncating limit order sizes
L˜′j > S − M˜ ′ following the same argument. Each time the truncation does not increase the
objective function and finally we obtain X˜ ′′ ∈ C, such that V (X˜ ′′) ≤ V (X˜).
Next, if X˜ is such that M˜ − ∑Kk=1 L˜k < S define s = S − M˜ − ∑Kk=1 L˜k, take
M˜ ′ = M˜, L˜′k = L˜k, k = 1, . . . ,K − 1 and L˜′K = L˜k + s. Then, on the event B ={
ω|ξK(ω) < QK + L˜K
}
we have v(X˜, ξ) = v(X˜ ′, ξ). However, on the event Bc,
v(X˜, ξ)− v(X˜ ′, ξ) = (h+ rK)((ξK −QK − L˜K)+ − (ξk −Qk − L˜K − s)+)
+ λu((ξK −QK − L˜K)+ − (ξk −Qk − L˜K − s)+),
therefore
V (X˜)− V (X˜ ′) = E
[









(λu + (h+ rk))((ξK −QK − L˜K)+ − (ξk −Qk − L˜K − s)+)|Bc
]
P(Bc) ≥ 0
with a strict inequality if P(Bc) > 0. 
Proposition 2 shows that it is never optimal to overflow the target size S with a single
order, but it may be optimal to exceed the target S with the sum of order sizes M+
∑K
k=1 Lk.
The penalty function (3.3) effectively implements a soft constraint for order sizes and focuses
the search for an optimal order allocation to the set C. Specific economic or operational
considerations could also motivate adding hard constraints to problem (3.4), e.g. M = 0
or
∑K
k=1 Lk = S. Such constraints can be easily included in our framework but absent the
aforementioned considerations we do not impose them here.
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Proposition 3 Under assumptions A1-A2, V : RK+1+ 7→ R is convex, bounded from below
and has a global minimizer X? ∈ C.
Proof: First, note that (ξk−Qk)+−(ξk−Qk−Lk)+ are concave functions of Lk. Therefore,
A(X, ξ) is concave as a sum of concave functions. Similarly, the cost term in v(X, ξ) is a sum
of convex functions, as long as rk ≥ −h, k = 1, . . . ,K and is itself a convex function. Second,
since S −A(X, ξ) is a convex function of X, and the function w(x) ∆= λu(x)+ − λo(−x)+ is
convex in x for positive λu, λo, so the penalty term w (S −A(X, ξ))) is also convex.
If λo > h + max
k




Finally, since V (X) is convex, it is also continous and reaches a local minimum Vmin on
the compact set C at some point X? ∈ C. By convexity, Vmin is a global minimum of V (X)
on C. Moreover, since λo > h + max
k
{rk}, Proposition 2 guarantees that Vmin < V (X˜) for
any X˜ /∈ C, so Vmin is also a global minimum of V (X) on RK+1+ . 
We may also consider an alternative approach to order placement optimization, which
turns out to be related to our original formulation by duality. Consider the following
problem:














] ≤ µo (3.8)
In this alternative formulation a trader can specify his tolerance to execution risks using
constraints on expected order shortfalls and overflows. The goal is to minimize an expecta-
tion of order execution costs under the expected shortfall constraints. Problem 2 does not
appear to be tractable, but it has a convex objective and convex inequality constraints, and
we can easily find its (Lagrangian) dual problem:




{V ?(λu, λo)− λuµu − λoµo} , (3.9)
where V ?(λu, λo) is the optimal objective value from Problem 1 given λu, λo.
We see that Problem 3 is related to our original order placement problem - solving Problem
3 (and therefore, Problem 2) amounts to re-solving Problem 1 for different values of λu, λo.
This discussion also leads to a new interpretation of parameters λu, λo in Problem 1 as
shadow prices for expected shortfall and overflow constraints in the related Problem 2.
Hereafter we focus on the (more tractable) Problem 1, but note that the optimal point for
Problem 2 can also be found by solving its dual.
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3.3 Choice of order type: limit orders vs market orders
To highlight the tradeoff between limit and market order executions in our optimization
setup, we first consider a case when the asset is traded on a single exchange, and the trader
has to choose an optimal split between limit and market orders. Since K = 1, we suppress
the subscript 1 throughout this section.
Proposition 4 (Single exchange: optimal split between limit and market orders)
Assume that ξ has a continuous distribution and (A1-A2) hold. The optimal order allocation
depends on λu:
If λu ≤ λu ∆= 2h+ f + r
F (Q+ S)
− (h + r), the optimal strategy is to submit only limit orders:
(M?, L?) = (0, S).
If λu ≥ λu ∆= 2h+ f + r
F (Q)
− (h+ r), the optimal strategy is to submit only market orders:
(M?, L?) = (S, 0).
If λu ∈ (λu, λu), the optimal split between limit and market orders is

M? = S − F−1
(
2h+ f + r





2h+ f + r




where F (·) is a cumulative distribution function of the bid queue outflow ξ.
Proof: By Proposition 2 there exists an optimal split (M?, L?) ∈ C between limit and
market orders. Moreover for K = 1 the set C reduces to a line M? + L? = S so it is
sufficient to find M?. Restricting L = S −M implies that {A(X, ξ) > S} = ∅, {A(X, ξ) <
S, ξ > Q+ L} = ∅, and we can rewrite the objective function as
V (M) = E
[
(h+ f)M − (h+ r)((ξ −Q)+ − (ξ −Q− S +M)+) +
λu (S −M − ((ξ −Q)+ − (ξ −Q− S +M)+))))+
]
. (3.11)
For M ∈ (0, S) the expression under the expectation in (3.11) is bounded for all ξ and
differentiable with respect to M for almost all ξ, so we can compute V ′(M) = dV (M)dM by
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interchanging the order of differentiation and integration (see e.g. [5], Theorem 24.5):






Note that if λu ≤ 2h+ f + r
F (Q+ S)
− (h+ r), then V ′(M) ≥ 0 for M ∈ (0, S) and therefore V is
non-decreasing at these points. Checking that V (S) − V (0) ≥ (h + f − λu)S + (λu + h +
r)S(1− F (Q+ S)) ≥ 0 we conclude that M? = 0. Similarly, if λu ≥ 2h+ f + r
F (Q)
− (h+ r),
then v(M) ≤ 0 for all M ∈ (0, S) and V (M) is non-increasing at these points. Checking
that V (S)−V (0) ≤ (h+f −λu)S+(λu+h+ r)S(1−F (Q)) ≤ 0 we conclude that M? = S.
Finally, if λu is between these two values, ∃ > 0, such that V ′() < 0, V ′(S − ) > 0 and
by continuity of V ′ there is a point where V ′(M?) = 0. This M? is optimal by convexity of
V (M) and (3.10) solves equations v(M?, ξ) = 0, L? = S −M?. 
In the case of a single exchange, Proposition 2 implies that M? +L? = S, therefore there is
no risk of exceeding the target size and λo does not affect the optimal solution. The trader
is only concerned with the risk of falling behind the target quantity, and balances this risk
with the fee, rebate and other market information. The parameter λu can be interpreted as
trader’s urgency to fill the orders, and higher values of λu lead to smaller limit order sizes,
as illustrated on Figure 3.2. In contrast, the optimal market order size increases with λu.
The optimal split between market and limit orders depends on the ratio 2h+f+rλu+(h+r) which
balances marginal costs and savings from a market order. It also depends on the order
outflow distribution F (·) and the queue length Q - keeping all else constant, a trader would
submit a larger limit order if its execution is more likely and vice versa. The optimal limit
order size decreases with λu as it becomes more expensive to underfulfill the order and
increases with f as market orders become more expensive. Another interesting feature is
that L? is fully determined by Q, F and pricing parameters h, r, f, λu, while M
? increases
with S. The consequence of this solution feature is that as the target size S increases,
a larger fraction M
?
S of it is executed with a market order. The total quantity that can
realistically be filled with a limit order is limited by Q and ξ, so to accommodate larger
target sizes the trader resorts to market orders. This bounded capacity feature of limit
orders also appears in our solutions for multiple exchanges. For example, as the number of
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available exchanges K increases, the overall prospects of filling limit orders at any of them
improve and the fraction M
?
S decreases. We can see that the solution (M
?, L?) depends on
the entire distribution F (·) and not just on the mean of ξ. Limit orders are filled when
ξ ≥ Q + L, so the tail of F (·) affects order executions and is an important determinant of
the optimal order allocation. Figure 3.2 shows two order allocations for exponential and
Pareto distributions of ξ with equal means.
Figure 3.2: Optimal limit order size L? for one exchange. The parameters for this figure
are: Q = 2000, S = 1000, h = 0.02, r = 0.002, f = 0.003. Colors correspond to different
order outflow distributions - exponential with means 2200 and 2500 and Pareto with mean
2200 and a tail index 5.
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3.4 Optimal routing of limit orders across multiple exchanges
When multiple trading venues are available, dividing the target quantity among them re-
duces the risk of not filling the order and may improve the execution quality. However,
sending too many orders leads to an undesirable possibility of exceeding the target size.
Proposition 5 gives optimality conditions for an order allocation X? = (M?, L?1, . . . , L
?
K)

















 , j = 1, . . . ,K
Intuitively, p0 is a probability that no limit orders will be filled given current queue sizes,
and it measures the overall execution prospects for limit orders. Each pj is a probability of
no fills everywhere except the j-th exchange, conditional on a fill at the exchange j, so pj
measure tail dependences between order flows on different exchanges.
Proposition 5 Assume (A1-A2), also assume that the distribution of ξ is continuous,
max
k
{Fk(Qk + S)} < 1 and λu < max
k
{














then any optimal order placement strategy involves market orders: M? > 0.
2. If
pj >
λo − (h+ rj)
λu + λo
, (3.14)
then any optimal order placement strategy involves submitting limit orders to the j-th
exchange: L?j > 0.
3. If (3.13)-(3.14) hold for all exchanges j = 1, . . . ,K: X? ∈ C is an optimal order
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((ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − L?k)+) < S
)
=








((ξk −Qk)+ − (ξk −Qk − L?k)+) < S
∣∣∣∣ξj > Qj + L?j
)
=
λo − (h+ rj)
λu + λo
,
j = 1, . . . ,K
(3.16)
Proof: Proposition 3 implies the existence of an optimal order allocation X? ∈ C. First,
we define XM
∆
= (S, 0, . . . , 0) and prove that X? 6= XM by contradiction. If XM were
optimal in problem (3.4) it would also be optimal in the same problem with a constraint
Lk = 0, k 6= j, for any one j. In other words, the solution (S, 0) would be optimal for any
one-exchange problem, defined by using only exchange j. But by our assumption, there
existsJ such that λu <
2h+ f + rJ
FJ(QJ)
− (h+ rJ) and Proposition 4 implies that (S, 0) is not
optimal for the J-th single-exchange subproblem, leading to a contradiction.
The function v(X, ξ) is bounded for X ∈ C and for all ξ, differentiable with respect to
M and Lk, k = 1, . . . ,K for X ∈ C\ {XM} for almost all ξ. Applying the same theorem as
in the proof of Proposition 4 we conclude that V (X) is differentiable for X ∈ C\ {XM} and
we can compute all of its partial derivatives by interchanging the order of differentiation
and integration. The KKT conditions for problem (3.4) and X ∈ C\ {XM} are
h+ f − λuP(A(X?, ξ) < S) + λoP(A(X?, ξ) > S)− µ0 = 0 (3.17)
−(h+ rk)P(ξk > Qk + L?k)− λuP(A(X?, ξ) < S, ξk > Qk + L?k)+
λoP(A(X?, ξ) > S, ξk > Qk + L?k)− µk = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K
(3.18)
M ≥ 0, Lk ≥ 0, µ0 ≥ 0, µk ≥ 0, µ0M = 0, µkLk = 0, k = 1, . . . ,K (3.19)
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Since the objective function V (·) is convex, conditions (3.17)–(3.19) are both necessary
and sufficient for optimality. The first result of this proposition follows from considering
any X˜ with M˜ = 0:












≥ (h + f)S = V (XM )
and we already argued that ∃X? with V (X?) < V (XM ), so X? 6= X˜ and therefore M? > 0.
Rearranging terms in a j-th equality (3.18) we obtain
P(ξj > Qj +L?j )
[
λo − (h+ rj)− (λu + λo)P(A(X?, ξ) < S|ξj > Qj + L?j )
]−µj = 0 (3.20)
The term in square brackets in (3.20) is negative for any X ∈ C\ {XM} with Lj = 0, because









by assumption and since µj ≥ 0 the condition (3.18) cannot be satisfied with L?j = 0. We
showed that M? > 0, L?j > 0 for all j = 1, . . . ,K and therefore, µ0 = µ1 = · · · = µK = 0 by
complimentary slackness. Then the KKT conditions (3.17)–(3.19) reduce to (3.15)–(3.16).

Equations (3.15)-(3.16) show that an optimal order allocation equates shortfall prob-
abilities to specific values computed with pricing parameters. This gives yet another in-
terpretation for parameters λu, λo - a trader can specify his tolerance for execution risk in
terms of shortfall probabilities and use the above equations to calibrate these parameters.
When the number of exchanges K is large, the probabilities in (3.15)-(3.16) are difficult
to compute in closed-form. However, the case K = 2 is relatively tractable and will be
analyzed as an illustration. The assumption of independence between ξ1, ξ2 is made only
in this example and is not required for the rest of our results. In Section 3.5 we study the
effect of correlation between order flows on optimal order placement decisions.
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Corollary Consider the case of two exchanges with outflows ξ1, ξ2 that are independent and
have continuous distributions. If
1. max
k=1,2
{Fk(Qk + S)} < 1,
2. λu < max
k=1,2
{












3. F1(Q1) < 1− h+ r2
λo
, F2(Q2) < 1− h+ r1
λo
,
then there exists an optimal order allocation X? = (M?, L?1, L
?
2) ∈ int{C} and it verifies
L?1 = Q2 + S −M? − F−12
(




L?2 = Q1 + S −M? − F−11
(















where F1(·), F2(·) are the cdf of ξ1, ξ2 respectively.
Proof: Solutions on the boundary of C are sub-optimal: M? = 0 and M? = S are ruled
out by assumption 2, L?1 = S −M and L?2 = S −M are ruled out by assumption 3 and
(3.18). Solutions with M? +
K∑
k=1
L?k = S are ruled out by directly checking (3.18). Finally,
L?1 = 0 and L
?
2 = 0 are also ruled out by (3.18). For example if L
?
1 = 0, then by Proposition
2 M? + L?2 = S and in (3.18) µ2 = 0 by complimentary slackness, P(A(X?, ξ) < S, ξ2 >
Q2 + L
?
2) = P(A(X?, ξ) > S, ξ2 > Q2 + L?2) = 0. But then (3.18) cannot hold because
P(ξ2 > Q2 + L?2) > 0.
For any X ∈ int{C}, A(X, ξ) > S if and only if all the following three inequalities are
satisfied:
ξ1 > Q1 + S −M − L2 (3.22a)
ξ2 > Q2 + S −M − L1 (3.22b)
ξ1 + ξ2 > Q1 +Q2 + S −M (3.22c)
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These inequalities give a simple characterization of the event {A(X, ξ) > S} which is directly
verified by considering subsets of (ξ1, ξ2) forming a complete partition of R2+.
Case 1: ξ1 > Q1 + L1, ξ2 > Q2 + L2. Since L1 + L2 + M > S, we have A(X, ξ) =
L1 +L2 +M > S and at the same time all of the inequalities (3.22a-3.22c) are satisfied, so
they are trivially equivalent in this case.
Case 2: ξ1 > Q1 + L1, Q2 ≤ ξ2 ≤ Q2 + L2. Because of the condition ξ1 > Q1 + L1,
(3.22a) is satisfied. We have in this case that A(X, ξ) = L1 + ξ2 − Q2 + M and thus
A(X, ξ) > S if and only if (3.22b) is satisfied. Finally, ξ1 > Q1 + L1 together with (3.22b)
imply (3.22c), so A(X, ξ) > S and (3.22a-3.22c) are equivalent in this case.
Case 3: ξ2 > Q2 + L2, Q1 ≤ ξ1 ≤ Q1 + L1. Similarly to Case 2 we can show that
inequalities (3.22a-3.22c) are satisfied if and only if A(X, ξ) > S.
Case 4: Q1 + S − M − L2 < ξ1 ≤ Q1 + L1, Q2 + S − M − L1 < ξ2 ≤ Q2 + L2.
This set is non-empty because 0 < S −M − L1 < L2 and similarly for L1, L2 reversed.
Inequalities (3.22a)–(3.22b) hold trivially, only (3.22c) needs to be checked. We can write
A(X, ξ) = ξ1 − Q1 + ξ2 − Q2 + M > S if and only if (3.22c) holds, so A(X, ξ) > S is
equivalent to (3.22a-3.22c).
Case 5: Outside of Cases 1-4, either (3.22a) or (3.22b) is not satisfied. If ξ1 ≤ Q1 +
S − M − L2, ξ2 ≤ Q2 + L2, then A(X, ξ) ≤ S − M − L2 + L2 + M = S. The case
ξ2 ≤ Q2 + S −M − L1, ξ1 ≤ Q1 + L1 is completely symmetric, and it shows that neither
A(X, ξ) > S nor (3.22a-3.22c) hold in this case.
Next, we use inequalities (3.22a-3.22c) to characterize the set {A(X, ξ) > S} in the first-
order conditions (3.15)–(3.16). We observe that in the two-exchange case
{A(X, ξ) > S, ξ1 > Q1 + L1} = {ξ1 > Q1 + L1, ξ2 > Q2 + S −M − L1}
{A(X, ξ) > S, ξ2 > Q2 + L2} = {ξ2 > Q2 + L2, ξ1 > Q1 + S −M − L2},
and then use the independence of ξ1 and ξ2 to compute
P(A(X, ξ) > S|ξ1 > Q1 + L1) = F¯2(Q2 + S −M − L1)
P(A(X, ξ) > S|ξ2 > Q2 + L2) = F¯1(Q1 + S −M − L2)
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Together with (3.15) and (3.16), this leads to a pair of equations for limit orders sizes:
F¯2(Q2 + S −M − L1) = λu + h+ r1
λu + λo
F¯1(Q1 + S −M − L2) = λu + h+ r2
λu + λo
whose solution is given by L?1, L
?
2 from (3.21a,3.21b). To obtain the equation (3.21c),
we rewrite the first equation in (3.15,3.16) using the inequalities (3.22a-3.22c). Then
P (A(X, ξ) > S) may be computed as the integral of the product measure F1 ⊗ F2 over
the region defined by
U(Q,S,M,L1, L2) =
{(x1, x2) ∈ R2, x1 > Q1 + S −M − L2, x2 > Q2 + S −M − L1, x1 + x2 > Q1 +Q2 + S −M}.
This integral is given by
P (A(X, ξ) > S) = F1 ⊗ F2 (U(Q,S,M,L1, L2))
= F¯1(Q1 + L1)F¯2(Q2 + S −M − L1) +
Q1+L1∫
Q1+S−M−L2
F¯2(Q1 +Q2 + S −M − x1)dF1(x1)
=
λu − (h+ f)
λu + λo

In the solution (3.21a)–(3.21b) optimal limit order quantities L?1, L
?
2 are linear functions of
an optimal market order quantity M?. When (3.21a)-(3.21b) are substituted into (3.21c)
we obtain a (non-linear) equation for M?, which can be solved for a given distribution of
(ξ1, ξ2).
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3.5 Numerical solution of the optimization problem
Computing the objective function in the order placement problem (Problem 1) or its gra-
dient at any point requires calculating an expectation (a multidimensional integral) which
is not analytically tractable aside from special examples. Fortunately, there are numerical
methods developed specifically for problems where the objective function is an expectation,
and they turn out to be very useful for this problem. Based on these methods we propose a
procedure for computing the optimal order placement policy using historical data samples
without specifying an order outflow distribution.
Our numerical solution is based on the robust stochastic approximation algorithm of [95].
Consider an objective function V (X)
∆
= E[v(X, ξ)] to be minimized and denote by g(X, ξ) ∆=
∇v(X, ξ) where the gradient is taken with respect to X. The stochastic approximation
algorithm tackles the problem of minimizing V (X) in the following way:
1: Choose X0 ∈ RK+1 and a step size γ;
2: for n = 1, . . . , N do
3: Draw an i.i.d. random variable ξn ∈ RK from a distribution F







Here ξn are independent across n, but the components of each draw ξn need not be inde-
pendent. The iterative algorithm produces an estimate Xˆ?, which converges to the opti-
mal point X? under some weak assumptions. In particular, it has a performance bound
V (Xˆ?)− V (X?) ≤ C√
N
, where the constant C depends on K,S and other problem param-
eters4. In general stochastic approximation methods require sampling random variables ξ
from the distribution F at each step to compute g(X, ξ). But in our case this function takes
4The method assumes that min
X∈X
{V (X)} is sought, where V (X) is a well-defined and finite-valued
expectation for every X ∈ X and X is a non-empty bounded closed convex set. Moreover V (X)
needs to be continuous and convex on X . The optimal step size is γ = D√
NM
and the constant
C = DM , where D = max
X,X′∈C




E [‖g(X, ξ)‖22]. We use a step size γ =
K1/2S
(




(h+ rk + λu + λo)
2
)−1/2
which scales appropriately with problem pa-
rameters. For more details we refer to [78] and [95].
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a particularly simple form which makes it unnecessary to specify the distribution F :
g(Xn, ξ) =

h+ f − λu1{A(Xn,ξ)<S} + λo1{A(Xn,ξ)>S}
−(h+ r1)1{ξ1>Q1+L1,n} − λu1{A(Xn,ξ)<S,ξ1>Q1+L1,n} + λo1{A(Xn,ξ)>S,ξ1>Q1+L1,n}
. . .
−(h+ rK)1{ξK>QK+LK,n} − λu1{A(Xn,ξ)<S,ξK>QK+LK,n} + λo1{A(Xn,ξ)>S,ξK>QK+LK,n}

Note that g(Xn, ξ) depends on ξ only through indicator functions, which have simple eco-
nomic meaning. For example 1{A(Xn,ξ)<S} = 1 if the trader fell behind the target size and
1{ξk>Qk+Lk,n} = 1 if a limit order Lk was fully executed. As a consequence, the solution is
updated on each step in response to order execution outcomes - limit order fills and target
size shortfalls or excesses. For example, the first component of g(Xn, ξ) describes market
order size updates - on each step this size is decreased by γ(h + f) to reduce the cost, in-
creased by γλu if the trader fell behind the target size, or decreased by γλo if the target was
exceeded. Limit order sizes are updated only when these orders are executed. Their sizes
are either increased or decreased depending on whether there was an execution shortfall or
excess.
This iterative algorithm gives a specific way to resample past order fill data or historical
order flow data and obtain a solution for the order placement problem. Since this method
involves only basic arithmetic operations it can also be implemented for on-line order routing
optimization in real-time trading applications. Alternatively, one can follow the same steps
using a parametric model for F to simulate ξ and compute the optimal order allocation
off-line based on a parametric model for order flows.
We apply this algorithm to several numerical examples using typical parameter values
for U.S. equity markets. We start by comparing numerical and closed-form solutions in
the single exchange case to assess the algorithm stability and convergence. Our exam-
ple assumes that a trader is buying S = 1000 shares of a stock with a deadline T = 1
minute with an initial bid queue size Q = 2000 shares, order outflow ξ ∼ Pois(µT )
and µ = 2200 shares per minute. With these parameters a small limit order is likely
to be executed before T , but a limit order for S = 1000 shares is unlikely to be fully
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filled. The pricing parameters and penalty costs (all in dollars per share) are set to
h = 0.02, r = 0.002, f = 0.003, λo = 0.024, λu = 0.026. According to (3.10) the opti-
mal allocation with these parameters is (M?, L?) = (728, 272) shares. Numerical estimates
Xˆ? were computed for five initial points X0 using a different number of samples N . For






v(X, ξi)) taken over additional L = 1000 samples of ξ. Figures 3.3 and 3.4
show that estimates converge to X? regardless of the initial point X0 and moreover when
X0 = X
? the iterates remain close to the optimal point. Convergence is also quite fast -
after as few as 50 samples the algorithm is within 2% of the optimal objective value. In the
worst case of initial points on the boundary it can take a few thousand samples to converge.
It is also worth noting that convergence in terms of the objective value occurs significantly
faster than convergence in terms of the order allocation vector.
We also estimated savings from dividing orders among multiple exchanges in a naive
way and according to our solution. Denote a pure market order allocation by XM =
(S, 0, . . . , 0), a single limit order allocation by XL = (0, S, 0, . . . , 0) and an equal split






, . . . ,
S
K + 1
). Table 1 presents numerical solutions with
X0 = XE , N = 1000, L = 1000 for different order sizes S and a varying number of exchanges
K = 1, . . . , 5. The parameters s, f, r, λu, λo are same as in the previous simulation and K
exchanges are identical replicas of each other: rk = r,Qk = Q and ξn,k ∼ Pois(µT ) are
i.i.d., k = 1, . . . ,K, n = 1, . . . , N . Optimal order allocations clearly outperform the
naive benchmarks, especially when a target quantity S is relatively small. This is because
small quantities can be allocated in form of limit orders among available exchanges and fully
capture limit order cost savings, while larger quantities are traded with costly market orders
even with the optimal allocation. Comparing W (XL) and W (XE) we also see that splitting
limit orders across multiple exchanges, even in a naive way, can be very advantageous when
limit order fills are independent. Since multiple exchanges in this example are copies of
each other, the algorithm splits the total limit order amount equally among them. There is
however a difference between the equal split allocation XE and the optimal allocation. The
former sets a market order size to
S
K + 1
, which may be too big or too small depending
on problem parameters. Another interesting feature of the numerical solution Xˆ? is its
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tendency to oversize the total quantity of orders: M +
∑K
k=1 Lk > S for S = 1000, 5000 and
K = 4, 5. This may be a consequence of assumed independence between ξk - by submitting
large orders to multiple exchanges the algorithm reduces the probability of falling behind













/S W (XM ) W (XL) W (XE) W (Xˆ
?)
S¯ = 500
1 0.481 0.519 11.50 3.36 2.79 2.76
2 0.034 0.601 0.615 11.50 3.48 -2.86 -6.00
3 0.003 0.438 0.433 0.421 11.50 3.39 -5.22 -10.56
4 0.002 0.280 0.277 0.273 0.264 11.50 3.52 -6.44 -10.84
5 0.001 0.198 0.215 0.224 0.206 0.214 11.50 3.35 -7.24 -10.91
S¯ = 1000
1 0.713 0.287 23.00 16.30 14.80 14.20
2 0.484 0.343 0.338 23.00 16.43 5.88 5.48
3 0.268 0.338 0.334 0.336 23.00 16.29 -3.16 -3.61
4 0.055 0.316 0.313 0.351 0.333 23.00 16.48 -9.27 -12.12
5 0.003 0.309 0.300 0.300 0.309 0.321 23.00 16.44 -12.88 -19.76
S¯ = 5000
1 0.839 0.161 115.00 120.33 112.83 107.76
2 0.747 0.192 0.192 115.00 120.44 105.86 99.65
3 0.693 0.189 0.189 0.189 115.00 120.40 97.35 90.71
4 0.650 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 115.00 120.37 88.64 81.89
5 0.614 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167 115.00 120.40 79.63 72.93
Table 3.1: Savings from order splitting.
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Figure 3.3: Convergence of objective values to an optimal point for different initial points.
Figure 3.4: Convergence of order allocation vectors to an optimal point for different initial
points.
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Modern high-frequency trading activity connects different trading venues (see e.g. [92]), so
in reality order flows across exchanges are highly positively correlated. To investigate how
order flow correlations affect order placement strategies and order execution costs we use
an example with two exchanges and a common factor in order flows:
ξ1 = αξ0 + (1− α)1, ξ2 = αξ0 + (1− α)2,
where ξ0, 1, 2 ∼ Pois(µT ) are three i.i.d. random variables and the scalar parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] controls the degree of positive correlation between ξ1 and ξ2. We set µ = 2200,
(Q1, Q2) = (1900, 2000) and the rest of the parameters are the same as in the previous
example. As the parameter α increases, we can see that the sum of order sizes M +L1 +L2
decreases to the target quantity S = 1000. When α → 1, the second exchange does not
provide any benefit in terms of diversifying execution risk, so it is not optimal anymore to
oversize the total quantity of orders. This is similar to the case of a single exchange where
M + L = S by Proposition 4.
Figure 3.5: Optimal order allocations with correlated order flows.
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However, executing orders on two exchanges with order flows (ξ1, ξ2) and queue sizes
(Q1, Q2) is not equivalent to the case of a single exchange with ξ = ξ1 +ξ2 and Q = Q1 +Q2,
even if the correlation between ξ1 and ξ2 is high. Figure 3.6 compares average execution
costs for these two cases with an optimal order allocation and different values α. It appears
from this example that the availability of multiple exchanges reduces the costs of trading
compared to a single consolidated exchange, but only as long as multiple exchanges remain
relatively uncorrelated.
Figure 3.6: Comparison of average order execution costs: two exchanges with correlated
order flows against vs a single consolidated exchange. Dashed lines show 95% confidence
intervals for averages.
To further illustrate the structure of a numerical solution we performed a sensitivity
analysis with K = 2 exchanges and parameters Q1 = Q2 = 2000, S = 1000, ξ1,2 ∼
Pois(µ1,2T ), µ1 = 2600, µ2 = 2200, T = 1, h = 0.02, r1 = r2 = 0.002, f = 0.003,
λu = 0.26 and λo = 0.24. Varying some of these parameters one at a time we plot the
numerical solution Xˆ? after N = 1000 iterations, together with an analytical solution for a
single exchange. The results are presented on Figures 3.7 and 3.8. Similarly to the single
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exchange case, limit order sizes on two exchanges L1, L2 decrease and market order size
M increases as the penalty λu increases. Increasing the half-spread h, the rebate r1 or the
fee f makes a limit order on exchange number one more attractive, so L1 increases and M
decreases. Because the penalty λu is large in this example, execution risk is more important
than fees and rebates, therefore the queue size Q1 and the order outflow mean µ1 have a
much stronger effect on the optimal solution than r1. Both decreasing the Q1 and increasing
µ1 make a limit order fill more likely at exchange number one and L1 increases
5. Finally,
as in the case of a single exchange, the target size S has a strong effect on the optimal
order allocation. Only limit orders are used while S is small, but as it becomes larger it
is difficult to fill that amount solely with limit orders and the optimal market order size
begins to grow to limit the execution risk.
3.6 Conclusion
We have formulated optimal order placement problem for a market participant able to sub-
mit market orders and limit orders across multiple exchanges as a well-posed optimization
problem, and studied the solution of this problem in various configurations. In the case
when there is a single exchange we have shown that this leads to an optimal split between
limit and market orders. For the general case of K exchanges, we have given a charac-
terization of the optimal order placement strategy and propose a stochastic approximation
algorithm for numerically computing it. Using this algorithm, we have explored the prop-
erties of an optimal order allocation and showed that an optimal routing of orders across
multiple exchanges can lead to a substantial reduction in transaction costs.
5The observed drop in L1 for large µ1 and small Q1 appeared only in this example, we were not able to















































Figure 3.7: Sensitivity analysis for a numerical solution Xˆ? = (M,L1, L2) with two exchanges and an optimal solution (M
a, La)















































Figure 3.8: Sensitivity analysis for a numerical solution Xˆ? = (M,L1, L2) with two exchanges and an optimal solution (M
a, La)
with the first exchange only.
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Chapter 4
Heterogenous traders in a limit
order book
This chapter is based on the paper ”A Limit Order Queue Model with Heterogenous Traders”
[77] which is a joint work with Professor Costis Maglaras.
4.1 Introduction
It should be observed that three classes of men are to be distinguished on the
stock exchange. The princes of business belong to the first class, the merchants
to the second, and the speculators to the last.
Joseph de la Vega, Confusion de confusiones, 1688
During the last two decades, financial markets worldwide experienced a fundamental
transformation fueled by computer technology and new regulation. Evidence shows that
automated electronic trading reduced various measures of trading costs (see [60; 69; 90]).
But the increasing complexity of electronic financial markets is also stimulating a substantial
debate on the overall benefits of their current structure. This discussion together with a
practical need to guide trading decision in a complex environment sparked an active interest
in limit order book modeling.
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Most financial markets in the world are organized as limit order books [66; 112]. In this
market structure liquidity is provided and prices are formed through a collective activity of
a diverse trader population. Strategies of individual traders include decisions on the timing
of their order submissions, as well as on order prices and quantities. These strategies
are flexible, complex and can depend on the previous activity of other traders, making it
difficult to model limit order books in an economic equilibrium framework. Nevertheless
useful insights can still be derived from reduced-form models of limit order books (see [100]
for a recent survey). Such “engineering” approach is further facilitated by the simplicity and
formality of basic rules underlying limit order trading as compared to other, more opaque
market structures (e.g. dealer markets).
On the fine level of individual order submissions, a limit order book can be represented
as a multiclass queueing system. To buy or sell an asset, traders can use two types of
instructions - limit and market orders. Limit orders specify the maximum quantity to be
bought or sold and the worst acceptable price, while market orders specify only a quantity.
In a standard “price-time” priority scheme, adopted by most financial markets1, limit orders
with identical prices form first-in first-out queues across different price levels as they arrive
to an exchange. The queue of buy orders with the highest price at a given time is called the
best bid and the queue of sell orders with the lowest price - the best ask. Market orders to
buy (sell) are matched only with limit orders at the front of the best ask (bid) queue. From
the queueing point of view market orders provide “service” (liquidity) to these limit order
queues2. A large number of limit orders is canceled and these orders abandon their queues
before reaching execution (in U.S. equities markets more than 90% of orders are canceled
[57]). When the best bid or ask queue is depleted by market orders and cancelations, the
queue at next-best price becomes the new best bid or ask. A new best bid or ask queue
can also be initiated by a new limit order with a price between the current best bid and ask
prices.
1Some markets, for example NASDAQ OMX PSX and certain interest rate futures markets, follow dif-
ferent schemes - see [67] for a discussion on order matching rules.
2Aggressive limit orders to buy/sell whose prices are above/below the best ask/bid are similar to market
orders. For simplicity we also do not specifically consider derived order types such as discretionary orders
and iceberg orders, most of which are equivalent to simple strategies employing limit and market orders.
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Limit order books are naturally modeled as dynamic stochastic systems, specifically as
queueing systems. An early development in this direction were “zero-intelligence models” in
econophysics [41; 108] where instead of making detailed behavioral assumptions regarding
traders’ strategies authors posited that orders arrive and cancel purely at random (hence the
name). Subsequent stochastic queueing models [31; 62] added more realistic features of limit
order books - order queues at a discrete price grid, varying order arrival rates and random
order sizes. These models are easily calibrated to real data and provide tractable procedures
for computing various quantities of practical interest. For instance, the distribution of a next
price move, a valuable input for optimal timing of order submissions [111], can be obtained
in these models using standard tools from queueing theory such as Laplace transforms [31],
or diffusion approximations [11; 29; 30]. Queueing models of limit order books also provide
valuable insights into the aggregate behavior of financial markets. They establish a link
between limit order flow dynamics on a microscopic scale and price volatility on a larger
timescale [30], and allow to describe order flow coupling and queue dynamics in a fragmented
market where agents strategically route their orders [94].
A common simplifying assumption made in stochastic order book models is that order
arrivals and cancelations are generated by a single mechanism, some random process. How-
ever, in reality there are significant differences across strategies of market participants [13;
75] and this heterogeneity plays a key role in classical market microstructure models.
Traders differ in terms of their patience [45; 106], information on future asset returns [34;
79], trading objectives and holding periods [57]. This heterogeneity leads to profound differ-
ences between properties of their order flows that are hard to capture with a single stochastic
process for all order arrivals and cancelations. Another typical assumption is that order
arrivals and departures are generated by an exogenous process with a common timescale
for all orders. Such process may represent orders of fund managers who come to the mar-
ket to fulfill their exogenous liquidity needs. But orders of other trading strategies (e.g.
high-frequency market-makers) depend mostly on the dynamics of the order book itself, i.e.
these orders are generated endogenously within the market environment and typically have
a different timescale for arrivals and cancelations. A recent empirical study [57] contrasts
“agency algorithms” that are used by money managers for trading large positions, with
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“principal algorithms” whose goal is to profit from the market environment itself. Agency
algorithms tend to update their orders based on a fixed time schedule, while principal al-
gorithms operate in “real time” reacting to order book updates almost immediately. The
queueing model developed here incorporates this distinction and the endogenous nature
of orders generated by market-makers. In our knowledge this is one of the first attempts
to unite reduced-form stochastic modeling of limit order books with more detailed market
microstructure models.
We propose a two-class queueing model of limit order book dynamics that distinguishes
between orders of institutional fund managers and high-frequency traders. Specifically, or-
ders of fund managers arrive to a limit order queue according to an exogenous process, while
high-frequency traders submit and cancel their orders in response to queue size changes.
Our analysis of this model shows how two classes of orders propagate through a FIFO
queue and delivers a procedure for forecasting waiting times of new orders. The model can
structurally explain abnormally long waiting times in large limit order queues of large-tick
stocks. This phenomenon is related by practitioners to a “crowding” of orders coming from
high-frequency traders [42]. Additionally, our model helps to explain limit order cancelation
behavior better than the existing models. It makes predictions on the amount of cancela-
tions, their dependence on a queue size and on a queue position of canceled orders. Order
waiting time estimates derived from our model can be used in practical order management
systems to improve order placement and order routing decisions. From a stochastic model-
ing viewpoint, our model seems novel and different from the bulk of the literature on that
topic that has been largely motivated by the analysis of call centers. In comparison to
previous studies of multi-class queues with abandonments (e.g. [68]) our model introduces
a new kind of heterogeneity, stemming from an endogenous, state-dependent dynamics of
one class of orders. This analysis can be of interest in studying service systems for het-
erogeneous populations with abandonment. To empirically validate our predictions we use
a proprietary data set from a broker providing of order execution services. The data de-
scribes actual orders submitted by firm’s agency algorithms, their outcomes (executions or
cancelations) and their realized queue waiting times. To the best of our knowledge such
data has not been previously studied in academic literature. Our empirical results verify
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that the two-class model makes realistic predictions for waiting times.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we introduce a two-class
queueing model with state-dependent order behavior. Section 4.3 presents our results for
a fluid approximation of this model, Section 4.4 describes empirical tests with order data
and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model description
We develop a two-class queueing model for orders at the best bid (or ask) of an exchange.
New limit orders arrive at random times and join at the back of the order queue. Market
orders also arrive at random times and match with a limit order currently in front of the
queue, if there is any, and all orders have a unit size. We assume that limit and market
orders are submitted by a heterogeneous population of traders and that limit orders belong
to one of two classes:
Type-1 limit orders are submitted by fund managers whose goal is to satisfy specific
needs to buy or sell their assets within certain time constraints. These orders arrive accord-
ing to an exogenous Poisson process with a rate λ and each has a finite patience deadline,
exponentially distributed with a mean 1/γ. Whenever a realized waiting time of a type-1
order reaches its patience deadline, the order is canceled.
Type-2 limit orders are submitted by high-frequency traders. They have no exogenous
liquidity needs or time constraints. Instead, their orders react to changes in the current
queue state:
 When any limit order joins the queue and its size becomes equal to q, one type-2 limit
order may instantaneously join the queue with a probability F (q).
 When any limit order leaves the queue (due to a trade or a cancelation) and the queue
size becomes equal to q, each type-2 limit order that is currently in the queue may
instantaneously cancel with a probability G(q)3.
3Since multiple type-2 orders may cancel at the same epoch, we assume that after an order departure
each type-2 order in the queue is selected with a probability G(q), and if more than one order is selected
they cancel as a batch. If at least one type-2 order so cancels, the selection and batch cancelation procedure
is repeated with the new queue size.
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Market orders are submitted by all traders and arrive according to an exogenous
Poisson process with a rate µ.
Type-2 order arrivals and cancelations are endogenously generated in this model, i.e.
they can be triggered only by another queue update. Since type-2 order arrivals or cance-
lations can trigger further type-2 orders arrivals or cancelations, these events can cascade.
We assume that the function G(q) is non-increasing, and that F (q) is non-decreasing near
zero with F (0) = 0. These conditions imply that type-2 orders tend to persist (do not
cancel) in large queues, but cancel more easily from small queues and also tend to avoid
joining small queues.
Such state-dependent queue behavior is observed in practice - fewer orders join a small
queue than a large queue, and more orders cancel from a small queue. Figure 4.2 shows how
average 10-second arrival, cancelation and trade volumes vary with the initial queue size at
the beginning of the 10 second time interval. A possible explanation for this behavior is that
small bid (ask) queue size implies a higher probability of a future negative (positive) price
change [11; 29]. To avoid trading at a price just before it changes in an adverse direction,
traders may prefer submitting orders to large queues where the risk of a price change is
small. For the same reason they may also cancel their orders from small queues. In our
model, this concerns only type-2 orders, since type-1 orders are driven solely by patience
and do not react to queue size fluctuations.
This general model description presented here covers a class of state-dependent queue
models with different functions F (q), G(q). For the sake of tractability we pursue a partic-
ular choice of F (q) = φ1{q>θ}, G(q) = 1{q≤θ}, where 0 < φ < 1 is a constant characterizing
the participation rate of type-2 orders (e.g. orders of high-frequency traders), and θ is a
threshold at which all type-2 orders instantly cancel4. We define the average size of a type-2
order arrival cascade f
∆
= φ1−φ and note that non-trivial queue dynamics are observed when
λf < µ < λ(1 + f), otherwise the queue tends to build up to infinity or decrease to zero.












































Figure 4.1: Average arrival, cancelation and trade volumes per 10 seconds, with confidence intervals, for different initial queue
sizes. This plot is based on trade and quote data for 30 Dow Jones stocks and all U.S. exchanges on 03/08/2012. All volumes and
queue sizes were standardized with averages and standard deviations computed separately for each stock, exchange and half-hour
interval during the trading day. To avoid the influence of “fleeting quotes” we only considered 10-second time intervals without
a price change.
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4.3 Fluid model
A direct analysis of the stochastic multiclass queueing model is complicated by event-driven
and state-dependent behavior of type-2 orders which motivates us to consider its fluid
approximation. The fluid model describes average dynamics of the stochastic model over
time intervals that are long in comparison with typical order inter-arrival times. It assumes
that the contribution of each order arrival or cancelation is small in comparison with the
queue size, and replaces discrete orders with a continuous fluid that is added to the queue
by limit order arrivals and is removed by market orders and cancelations. At the back of the
queue, infinitesimal quanta of type-1 orders arrive at a constant rate λ. Quanta of type-2
orders also arrive at the back of the queue at a constant rate λf , as long as the queue size is
larger than the threshold θ. In front of the queue, orders of both types leave the queue at a
rate µ due to executions, and additionally type-1 orders leave the queue due to cancelations.
The basic components of this fluid model are q1,2(t, y) - quantities of type-1 and type-2
fluid that are in the queue at time t and have waited there for at most y units of time. With
this notation the total amount of type-1 or type-2 fluid is denoted by q1,2(t)
∆
= q1,2(t,∞)
and the total fluid amount (queue size) is q(t)
∆
= q1(t) + q2(t). We can also write q1,2(t) =
q1,2(t, τ(t)), where τ(t) is the head-of-line waiting time, defined as:
τ(t) = inf
y≥0
{y|q1(t,∞)− q1(t, y) = 0} = inf
y≥0
{y|q2(t,∞)− q2(t, y) = 0}






where ζ1,2(t − u, u), u ≤ t is a density of fluid that arrived at time t − u and waited for
exactly u units of time. We are now ready to describe the queue evolution.
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Fluid quantity dynamics:
q˙1(t) = λ− γq1(t)− α(t)µ






ζ1(t− τ(t), τ(t)) + ζ2(t− τ(t), τ(t))
(4.1)
where δ(x) is the delta function.
Fluid density dynamics:
ζ1(t, 0) = λ, t > 0
ζ2(t, 0) = λf1{q(t)>θ}, t > 0
∂ζ1(t, u)
∂u
= −γζ1(t, u), t ≥ 0, 0 < u ≤ τ(t)




}, t ≥ 0, 0 < u ≤ τ(t)
(4.2)
It easily follows from (4.2) that the density of type-1 orders that arrived after the initial
moment, ζ1(t, u) = λe
−γu and in particular it does not depend on t. However, arbitrary ini-
tial densities ζ1,2(0, u) may introduce a non-linear delay into ordinary differential equations
(4.1) through α(t). Differential equations of this kind are generally hard to solve, but this
complexity can be avoided by assuming a special queue structure, hereafter called regular
queue structure.
Assumption Rt: For a fixed t ≥ 0, θ < q1(t) < λγ , q2(t) > 0 and ζ1(t, u) = λe−γu, ζ2(t, u) =
λf, 0 ≤ u ≤ τ(t)
Proposition 6 shows that the regular queue structure is stable - once Rt is true, Rs is also
true for all s > t. Proposition 7 shows that all sufficiently large queues must be regular, and
Proposition 8 shows that the model converges to the regular structure in a finite amount of
time. Except for an initial time interval during which arbitrary initial conditions may lead
to complicated dynamics, the queue structure is regular and differential equations (4.1) are
non-delayed.
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Proposition 6 Assume that λ−µγ > θ and R0 is true, then Rt holds for all t > 0. Moreover,




















e−γt + λ−µγ , and note that p(t) > θ, t > 0
because λ−µγ > θ and p(0) = θ. Since q1(0) > p(0) = θ and q˙1(t) ≥ p˙(t), t > 0 we conclude
that q(t) ≥ q1(t) = q1(0) +
∫ t
0 q˙(s)ds ≥ p(0) +
∫ t
0 p˙(s)ds > θ, t > 0. Since q(t) > θ for all
t > 0, type-2 orders never cancel from the queue. Combining this with equations (4.2) and
the assumption R0 we can write ζ1(t, u) = λe
−γu, ζ2(t, u) = λf for all t ≥ 0, 0 ≤ u ≤ τ(t).
Therefore for any t ≥ 0, q1(t) =
∫ τ(t)











1− e−γt) < λγ , and therefore λ − γq1(t) > 0. Substituting the expressions for
ζ1,2(t, u) and τ(t) into (4.1) yields (4.3) where α(t) depends solely on q1(t). Therefore
differential equations (4.1) depend only on the current state of q1(t), q2(t) and not on their
past. 








and ∃T0, 0 < T0 < t such
that q(T0) < θ, then Rt holds.
Proof: Given that q(T0) < θ we can write for some s > T0
q˙(s) = λ− γq1(s)− µ




e−γ(t−T0)+ λ−µγ . The function q(s) is monotonically
increasing towards λ−µγ > θ > 0. Since it is also continuous there exists a time T1 such that
q(T1) = q1(T1) = θ.
At time T1 type-2 orders start arriving, but it takes some time for them to reach the
front of the queue. Denote by r1,2(s) = q1,2(s, s − T1), s > T1 the quantities of type-1 and
CHAPTER 4. HETEROGENOUS TRADERS IN A LIMIT ORDER BOOK 104
type-2 fluids that arrived after T1 and are still in the system at time s. Also denote by
p(s) = q1(s) − r1(s) the quantity of fluid that arrived before T1 and is still in the queue.






r2(s) = λf(s− T1). Noting that r˙1(s) = λ− γr1(s), r1(T1) = 0 we obtain p˙(s) = −γp(s)−




e−γ(s−T1) − µγ . Setting p(T2) = 0 we






by which all of the initial single-type queue content





e−γ(s−T0) + λ−µγ > θ, so type-2 orders did not cancel and q2(T2) > 0.
We have established RT2 , which implies Ru for u > T2 via Proposition 6. It remains to
show that q(t) > Q¯ implies t > T2. The function q(s) = q1(s) + q2(s) = q1(s) + r2(s) is
monotonically increasing for s ∈ [T1, T2] and since q(T2) = Q¯, it implies that q(s) < Q¯ for
s ∈ [T1, T2), therefore t ≥ T2. 
Proposition 8 If µ > 0 and ζ1,2(0, y) < ∞, y ≤ τ(0) < ∞, then Rt is true for t ≥ T¯ ∆=
q(0)




















Moreover qi(t) are monotinically increasing (decreasing) if q1(T ) < q
∗
1 (q1(T ) > q
∗
1), qi(t)→
q∗i , i = 1, 2 as t→∞ and the limit point q∗1, q∗2 is given by
q∗1 =

















Proof: If q(0) < θ then without loss of generality q2(0) = 0 and we simply follow the
argument of Proposition 7 with T0 = 0 to show Rt for t > T¯ . Otherwise if q(0) > θ,
we denote by ri(t) = qi(t, t), pi(t) = qi(t) − ri(t) and p(t) = p1(t) + p2(t). For t > 0 we
can write r˙1(t) = λ − γr1(t), r˙2(t) = λf and therefore p˙(t) = −γp1(t) − µ ≤ −µ. Since
p(t) = p(0) +
∫ t
0 p˙(s)ds ≤ p(0) − µt, ∃Tp such that p(Tp) = 0 and Tp ≤ q(0)µ . We now
consider two alternatives.
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If ∃Tq ∈ [0, Tp], such that q(Tq) < θ, all type-2 orders cancel at the time Tq, and queue
dynamics for t > Tq are the same as if the queue were initiated with q1(Tq) < θ type-1
orders and no type-2 orders. Following the same steps as in Proposition 7, we see that such
queue will reach level θ by time Tq + T1 ≤ q(0)µ + T1 and establish Rt for t ≥ Tq + T1 + T2,
therefore Rt is true for t ≥ T¯ .
If there is no such Tq and q(t) ≥ θ, t ∈ [0, Tp], then by the time Tp all initial queue
content has left the queue, and RTp is satisfied by construction. Since Tp ≤ q(0)µ + T1 + T2,
we also have RT¯ .
To find the limit state of the queue, we useRT and note that q2(t) =
τ(t)∫
0







for t > T . This is a continuous monotonically increasing function of q1(t),
so q2(t) converges to a limit as t → ∞, as long as q1(t) does. Substituting expressions for
α(t), τ(t) into the equation for q˙1(t), we can write:
q˙1(t) = λ− γq1(t)− λ− γq1(t)
λ(1 + f)− γq1(t)µ (4.5)
Monotonicity of q1(t) for q1(t) > q
∗, q1(t) < q∗ follows directly from (4.5) and q1(t) < λγ , t ≥
T . Since q2(q1) is also monotonically increasing, this proves monotonicity of q(t). Applying
a Lyapunov function V (x) = x2 we find that q1(t) is globally asymptotically stable with a
unique stability point q∗1, which implies convergence of q1(t), q2(t) to q∗1, q∗2 as t→∞. The
expressions for α∗, τ∗, q∗2 are found by direct substitution of q∗1 into corresponding equations.

Remark 1: In the steady state all type-2 fluid must be executed, therefore we must have
(1 − α∗)µ = λf . Because of this the steady-state amount of type-1 fluid in the two-class
system is the same as the steady-state amount of fluid in a single-class system with a lower
market order rate µ− λf . This can also be seen by rewriting q∗1 = λ(1+f)−µγ = λ−(µ−λf)γ .
Remark 2: The steady state fluid quantities depend on model parameters in an intuitive
way: both q∗1,2 and τ∗ increase with λ and f , and decrease with γ and µ.
We now turn to studying transient dynamics of the fluid model. Depending on the
initial composition of type-1 and type-2 orders in the queue, the model predicts different
limit order waiting times. The following Proposition 9 describes a procedure for computing
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the virtual waiting time w - the time that a newly submitted infinitely patient limit order
would wait until its execution. The initial queue size is denoted by q(0) = Q and is divided
in different proportions into type-1 and type-2 orders.
Proposition 9 If at t = 0 all orders in the queue belong to type 1, i.e. q1(0) = Q, q2(0) = 0




. If q1(0) = 0, q2(0) = Q and Q > θ, then w =
Q
µ .
Othewise, if the initial queue structure is given by R0, w is computed by solving the
following system of differential equations:

p˙1(t) = −γp1(t)− α(t)µ
p˙2(t) = −(1− α(t))µ
q˙1(t) = λ− γq1(t)− λ− γq1(t)
λ(1 + f)− γq1(t)µ
α(t) =
λ− γq1(t)
λ(1 + f)− γq1(t) ,
(4.6)
with initial conditions p1(0) = q1(0), p2(0) = q2(0) and terminal conditions
p1(w) = p2(w) = 0.










q2(0) = Q− q1(0).
(4.7)
Moreover, if q1(0) < q
∗















Proof: Denote by p1,2 = q1,2(∞, t)− q1,2(t, t) the amounts of type-1 and type-2 fluid that
was in the system at time 0 and is still in the queue at time t. The two extreme cases
with q1(0) = Q, q2(0) = 0 and q2(0) = Q, q1(0) = 0 are trivial. In the first case w is a
solution of a differential equation p˙1(t) = −γp1(t) − µ with initial condition p1(0) = Q
and terminal condition p1(w) = 0. In the second case the equation is p˙2(t) = −µ with
p2(0) = Q, p2(w) = 0.
If the initial queue structure is given by R0, q2(0) = λfτ(0) and with (4.4) it can be
further expressed as a function of q1(0), which, together with the initial condition q1(0) +
CHAPTER 4. HETEROGENOUS TRADERS IN A LIMIT ORDER BOOK 107
q2(0) = Q leads to equation 4.7. The equations (4.6) follow from computing the derivatives
of p1,2 and finding the time w such that p1(w) = p2(w) = 0. Although they reach zero at
the same time it is easier to bound w through type-2 fluid dynamics. Depending on whether
q1(0) < q
∗
1 or q1(0) > q
∗
1, Proposition 8 implies that q1(t) is monotonically increasing or
decreasing, therefore (1−α(t)) is either monotonically increasing or decreasing in these two
cases. Therefore, it is possible to bound the time when p2(t) reaches zero by bounding its
rate of decrease. In the case when q1(0) < q
∗
1, (1− α(0)) ≤ (1− α(t)) ≤ (1− α∗), therefore
q2(0)
(1− α∗)µ ≤ w ≤
q2(0)




We rely on an extensive proprietary dataset of limit order executions to test the results of
Section 4.3. Specifically, our aim is to compare queueing delays experienced by limit orders
in practice with theoretical predictions of Proposition 9. Our results show that the queue
structure significantly affects limit order delays. It is unrealistic to assume that the queue
consists only of type-1 or type-2 orders, because this leads to biased delay estimates that
under- or overestimate realized delays by a factor of 10. Assuming a mix of order types in
a queue leads to more accurate delay predictions that lie between the two extremes.
The dataset for this study was collected by an electronic broker dealer firm and consists
of 327,505 orders that were sent by firm’s algorithms to various U.S. equity exchanges be-
tween 03/01/2012 and 04/30/2012. Each entry describes a single limit order: its submission
date and time (up to a millisecond), its destination exchange, a stock symbol, an order di-
rection (buy or sell), a trade execution strategy that generated the order (e.g. VWAP), the
order outcome (execution or cancelation) and the order waiting time that elapsed between
its submission and its execution or cancelation.
Because of a large variation in orders submission times, destination exchanges and stock
symbols in our data we chose to estimate fluid model parameters (λi, γi, µi, fi, Qi) separately
for each order i = 1, . . . , N using trades and quotes that happened before its submission.
For order i, we consider a 3 minute time interval before its timestamp (henceforth the i-th
time interval) and retrieve trades and quotes at the i-th destination exchange for the i-th
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interval from the NYSE TAQ database5. The market order rate µi (in shares per second)
was estimated as the total volume of trades in the i-th time interval divided by 360. The
initial queue size Qi was set to the size of the last bid or ask quote in the i-th interval,
depending on the i-th order direction. We also computed a time-weighted average Q¯i of bid
or ask quote sizes during the i-th interval.
TAQ data does not contain neither trader identifiers nor order “types”, but parameters
λi, γi and fi can still be approximately inferred by using structural assumptions of our
model. In the stochastic model, Type-2 orders arrive instantaneously after a type-1 order
arrival, suggesting that order types can be inferred from the lengths of their inter-arrival
periods. In practice, responding to quote updates takes some time even for the fastest
traders, for example, the analysis in [57] suggests a lower bound of 2-3 ms. The total
number of limit order arrivals in the i-th interval Λi is divided into Λ
1
i , the number of new
orders whose inter-arrival times were shorter than 20 ms, and Λ2i = Λi − Λ1i . The fraction
of “fast” order arrivals Λ1i /Λi during the i-th interval measures the relative activity of high-
frequency traders (i.e. type-2 orders), but it needs to be corrected for the expected number
of type-1 orders whose inter-arrivals were short due to randomness. To make this correction
we assume in correspondence with the stochastic model that type-1 orders arrive according












, where MΛi is the
mean inter-arrival time (in ms) of orders counted in Λ2i . Then we calculate the fluid model
parameters fi =
φi




The parameter γi is estimated in a similar way. First we decompose Ωi - the total number
of order departures during the i-th interval - into Ω1i and Ω
2
i that are correspondingly the
number of orders whose inter-departure times were shorter or longer than 20 ms. Then







i is the mean inter-departure time for orders counted in Ω
2
i
and Γi is the total cancelation volume in the i-th interval. Using the steady-state equations
(4.5) we can then recover γi =
(





The descriptive statistics and average parameter values for our data are given in Table
5For 18% of orders there were no trades or quotes during that interval at their destination exchange.
Instead, for these orders we used NBBO quotes and consolidated trades.
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4.5, where order dataset is divided into 25 equal-sized subsamples by quintiles of µi and
Q¯i. There are significant differences in order waiting times across subsamples and we can
also note a correlation between average bid-ask spreads and average quote sizes. We find
that the bottom group consists of orders for ultra-liquid stocks that have large queue sizes
and large tick sizes relative to their prices. Average values of fi show little variation across
subsamples and imply that on average about 40% of orders are of type-2. The values of γi
decrease with queue size and increase with trading volume, suggesting that type-1 orders are
more patient in markets with larger average queues and smaller average trading volumes.
Order data is distributed unevenly among 487 different stocks, 13 exchanges and alter-
native trading venues, 7 execution strategies and 42 days. To ensure data consistency and
at least a moderate number of data points in each group of orders we applied multiple data
filters6. The filtered dataset contains 109,938 orders for 268 stocks submitted to NASDAQ
(48%), NYSE (24%), ARCA (13%), BATS Z (10%) and EDGE X (5%) over the course
of 21 days in March and April 2012. As illustrated on Figure 4.2, the top 10 symbols
by a number of orders7 contain more than 30% of observations, with the next 40 symbols
contributing another 30%. Orders are submitted throughout the entire trading session and
our sample has 5,000 to 20,000 orders in each half-hour time interval between 9:30am and
4:00pm. Most orders are submitted by VWAP strategies (59%), followed by TWAP (31%)
and POV (9%). Only 35% of all orders are executed, and the rest is canceled. VWAP and
TWAP strategies generate orders with execution rates of 38% and 32% respectively. POV
strategies are supposedly less patient with their orders and only 26% of them are executed.
Most orders in our data are canceled (56-85% depending on a subsample) which has
important implications for the analysis of limit order execution delays. An order is canceled
6Specifically, we filtered out: orders placed behind NBBO prices (deep in the order book) and aggressive
orders; trade execution strategies other than TWAP, VWAP and POV; orders sent to alternative trading
venues, inverse exchanges and the NASDAQ PSX exchange (due to different order execution mechanics
there); orders sent to the National Stock Exchange (it had only 88 orders); trading dates with less than 1000
orders; orders sent during the first five and the last five minutes of trading; orders submitted to markets
with wide spreads (the NBBO spread ≥ 50 basis points at an order submission time); orders submitted
to markets with small queues (average NBB or NBO quote size < 1000 shares during 3 minutes before an
order submission); symbols with less than 200 orders in the full dataset or less than 50 orders in the filtered
dataset; orders whose lifetime at an exchange includes an anomalous burst of trading volume (defined as a
1-second time interval in the top 5% of 1-second intervals by volume for that stock, date and exchange).
7These stocks are MU, GLW, USB, TXN, CVS, ALTR, BAC, GT, COP, LOW.
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when its waiting time in a queue exceeds its patience deadline or when the cumulative
trading volume since its submission exceeds a threshold value. Orders are also canceled and
resubmitted when prices move away from them. Finally, since orders are sent to multiple
exchanges at the same time, an order can be canceled when its substitute order at a different
trading venue is filled. Regardless of cancelation motives, a hypothetical execution delay
of a canceled order (had it remained in its queue) is longer than its actual waiting time
until cancelation. In other words, a waiting time of an order until cancelation is a truncated
observation of its queueing delay until execution. Ex-post, orders with long execution delays
are canceled more frequently than orders with short delays, which can be observed in Table
4.5. Because of this selection bias, it would be incorrect to directly compare a theoretical
execution delay estimate for an infinitely patient order with a realized waiting time of a
canceled order. To avoid the bias we use four different methods to transform (un-censor)
waiting time observations of canceled orders.
First, we fit two parametric models - an exponential and a Pareto distribution to each
of 25 order subsamples defined by µi and Q¯i. These two distributions are convenient for
modeling censored execution delay data because they have non-negative support and are
memoryless8. The parameters of exponential or Pareto distribution can be directly esti-
mated from censored waiting time data Di, i = 1, . . . , N, as a fixed-point solution of a
corresponding E-M scheme. For an exponential distribution, we estimate for each sub-




i=I(g−1)+1Di, where E(g) is the number of
executed orders in subsample g and I(g) is the index of the last observation in sub-
sample g with I(0) = 0. For the Pareto distribution, we estimate its scale parameter
mˆg = min
I(g−1)+1<i≤I(g)








β2 + (I(g) − I(g − 1))β + E(g) = 0. After estimating these
distribution parameters separately for each group we use the memorylessness property again
and add a random variable drawn from a corresponding distribution to the waiting time of
each canceled order.
The other two un-censoring methods are based on a concept of maximum entropy (see
8If a delay D has an exponential distribution with a mean µ, then P(D > s+t|D > t;µ) = P(D > s;µ). If
it has a Pareto distribution with a scale parameter m and tail parameter α, then P(D > s+ t|D > t;m,α) =
P(D > s; t, α).
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e.g. [32]). The first method assumes a maximum entropy (uniform) distribution for the
length of time that each canceled order had to wait until execution, in excess of the time it
already spent in a queue. For each such order, this procedure replaces its waiting time with
a random variable, uniformly distributed between its waiting time until cancelation and an
observation-specific ceiling value Qi/µi. The second method finds a maximum entropy dis-
tribution for the entire dataset, subject to fractile constraints of the form P(Di > x) = y(x)
imposed by the censored data sample. We refer to [38] for a formulation of the maxi-
mum entropy distribution problem with fractile constraints. In short, this approach assigns
higher values to censored observations so that the resulting distribution of execution delays
satisfies fractile constraints and has the highest possible entropy. The maximum entropy
distribution has the least possible structure as measured by its descriptive complexity. Hav-
ing solved for the maximum entropy distribution, we then re-allocate censored observations
according to the solution, in addition restricting each un-censored point to be smaller than
Qi/µi. To prevent the power and maximum entropy distributions from assigning arbitrarily
large values to truncated observations we also impose a constraint that all execution delays
are smaller than 30 minutes. Histograms of the resulting execution delay distributions for
the entire sample are shown on Figure 4.5. We note substantial differences between some
of these histograms - the choice of an un-censoring methodology has a significant effect on
the overall distribution of data because a large share of data is censored. For this reason,
we view the output of four un-censoring procedures as four different samples of data and
test our model on each sample.
For each order i we numerically solve equations 4.6 and compute a delay forecast wi














that assume all orders in front of ours to be of type-1. We divide the




i=1 into equal-sized bins sorted by un-censored execution delays D
u
i ,




i , wi. If estimates were correct,
their averages should lie on a 45o line when plotted against average realized delays. These
plots together with 95% confidence intervals for average values are presented on Figures
4.5-4.5. We can observe that for delays Dui of 0-10 seconds all three forecasts systematically
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overestimate realized delays. A possible explanation is that short delays are experienced
when Qi is small relative to µi, i.e. when the volume of market orders is larger than the
queue size. This case cannot be reliably described by a fluid model which assumes that
on the contrary the queue size is large compared to order sizes, making fluid model-based
forecasts inadequate for short realized delays.
As realized delays become longer, single-type forecasts w1i seem to asymptote at around
60 seconds, even as the average delay Dui extends to several minutes. Estimates w
1
i assume
that all orders in the initial queue have a finite patience (belong to type-1) so even if the
initial queue Qi is large, most of them are expected to cancel, and therefore their presence
does not significantly increase the forecast w1i . Mathematically, this can be seen from the
expression for w1i (Qi) ∼ O(log(Qi)). On another hand, assuming that all orders in the
initial queue belong to type-2 (i.e. never cancel) leads to extremely long delay forecasts.
After all, some orders will cancel and realized delays are smaller than forecasts w0i .
For delays longer than 60 seconds, we see that two-type forecasts wi are closer to real-
ized delays, suggesting that a mixture of type-1 and type-2 orders better describes queue
dynamics in this range. Although none of three estimates gives a perfect fit, the comparison
seems to favor a model with a mixture of order types. We note that the aim of this com-
putation was to compare single-type models with a two-type model without fitting any of
them to the realized delay data. If we were to calibrate parameters (λi, γi, µi, fi) to realized
delays Dui we would a priori expect better performance from the model with heterogeneous
orders because it has more parameters than its single-type counterparts.
4.5 Conclusion
We propose a multiclass queueing model that describes the evolution of bid and ask quotes
in a limit order market. The model distinguishes between orders of fund managers that have
finite patience and orders of high-frequency traders that are driven by changes in the order
book state. Our model structurally explains long waiting times experienced by limit orders
in large queues and bursts of cancelations in small queues. It leads to qualitatively different
waiting time estimates that are closer to empirical measurements, and sheds light on the
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composition of order queues in limit order markets. Our analysis is one of the first steps in
the direction of reconciling naive “zero-intelligence” stochastic models of limit order books
with more detailed economic models from the market microstructure literature, and it also
motivates a new class of queueing models for studying service systems for heterogeneous
























































































Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for order data
Subsample Average parameter values Mean waiting % of executed Mean bid-ask Number
number Qi µi λi γi fi time (sec) orders spread (bp) of stocks
1 342 2 22 0.156 1.171 32 34% 4.16 235
2 366 4 31 0.281 1.723 28 37% 3.99 238
3 396 8 57 0.372 1.144 26 38% 4.08 238
4 421 15 77 0.498 1.269 26 36% 4.01 235
5 453 38 127 0.741 1.351 27 38% 4.21 206
6 942 4 50 0.134 1.241 31 34% 4.25 238
7 954 10 78 0.228 1.393 27 36% 4.03 244
8 977 18 120 0.312 1.335 28 38% 4.04 235
9 1000 29 158 0.388 1.136 26 39% 4.17 229
10 1038 70 275 0.665 1.334 24 42% 3.87 210
11 2163 6 98 0.114 1.443 35 31% 4.29 237
12 2197 16 143 0.190 1.755 31 38% 4.13 223
13 2219 28 172 0.280 1.811 28 38% 4.06 225
14 2320 48 296 0.302 1.230 26 40% 3.97 226
15 2391 126 600 0.678 1.298 22 43% 3.85 209
16 6199 6 133 0.064 1.459 44 25% 5.39 214
17 5797 22 240 0.109 1.264 35 31% 5.07 207
18 5772 44 353 0.156 1.171 33 35% 4.82 215
19 6015 78 466 0.233 1.423 30 35% 5.16 204
20 6472 187 986 0.450 1.504 25 41% 4.43 182
21 49285 3 339 0.021 1.325 59 17% 8.20 149
22 41533 20 509 0.038 1.289 47 18% 7.94 172
23 45579 57 984 0.066 1.520 44 24% 7.59 178
24 46354 134 1523 0.130 1.512 38 29% 6.73 171




























































































































































































































Figure 4.7: Average delay estimates and forecasts, based on the maximum entropy uncensoring.
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